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Résumé 
Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque 
la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal 
déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables 
intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en 
déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états 
secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des 
négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur 
point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes 
d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié 
dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux 
pressions du plus fort.   
L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, 
les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau 
international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas 
toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique 
étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié 
dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. 
L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique 
ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et 
étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances 
militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte 
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sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les 
États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et 
contraintes systémiques.    
Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de 
l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode 
comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la 
réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 
2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer 
dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé 
du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui 
ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire.    
 
Mots-clés : Relations internationales, sécurité internationale, coopération militaire, 
alliances militaires, politique étrangère et de défense, interventions militaires 
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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its 
special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military 
cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and 
military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary 
states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, 
international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on 
special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. 
My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but 
they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. 
The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between 
allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when 
disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily 
dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the 
dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. 
they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a 
politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. 
To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I 
introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the 
interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to 
alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond 
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to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled 
through state-level variables.  
To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and 
domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with 
three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies 
regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The 
decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and 
measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The 
case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the 
war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003. 
 
Keywords: International relations, international security, military cooperation, military 
alliances, foreign and defence policy, military intervention 
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Introduction 
There has been much controversy surrounding the United States’ decision to go to 
war against Iraq in 2003. The overwhelming support exhibited by the United States’ allies, 
immediately following September 11, began to unravel over the course of 2002 and did not 
recover during George W. Bush’s second term. The process leading to war was closely 
scrutinized by the international community in what turned out to be a public trial of 
American legitimacy. Throughout this trying period, however, the survival of these alliance 
relationships was not at stake. In hindsight, it appears that no long-term damage was 
inflicted on the United States’ web of alliances. The central puzzle is why Canada, the UK 
and Australia, the closest American allies, participate in some US-led wars, but not others. 
What determines the nature and scope of their military commitments? Why is their 
behaviour so unpredictable when these states rely on, thrive under, and support American 
leadership? This project addresses these questions by investigating the UK, Canada and 
Australia’s level of participation when contemplating military cooperation with the United 
States after September 11, 2001. 
Despite the resilience of Western alliances, the diversity of state responses to the 
American-led War on Terror is perplexing, especially in light of the power differentials 
between the United States and its allies. At first glance, it could be assumed that this 
asymmetry would impose powerful constraints on allies to act in step with US plans. The 
reality is far more complex. If we look at the period since the end of World War II, there 
have been several examples of close allies acting autonomously to the detriment of their 
more powerful ally, the US. For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of 
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State Dean Rusk failed in their bid to get allies to rally behind them in Vietnam with their 
More Flags campaign. Canada and Britain, countries that have closely tied their foreign 
policy to the American grand strategy, did not contribute a single pair of boots to the 
Vietnam effort, while Australia sent a force of 50 000. Looking at the recent past, Australia 
did not make a military contribution during the war in Kosovo in 1999 and Canada opted 
out of the Iraq War in 2003. Power differentials in themselves are important but we need to 
consider how asymmetry interacts with other factors to explain this variation in behaviour. 
Non-western allies appear to be driven by short-term strategic imperatives when lending 
support to the United States, as demonstrated by South Korea or the Republic of China’s 
participation in the Vietnam War. The alliance relationship was primarily defined by 
regional security concerns but did not result in close security integration. Traditional allies, 
however, are set apart by longer-term strategic imperatives, as their institutional 
arrangements are far reaching and deeply entrenched and because there are strong common 
historical and cultural ties linking these states. 
In the field of International Relations (IR), alliances have been presented as devices 
for strong states to control, or manage, secondary powers.1 This feature of alliance 
dynamics has most often been discussed in the context of alliance creation. This concern is 
present at different levels of interaction, from bilateral meetings between states to 
multilateral settings, such as the United Nations. Through diverse fora, the pressures of 
                                                 
1 Christopher Gelpi, “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control” in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (eds), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 107-139. This argument was introduced in Paul Schroeder, 
“Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management” in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical 
Problems of National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 247-286. 
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asymmetry weigh heavily on the relationship between allies, but in more subtle ways than 
acknowledged by arguments dealing with alliances as tools of control. When combined 
with other factors, power asymmetry is expected to account for a significant portion of 
alliance dynamics. Although a common phenomenon, not much has been written on 
asymmetric security cooperation. Moreover, the explanations offered to account for the 
impact of asymmetry on alliance relationships tend to be case specific. 
This dissertation addresses the interactions and decision-making processes leading 
to military cooperation so as to understand the behaviour of long-standing alliance partners. 
By studying the United States’ closest allies, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, 
my goal is to develop a theory of foreign policy which will account for allied contributions 
in times of war. Central to this task is to identify how these allies, through various 
strategies, attempt to benefit from their interactions with their powerful partner, the United 
States. I argue that alliance expectations are fundamental in determining military 
commitments. Special allies must balance US expectations against domestic constraints, 
defined as the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities.  
The United States and its Allies 
The UK, Canada, and Australia all consider the United States as their most important 
bilateral partner. The relationship between the United States and these closest alliance 
partners is asymmetric by all material indicators of power. This relationship is also deeply 
institutionalized and characterized by a history of integrated military cooperation, through 
interoperability, common military exercises and intelligence sharing. Among asymmetric 
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allies there are major structural differences, however, based on underlying disparities in 
their power capabilities and global interests, as will be discussed in the case studies. 
  The United States, for its part, has the status of a superpower and ambitions to 
match. A dominant state in the international system, the U.S. has the capacity to project its 
power across different regions of the world. This trend evolved from the Second World 
War, when American interests shifted in a definitive way from the regional to the global 
realm. Global interests then translated to a more expansive definition of what could 
constitute a threat to the United States. As Knorr states, commenting on this historical 
juncture: “American security was now seen as requiring a particular world order which 
could be maintained only by the global commitment of American power to the preservation 
of the status quo.”2 Moreover, while the United States focuses on its many international 
responsibilities on the global stage, secondary states can work to advance their case in 
bilateral negotiations by investing more time and effort in them than their more powerful 
ally. In international economic negotiations, for example, the United States may concede 
more easily to demands made by their allies. Do asymmetric advantages also apply to high 
security issues? The United States is arguably more responsive to the management of 
international security issues which challenge its systemic predominance. 
The United States, as a leading power in the international system, has a stake in the 
status quo and is sensitive to international threats directed against its higher global power 
position. This corresponds to the well-established realist notion that as a state’s relative 
                                                 
2 Klaus Knorr, “Threat Perception” in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security 
Problems (Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), 93. 
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power expands, so will its interests.3 The United States has consolidated its position of 
primacy in the international system with the end of the Cold War. More than ever, 
American power has extended its reach across regions. American pre-eminence carries a 
burden, as the United States must also address threats internationally, alone or with alliance 
partners. Walt argues that international threats are evaluated according to other states’ 
material capabilities, their geographic proximity, the capacity for offensive power and 
overall aggressive intentions.4 I argue that the perception of threat is in the eye of the 
beholder and is strongly influenced by a state’s relative power. In other words, not all 
states, even allied states, perceive threats similarly given asymmetric capabilities. 
Perceptions of threats certainly converge at the moment of alliance creation but are re-
evaluated over time. Even if the alliance endures and becomes institutionalized, allies will 
have individual assessments of threat that may or may not be shared, or considered in the 
same order of priority, by their alliance partners. Secondary states respond to threats in their 
immediate region but leave international burdens to the initiative of the dominant power. 
As such, secondary states rely on the United States for international threat assessments, and 
are guided by alliance requirements when responding to them. 
                                                 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Paul Kennedy, The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (New York: 
Random House, 1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). This argument is consistent with various strands of realism, from classical realism, to structural 
realism and neorealism. 
4 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Walt’s argument is similar 
but distinct from the argument made in Waltz, Theory of International Politics in that states are said to 
balance against threat, rather than power alone. As such, the assessment of another state’s aggressive 
intentions is crucial in evaluating the seriousness of the threat posed by another state. 
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In other words, for allies, the weight of American actions structures their foreign 
policy options to a considerable extent. Given the presence of overlapping security 
institutions between the United States and its closest allies, actions undertaken by the 
dominant state in the alliance has repercussions for all other partners. The new orientation 
in American foreign and defence policy following September 11 changed the basic 
parameters of military cooperation, with a marked preference for coalition-based 
cooperation rather than the more multilateral approach favoured in the 1990’s. It initiated 
two wars, inviting allies to join in the Coalition. The allies’ responses have been varied. 
The focus here is on special allies, as they have most to gain or lose by going along with 
American plans. I will establish parameters to examine the theoretical puzzle presented by 
asymmetric military cooperation by elaborating on the literature in IR and alliance theory. 
Beyond these observations, how can we systematize our understanding of asymmetric 
alliance interactions? 
The Literature 
In order to understand asymmetric alliances, it seems crucial to recognize that, given 
substantial power differentials, two allies might not be prone to the same insecurities. By 
focusing on the internal dynamics of asymmetric alliances, my goal is to address the 
following questions: Under what conditions will secondary states contribute to military 
cooperation to pursue allied goals? What types of strategies can secondary states pursue in 
such situations? 
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This dissertation will study these questions, while investigating three of the United 
States’ closest allies: the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, since 2001. The period 
from 9/11 to the beginning of the War in Iraq in 2003 is significant because it is rich in 
allied interactions. Beyond these watershed events, the goal is to uncover alliance patterns 
that are telling of the bilateral and multilateral security arrangements which tie these states 
together and are brought to the fore when the status quo has been shattered. It has been 
argued that the George W. Bush administration stands apart from previous administrations 
and may be unique in its management of foreign and defence policy during both terms. 
Kupchan and Trubowitz describe a broadly held perception that “…the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy is an aberration and that the United States’ commitment to 
the formula of liberal internationalism – U.S. power plus international cooperation – will be 
restored after Bush leaves office”.5 This may be true but the significance of this period for 
the study of asymmetric security cooperation is not undermined. The interaction of the US 
and its allies during this important time in history transcends the particularities of the Bush 
administration. If anything, periods of disagreements between the United States and its 
allies highlight how divergent expectations can be reconciled under conditions of 
asymmetry. 
When looking at the United States’ closest allies, I argue that their level of military 
cooperation with the United States is determined by alliance expectations and domestic 
constraints, defined as the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities. 
                                                 
5 Charles A. Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the 
United States”, International Security 32, 2 (2007), 7-44. 
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Because special allies look to their dominant alliance partner for international leadership, 
they strongly rely on US expectations when pledging their political and military support. At 
the same time, state leaders are sensitive to domestic constraints, as these structure the type 
and scope of their alliance commitment. Stated differently, special allies are inclined to 
favour US requests for assistance due to the close nature of their security relationship, but 
are limited in the commitments they can make: military capabilities determine the scope of 
military cooperation, while the level of government cohesion influences the implementation 
of the commitment, as a measure of political feasibility. This is reminiscent of the two-level 
game, where states balance allied and domestic expectations in international negotiation.6 
The main argument illustrates how secondary states must pursue a foreign and defence 
policy that strikes the right balance between alliance requirements and domestic 
considerations. In other words, the UK, Canada and Australia must fulfill American 
expectations in a politically and militarily feasible way. How has the literature in 
International Relations (IR) addressed the question of military cooperation under conditions 
of asymmetry? 
 The IR literature on alliance theory can be broadly classified according to the three 
dominant schools in the field: realism, liberalism and constructivism. A more detailed 
discussion of individual theories will follow in the next chapter. The realist literature 
suggests that alliances are ruled by existing power differentials.7 To the extent that realism 
                                                 
6 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization 42, 3 (1988), 427-461. 
7 This argument is consistent across different variants: classical realism, structural realism, neorealism and 
neoclassical realism. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
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discusses the relationship between asymmetric alliance partners, the argument is that the 
dominant power in the alliance will generally dictate the conditions of cooperation without 
upsetting the balance of capabilities between partners.8 However, in terms of specifying the 
conditions under which the secondary partners can manifest greater autonomy, other 
theories fare better in explaining intra-alliance dynamics.  
For example, theories of systemic change represent a more persuasive argument 
associated with realist thinking. The bipolar distribution of power during the Cold War was 
represented by two blocs, each consisting of a superpower and its supporting states. This 
structure allowed for little flexibility, as the Soviet Union and the United States invested 
heavily in countervailing alliances.9 With the bipolar competition no longer being a guiding 
principle of American foreign policy, US military interventions and their size are still 
influenced by its national interests, regional considerations, and capabilities, but are also 
confronted with more diverse international threats.10 This unipolar distribution of power, it 
is argued, makes alliances more fluid and their decision-making more context dependent.11 
This is arguably correct if the goal is to explain the presence or absence of military 
                                                                                                                                                    
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; John J. Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Randall L. Schweller, 
Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006). 
8 Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 47. 
9 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
10 Benjamin Miller, “The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era”, Contemporary 
Security Policy 19, 3 (1998), 72-109. 
11 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, “Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War”, 
International Organization 48, 1 (1994), 39-75. 
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cooperation but this macro-level explanation cannot account for the scope of particular 
commitments. 
 Turning to the liberal school in IR, the literature on international institutions is 
particularly relevant in providing insights on intra-alliance dynamics. Referring to the US-
Canada alliance specifically, Keohane and Nye reject the realist account for making sense 
of the asymmetric relationship.12 By identifying cases where Canada was able to secure 
better outcomes than the US, liberal institutionalism makes the point that secondary powers 
can influence powerful alliance partners through institutions.13 International institutions can 
enhance the role of secondary powers in the system by allowing states to act collectively.14 
Although institutions can be leveraged by weaker states, the dominant power can choose to 
act outside of these institutional frameworks. My argument does not discount the 
importance of international institutions but presents them as enablers of autonomy-
enhancing strategies on behalf of allied states when attempting to gain leverage with the 
United States, rather than as an independent variable when evaluating allied levels of 
military cooperation. International institutions are instrumental to both dominant and 
secondary states in their strategies to manage their alliance partners. 
                                                 
12 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd Edition (New York: Longman, 
2001). 
13 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. 
Wallander, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
14 Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”, International 
Organization 23, 2 (1969), 291-310. See also Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967) and David Vital, The Inequality of States (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967). 
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 Finally, the contribution of constructivism to the debate on asymmetric security 
cooperation is tied to the consideration of non-material and ideational variables in crafting 
explanations for alliance behaviour. The constructivist thesis on security communities 
offers a plausible explanation as to why there is an absence of violent conflict between 
long-standing allies due to a “shared sense of community”.15 Even when allies have 
competing interests, the relationship is held together by the community. We can thus 
identify patterns of cooperative behaviour and explain how these are strengthened through 
iterated practice. However, in this case as well, explaining non-cooperative outcomes 
presents a challenge.  
Arguments on strategic culture are also useful to the extent that they highlight 
longstanding trends in foreign policy, and examine the interaction between the government 
and public opinion in defining the role of a state’s armed forces.16 I intend to control for 
these important variables by selecting cases that are similar in this respect. Indeed, by 
focusing on states that belong to the so-called Anglosphere, we can assume that cultural 
variables are not crucial to the difference in outcomes, namely the level of participation to 
military cooperation with the United States.17 
From this brief introduction of the IR literature on alliances, we can make the 
following observations. The appeal of realism is its appreciation of relative power and 
                                                 
15 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 333. 
16 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, International Security 19, 4 (1995), 32-64. 
17 For a discussion on the uses of the term anglosphere, see James Bennett, “American and the West: The 
Emerging Anglosphere”, Orbis 46, 1 (2002), 111-126. 
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systemic constraints in structuring alliance relationships. To explain variation in military 
cooperation between allies, the neoclassical variant, discussed in the next section, may be 
most helpful since it considers domestic factors as well, such as state structure, elite 
perceptions, state-society interactions, etc. Liberalism, especially the literature which 
focuses on the role of international institutions, may be ill-fitted for the research question at 
hand. Allied contributions are certainly negotiated through the use of institutions, but 
ultimately, governments decide on the scope and size of their military commitments and 
finalize these commitments bilaterally with the United States. There is thus a strong 
rationale for including domestic-level variables in the analysis. Finally, constructivism may 
explain the endurance of certain military alliances better than any other framework, but 
focuses on the variables that are controlled for in the analysis: identity, culture, and a 
legacy of established security practices. 
The Argument 
My argument is built on three central claims: First, power asymmetries between allies can 
translate into different assessments of international threats. In other words, relative power 
capabilities largely determine the importance of security threats. States that have different 
power capabilities may not rank threats in the same order of priority. Second, when 
disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily 
dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Through various devices and strategies, 
states of secondary rank can act autonomously when dealing with a dominant partner. 
Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when 
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confronting major foreign policy decisions, i.e. there is a trade-off between establishing a 
credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing 
domestic audience costs. To overcome this fundamental trade-off, secondary states appeal 
to strategies in order to minimize the impact of the chosen course of action. If the decision 
favours the alliance over domestic factors, certain strategies, such as appealing to principle 
or lessening the visibility of the commitment, can minimize the negative impacts of the 
decision. If a state turns down an alliance partner because of domestic factors, there are 
different types of strategies to minimize the damages to the alliance such as offering a 
financial contribution or promising a future commitment, when engagement is less 
controversial. Secondary states must carefully balance the United States’ expectations and 
domestic constraints when contemplating military cooperation. 
Given their special status and considering their strategic linkages with the United 
States; the UK, Canada and Australia have structural pressures which favour their 
following the American lead in high security issues. There are certainly important 
implications from opting out of military cooperation when their security is so intertwined. 
Their foreign and defence policy statements invariably prioritize the American alliance as 
vital to their security. The fact that there is so much variation in the levels of participation 
deserves further investigation as standard explanations relying on coercion or conformism 
through dependence (realist), institutional cooperation (liberal) and shared values 
(constructivist) cannot fully account for such intra-alliance dynamics.  
To make sense of asymmetric alliances, I will build on neoclassical realism’s 
argument that perception of threats is “shaped by one’s relative material power,” but that 
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domestic-level variables complete the equation.18 This type of analysis allows for research 
questions on foreign policy decisions rather than on international outcomes. Drawing on the 
scholarly work in IR, it can be argued that the parameters of allied interactions are 
primarily determined by systemic conditions. However, specific alliance decisions can only 
be understood by referring to interactions at the state level as well. Thus, it is possible to 
reconcile IR theory and foreign policy theory, through different sets of questions. In other 
words, systemic factors are made intelligible by the calculations and perceptions of political 
leaders, as their capabilities set clear constraints on what they can undertake and the kinds 
of threats they can pursue beyond their borders. 
To correct this over-reliance on systemic factors, which is one of the main 
shortcomings of neorealist thinking, neoclassical realism focuses on the interaction between 
systemic and domestic variables. As Lobell and his co-authors remind us, long-term trends 
in the international system are well explained by system-level variables, but are generally 
insufficient in dealing with specific policy decisions.19 This approach challenges us to delve 
into how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables, a central concern 
for this research. While neoclassical realist authors are primarily concerned with how 
contemporary great powers formulate grand strategy, my research focuses on state 
behaviour between allies, by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in 
times of threat. 
                                                 
18 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics 51, 1 (1998), 150. 
19 Ibid. 
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In this research, I focus on two main questions: first, how states appraise 
international threats, and second, what happens when disagreements arise over which 
threats to respond to.20 Threat perception is an important starting point, an underlying 
variable, but secondary states must sometimes choose which threats to prioritize and devote 
resources to. They do so based on alliance expectations and the desire to enhance their 
bilateral alliance with the United States. There are also constraints at the domestic level that 
set limits on the types of ventures allies can undertake. How allies respond to American 
expectations, or perceived expectations, is at the heart of the decision-making process. This 
explanation is thus located at both the systemic and domestic levels. Furthermore, while 
focusing on asymmetric alliances, I also investigate the types of strategies on which 
secondary states rely when dealing with the dominant alliance partner. My contention is 
that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively but they can act 
autonomously and resist pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner, or at least 
mitigate the impact of doing so as not to damage the alliance relationship. 
Case Selection and Methodology 
To further investigate the link between threat perception, alliance expectations and 
domestic constraints, this study will rely on the method of structured focused comparison 
with three detailed case studies. The chosen case studies are the UK, Canada and 
Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, during the period from 
                                                 
20 Steve E. Lobell, Norrin P. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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2001 to 2003 when the initial military commitments were made for both missions. The case 
selection is discussed at length in the third chapter. In terms of primary sources of data, 
references will be made to the many publicly available government documents, which are 
supplemented with information collected through in-depth interviews with officials from 
Foreign Affairs and Defence in each of the three case study countries. The focus is on the 
initial decision made by these allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint 
mobilization with the United States and on the explanatory factors which motivated the 
commitment of troops. These decisions are inherently political and do not reflect the 
complexity of the allied interactions which follow be it in cases of military cooperation or 
non-participation. The analysis will go beyond the presence or absence of military 
cooperation to evaluate the level of military cooperation.  
By targeting the UK, Canada and Australia, the focus is on the United States’ 
special allies. In terms of military cooperation, no other states share such closely integrated 
security arrangements, from intelligence sharing to the use of interoperable military 
hardware. The UK, Canada, and Australia are ideal subjects for comparison because they 
are all parliamentary democracies and have a close historical, cultural and linguistic bond. 
Their domestic institutions are similar and the decision-making on national security issues 
is largely the prerogative of the executive. As such, certain domestic variables can be 
controlled for in the analysis, such as the nature of the political system.21 Other factors can 
mitigate the effects of asymmetry as well. The challenge will reside in identifying the 
                                                 
21 The UK, Canada and Australia are parliamentary democracies. 
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specific ways in which asymmetry is altered and under what conditions. For example, long-
term partners engaged in a cooperative relationship have built-in incentives to reach 
agreements on certain issues: “relationships imposed by geography or strategy add 
supplementary interests to the negotiated stakes, equalizing power, and limiting its 
asymmetrical exercise”.22 
Given what was outlined in this section, this is a most-similar research design, 
where the UK, Canada, and Australia are similar in most respects but for the explanatory 
variables, with variance on the dependent variable.23 The dependent variable, the level of 
participation in military cooperation with the United States varies along a continuum: non-
participation, political support with no troops, minimal military contribution and full 
military cooperation.  
Conclusion 
Special security relationships are epitomized as models for security cooperation.24 
However, perceptions of threats are sometimes greatly divergent between the United States 
and its allies. They may also hold different views on threat response. In other words, both 
threat perceptions and responses to perceived threats vary. As the leading power in the 
international system, the United States is concerned with staying on top of the game. This is 
                                                 
22 I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation”, in I. William 
Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
2002), 288. 
23 Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and theory in Political Science”, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby 
(eds), Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137. 
24 This is true in regards to the literature on complex interdependence and on security communities, as 
referred to in the first section. 
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expressed by its continued efforts to project power across the globe despite the formidable 
costs entailed. In contrast, weaker powers, with no hegemonic ambitions, might not be so 
bold in terms of their foreign and defence policy. Thus, military initiatives are mostly 
driven by the stronger power. Under such circumstances, allied countries rely principally on 
US expectations when deciding on military commitments.  
The next chapter is a review of the literature on alliances, with particular emphasis 
on asymmetric security cooperation. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework. It 
focuses on the decision-making matrix of secondary states when dealing with a dominant 
alliance partner and argues that there is a fundamental trade-off between alliance 
requirements and domestic constraints. Comparative case studies, drawing on the UK, 
Canada and Australia’s foreign and defence policy since 9/11 are presented to test the 
argument in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Qualitative data were generated through interviews, 
official documents and a variety of secondary sources. The conclusion includes a summary 
of the argument based on the research project’s main findings. The discussion is also 
broadened to include avenues for future research and policy implications. 
 
 
 
 
  
-1- 
Asymmetric Alliances in International Relations 
Although inter-state alliances are quite diverse in their manifestations, they largely 
are created for defensive purposes: addressing a security threat. Once created, alliances 
evolve and may outlive the threats which motivated their creation. Specific intra-alliance 
patterns of behaviour emerge over time. How do we uncover these patterns? In this chapter, 
I will review the literature in International Relations (IR) that deals with the topic of 
asymmetric alliances to see how we can make sense of state behaviour within the 
framework of a long-standing alliance. 
This topic is made more complex by the diversity of alliance relationships. Not only 
is the literature biased in favour of alliance formation, but the main focus seems to be on 
great power alliances, which account only for a smaller portion of alliance interactions.25  
Indeed, a great number of alliances, like those led by the United States, are characterized by 
power asymmetries. As Zartman and Rubin mention, “… they [asymmetrical cases] 
correspond to the nature of international relations, where the number of asymmetrical 
encounters vastly exceeds more symmetrical relations; and second, these cases tend to be 
                                                 
25 The literature on alliance formation is too large to be properly cited in a footnote. For a sample, see 
Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and tools of Management”; Jack Levy, “Alliance 
Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 
25 (1981), 581-613; Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The 
Case of Egypt, 1962-73”, International Organization 45, 3 (1991), 369-395; Douglas M. Gibler and John A. 
Vasquez, “Uncovering Dangerous Alliance, 1495-1980”, International Studies Quarterly 42, 4 (1998), 785-
807; Kathy L. Powers, “Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances”, International Interactions 30, 4 
(2004), 373-395.  
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the most theoretically interesting cases”.26  At first glance, power assymetries would appear 
to have a huge impact on the nature of the security relationship. How can the weaker 
partner hope to gain when dealing with the stronger partner, or is compliance the only 
option? 
A more optimistic segment of the literature, dealing with security communities, 
presents certain defense arrangements in terms of the actualization of common interests or 
the achievement, over time, of a consensus in terms of security planning between the 
partners involved.27 This argument provides a compelling explanation for the absence of 
war in certain regions, but does not deal specifically with alliance dynamics. Thomas Risse 
combines both constructivist and institutionalist approaches by making the case that 
because of their interdependence and their shared values, war between Western allies is 
unthinkable.28 In both versions of the argument, the theoretical claims stress the importance 
of relationships and practices built over the long term. For example, the United States-
Canada relationship has evolved as a partnership built on “formal equality, consensus 
building, and a great deal of informal contact.”29 However, a recurring tension for the 
secondary partner engaged in asymmetric security cooperation exists: Do such agreements 
                                                 
26 I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation”, in I. 
William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 2002), 22. 
27 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, 
and Pathologies of International Organizations”, International Organization 53, 4 (1999), 699-732. 
28 Thomas Risse, “U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community”, in John Ikenberry (ed.) America Unrivaled: 
The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 260-283. 
29 Dwight N. Mason, “The Canadian-American North American Defence Alliance in 2005”, International 
Journal 60, 2 (2005), 386. 
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enhance its sovereignty through increased security, or threaten its sovereignty by 
surrendering autonomy to the stronger partner.30 
In order to understand the asymmetric alliance dynamic, it seems crucial to 
recognize that, given substantial power differentials, two allies might not be prone to the 
same insecurities, even when they have overlapping interests. Secondary states must adjust 
to actions undertaken by the dominant alliance partner as it responds to international 
threats. The goal of this chapter is to address the topic of asymmetric alliances through 
different theoretical perspectives in IR and to evaluate their potential for explaining 
asymmetric security cooperation. I will review the merits of various theoretical frameworks 
in IR, namely neorealism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism in order to understand 
asymmetric alliance behaviour. The literature on international economic cooperation is also 
introduced, with some important insights about asymmetric security cooperation. 
Asymmetry in Security Studies 
  The dynamics of asymmetry have been well explored in the context of conflict and 
war. A scan of the literature will reveal that we have a better understanding of asymmetry 
between opponents than we do for allies. The general expectation when examining how 
weaker states behave is that there are strong constraints on what they can undertake, given 
their asymmetric capabilities. However, the historical record shows that weaker states can 
overcome such constraints through different means.  
                                                 
30 Nils Ørvik, “The Basic Issue in Canadian National Security: Defence Against Help/Defence to Help 
Others”, Canadian Defence Quarterly 11, 1 (1981), 3-7. 
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Paul looks at the perplexing empirical occurrence of war initiated by weaker 
states.31 He argues that a state, despite considerable disadvantages in overall material 
strength, may instigate a war if specific conditions are present: the possibility of opting for 
a fait accompli strategy (as opposed to initiating an open-ended war or war of attrition); 
possessing mighty offensive weapons; having powerful allies, and finally; favourable 
domestic conditions. Paul argues that, although these considerations are important for war 
initiation by great powers as well, they are more significant for weaker powers. Certain 
findings from this work may be relevant for asymmetric alliances: how specific strategies 
can be used by weaker states to overcome a condition of asymmetry.  
Arreguin-Toft also explores the problem of asymmetry, but he is particularly 
interested in outcomes where the weak defeat the strong.32 His explanation stresses that the 
choice of strategy matters more than power. His account of strategic interaction posits that 
when the strong actor and weak actor follow different approaches, the outcome is likely to 
favour the weak actor. When they follow the same strategy, the strong will probably 
prevail. In other words, opposite military strategies increase the likelihood of the weak 
winning the confrontation. Weaker states appear more successful when opting for a niche 
strategy. Arguably, weaker states committed to an asymmetric alliance can level the 
playing field through strategies of their own. 
                                                 
31 T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). See also, Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict”, World Politics 27, 2 (1975), 181. 
32 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). See also Mack, “Why Big nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict”. 
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The literature on asymmetric security cooperation, though scarce, has generally 
depicted the tendency of the weaker partner to pursue reactive defensive policies driven by 
its ties to the stronger state. In a sense, the theoretical literature on alliances and empirical 
findings on asymmetric alliances naturally intersect. What is common to both segments 
(theoretical and case-specific literature) is that they focus on watershed moments, mainly 
alliance creation, but say little about how the alliance relationship matures.  
A pervasive idea is that the weaker power must carefully manage the alliance 
because the stronger partner has a tendency to act unilaterally.33 Within alliances, however, 
we witness events where some players demonstrate considerable autonomy with regards to 
foreign and defence policy. There is evidence to suggest that the security relationship is 
more complex than is illustrated by the “reactive defense” thesis, which states that, if a 
weaker alliance partner fails to provide for his own security in a way that is satisfactory to 
the dominant alliance partner, the latter will impose his standards on the weaker partner.34  
Neorealism 
Mainstream IR theories have also addressed the topic of asymmetric alliances. For its part, 
the realist school suggests that alliances are ruled by existing power differentials. 
Moreover, several realist theories presuppose that the dominant power in the alliance will 
dictate the conditions of cooperation without upsetting the balance of capabilities between 
                                                 
33 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign 
Affairs 78, 2 (1999), 35-50. See essay by Gary Willis, “Bully of the Free World”, 50-59 in the same issue. 
34 Nils Ørvik, “Defence against Help: A Strategy for Small States?”, Survival 15, 5 (1973), 228-231. 
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partners. Concerns over relative gains are cited as the main impediment to cooperation.35 
Realist authors offer rationalist predictions about burden-sharing between allies, arguing 
that military cooperation with allies is a function of cost-benefit calculations.36  
A change in the security environment may also have an impact. Authors such as 
David Skidmore argue that the end of the Cold War has lessened key allies’ dependence on 
the US for their security.37 For instance, decreasing international tensions permitted 
European states to distance themselves from the unilateralist turn exhibited by the United 
States in the conduct of its War on Terror. Indeed, the realist view sees the security 
environment as an important influence on the amount of pressure the alliance leader would 
exert on its smaller allies. Such constraints would be especially strong during the Cold War, 
given the bipolar structure.38 During the Cold War, it is fairly obvious that there was a 
structural divide which polarized the broadly conceived East/West geographical divide. For 
the West, the chief threat was Communism, personified by the Soviet Union. As such, 
anticommunism served as a broad framework for Western foreign policy, internalized by 
the United States and its allies.  
                                                 
35 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-
Tariff Barriers to Trade, 47; Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”, 
American Political Science Review 85 (1991), 710-726. 
36 Miller, “The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions in the post-Cold War Era”. 
37 David Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy”, Foreign Policy Analysis 2 
(2005), 207-228. 
38 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Stephen Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse”, World Politics 
39, 1 (1997), 156-179. 
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The end of the Cold War is often seen as a significant marker in assessing alliance 
performance.39 No longer bound by the constraints of bipolarity, special allies have a new 
window of opportunity to assert their independence from the United States and to push for 
international pre-eminence with a new foreign policy agenda.40 There was a period of 
transition in the 1990’s where the challenges of weak states and unstable dictatorships 
preoccupied Western nations, but not in the sense of being the potential targets for 
aggression. No existential threat dominated the conduct of international security at that 
time. This, of course, was altered by the events of September 11, which ushered in a new 
unifying theme, namely the War on Terror.  
Under this banner, one could finally funnel all the disparate threats which had 
plagued the post-Cold War order: they were asymmetric in nature, difficult to locate and 
proliferated in weak or stateless societies. A main enemy was identifiable once again since 
terrorism was personified by al-Qaeda and terrorist-harboring countries. This unifying 
theme, heavily focused on terror, has been in flux since September 11 and can clearly be 
seen as defining the parameters of American foreign and defence policy. However, the 
absence of a near-peer, clearly identifiable foe should make the alliance more flexible, as 
the currently unchallenged dominant power is more secure in its preeminence. Some 
                                                 
39 John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War”, International Security 
17, 3 (1992-93), 5-58. 
40 Nicholas Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada’s Response to the Yugoslav Crisis 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 78. 
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scholars have even charged realist theories with failure, as the absence of hard balancing 
became one of the realizations of the 1990’s.41  
The era of American primacy, whether hegemonic, imperial, unipolar or multipolar, 
has stimulated much scholarly attention in an attempt to explain the logic of American 
intervention in the world. While structural realists as Kenneth Waltz argue that such 
unbalanced configurations of power are likely to provoke balancing and are ultimately 
unstable, others, like Walt and Wohlforth, maintain that the gap between the United States 
and other powers is so vast that the current order is likely to endure for some time.42 
Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism posits “unbalanced multipolarity” as the least 
stable power configuration where there is a gap between the most powerful state, the 
potential hegemon, and the next state in line.43 There is no consensus on the relationship 
between polarity and the stability of the international system. As a basic claim, it is 
reasonable to state that the United States is the most powerful state in the system militarily 
and economically, and that it is currently unchallenged.44 
                                                 
41 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, International 
Organization 48, 2 (1994), 249-277. For a more in-depth discussion on the applicability of the balance of 
power concept in the post-Cold War context, see T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds), 
Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
42 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic 
Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000; Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global 
Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); William C. Wohlforth, “The 
Stability of a Unipolar World”, International Security 24, 1 (1999), 5-41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. 
Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
43 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 45. 
44 More than 20 years of American unipolarity has disconfirmed the early predictions of realists, immediately 
after the end of the Cold War. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International 
Security 25, 1 (2000), 5-41; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”, American Political Science Review 91, 
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Arguments on soft balancing bring nuance to this claim, suggesting that states 
engage in balancing behaviour against the United States by using non-military means. Paul 
defines soft balancing as “…the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, 
especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the 
United States goes beyond its stated goals,” citing the military interventions in Kosovo in 
1999 and Iraq in 2003 as such cases.45 Since potential near-peer competitors such as Russia 
and China, and second-tier major powers perceive the United States as a constrained 
hegemon, hard balancing does not appeal to these states as a necessary response to 
American preponderance.46 In the absence of hard balancing, these states can impose costs 
on the use of American power through soft balancing.47  
The Iraq War is often used as an example of soft balancing. Close US allies not only 
failed to provide political support for the invasion, but actively sought to constrain 
American actions. Countries, like Germany and France, appealed to the UN to oppose the 
United States’ position, employing fiery political rhetoric meant for their domestic 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 (1997): 913-917; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International 
Security 18, 2 (1993), 44-79; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War”, International Security 15, 1 (1990), 5-56; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great 
Power Will Rise”, International Security 17, 4 (1993), 5-51 and his updated article “The Unipolar Illusion 
Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar moment”, International Security 31, 2 (2006): 7-
41. 
45 T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of Primacy”, International Security 31, 1 (2005), 47. 
46 Ibid., 53. 
47 A related argument to T.V. Paul’s can be found in the same issue of International Security. See Robert A. 
Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States”, International Security 30, 1 (2005), 7-45. While Paul argues 
that the United States was a target of soft balancing in the 1990s, Pape argues that the United States was 
exempt from such tactics in the 1990s and that soft balancing occurred only in response to the Bush 
administration’s unilateralist foreign policy. For a critique of soft balancing, see Stephen G. Brooks and 
William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, International Security 30, 1 (2005), 72-108. 
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audiences. The role of France is of particular interest, since key official figures such as 
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, explicitly stated the French intention of providing 
a counterweight to American influence.48 However, it is not clear that the decision to 
oppose the United States was motivated by systemic incentives, as the soft balancing 
argument states.49 The Russian case is also cited as an example of soft balancing, but the 
argument may be undermined by Russia’s efforts to minimize the political costs of the 
decision with the United States. As Brooks and Wohlforth mention, “Putin worked very 
hard to ensure that his tack toward Europe did not come at the expense of a working 
strategic partnership with the United States.”50 For Paul, soft balancing does not preclude 
such possibilities, since soft balancing is used precisely to avoid costly backlash from the 
US.51  
With their emphasis on first-tier states and their efforts to restore the balance of 
power, classical, structural and offensive realism do not specify exactly how a change in the 
international structure impacts the foreign policy options of United States’ allies. Indeed the 
systemic explanation can be turned on its head: after the end of the Cold War and 
throughout the 1990s, European states saw a decrease in their military expenditures, 
consistent with a lower level of threat, while Canada’s military expenditures declined in the 
                                                 
48 Dominique de Villepin. France. Sénat. “Iraq”. Compte rendu intégral des débats. February 26, 2003. 
49 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, 99-100. 
50 Ibid., 98. 
51 Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of Primacy”, 46-71. 
  
 
29
mid-1990s and Australia’s remained relatively constant.52 Some states, having failed to 
independently provide for their security have increased their security dependence on the 
United States since the Cold War. However, this tendency is not necessarily observed 
across all regions, leading to interesting intra-alliance variation. To understand the 
conditions under which secondary states can manifest greater autonomy, we need to 
consider variables other than how power is distributed in the international system. The 
United States relies on alliances and institutions to consolidate and manage its position of 
pre-eminence. This implies a tacit international bargain where the United States exerts a 
certain level of authority by providing the leadership necessary for the maintenance of this 
international order, an argument made by the liberal school, to which I will now turn.53 
Neoliberalism 
Neoliberal perspectives argue that international institutions can improve the prospects of 
cooperation by improving information and alleviating concerns for cheating, thereby 
mitigating the effects of anarchy in the international system.54 Institutions or regimes can 
also level the playing field by mediating cooperation between unequal states. Asymmetry, 
in this context, is directly tied to the problem of order. The extent to which the United 
                                                 
52 David Lake offers an alternative explanation arguing that a decrease in defence spending is a feature of 
international hierarchy under the United States’ leadership. See David Lake, “Escape from the State of 
Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics”, International Security 32, 1 (2007), 47-79. 
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Press, 1977), 4-6. 
54 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Neoliberalism has been 
criticized for paying insufficient attention to the distribution of power underlying international institutions or 
regimes. For example, see Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the 
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States needs its allies is a complex question. In the long term, the United States is 
concerned with maintaining its position of primacy, supported by allies. In the short term, 
alliance decisions may be highly context dependent.  
Ikenberry defines the great bargain made by the United States at critical historical 
junctures to maintain the status quo, which favours it.55 Responding to weaker states’ fears 
of abandonment or domination, the US accepts that it will bear a greater share of the burden 
in security cooperation. The process is replicated when we consider alliance relationships, 
since alliances are a formal solution to curtail fears of abandonment and domination. In the 
context of a longstanding alliance such as NATO, we can assume that a minimal consensus 
about security goals has emerged over time. Indeed, alliance arrangements are more durable 
when they are led by a hegemonic power willing to bear a greater share of the burden.56  
The argument goes even further, stating that secondary powers can influence 
powerful alliance partners through institutions.57 To overcome inherent disadvantages in 
hard power, secondary states can resort to several strategies at the international level. 
Opting for multilateral settings is one such strategy, allowing the weaker powers to tie great 
powers to institutions, thereby mitigating the asymmetry.58 Institutional arrangements may 
also temper fears of entrapment, as they encourage consultations and discussions for 
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foreign policy decision-making. Notwithstanding, secondary states still have to demonstrate 
the credibility of their commitment to increase their bargaining leverage.59 Despite a wide 
range of multilateral arrangements and agreements, the international community’s ability to 
constrain American behaviour has been called into question as the United States has 
sometimes undermined international cooperation through inconsistent and sometimes 
damaging treaty behaviour.60 
This segment of the literature also looks at how the degree of institutionalization 
may have an impact on the asymmetric dynamic. As stated before, the moment of alliance 
creation does not predetermine the following intra-alliance interactions. Time is a strong 
component in understanding this dynamic. If allies engage in peacetime military 
coordination and invest in the formalization of their alliance, it is arguably solidified in a 
way proportional to the investments made.61 Despite this process of consolidation, 
empirical studies have shown that alliance performance does not become more reliable.62 
Allies are no more likely to commit to war initiatives, no matter how formalized or 
enduring the alliance commitment is.  
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61 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). 
62 Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance”, International 
Interactions 31 (2005), 199. 
  
 
32
Alternatively, as an alliance becomes increasingly consolidated over time, the initial 
commitment is no longer put into question. This may translate in alliance partners being 
more creative in regards to the original requirements. Even if power differentials remain 
unchanged, an alliance which is more institutionalized should allow weaker alliance 
partners more leeway in achieving their aims vis-à-vis the dominant power when those 
aims do not coincide. Since the dissolution of the alliance is no longer feared, the secondary 
powers may be willing to risk an autonomous course of action as Canada did in opting out 
of the 2003 Iraq invasion.  
Moreover, the presence of multiple security institutions, which are common to both 
the dominant partner and its special allies, may allow the latter to forum shop. Forum-
shopping refers to the ability of states to choose the most strategic venue to pursue their 
aims. “A key strategy for actors seeking to influence outcomes is to push issues to arenas, 
which work to their advantage”.63 This argument is to show that soft power is 
instrumentalized by secondary states that want to influence a dominant alliance partner.  
The literature on soft power in its original version highlights the importance of 
multilateral support on major international security issues and the advantages of funneling 
American leadership through international institutions.64 This is essential, it is argued, to 
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ensure the sustainability of American foreign policy in the long term.65 Nye defines soft 
power as “the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of 
others” based on intangible resources like culture.66 However, soft power is a considerably 
more elusive concept than hard power, which benefits from tangible measures. What tools 
of persuasion-by-attraction can be brought to bear on specific foreign policy decisions to 
enlist the compliance and even participation of allies? More specifically, how can the 
government deploy soft power to achieve foreign policy support from its closest allies in 
times of war? Even if there were mutual recognition of these converging long-term 
interests, they would not necessarily buy supplemental leverage to secondary states in the 
short term. Beyond the established institutional bargain embodied by alliances, how are 
specific courses of action chosen? How are disagreements overcome between alliance 
partners? 
Constructivism 
The constructivist research program on security communities offers a third plausible 
explanation for asymmetric security cooperation. Over time, it is argued, close allies 
develop a shared sense of community which develops into a tradition of peaceful 
interactions. Thus, reiterated practice between cooperative states explains the absence of 
violent conflict between long-standing allies.67 A different strand of constructivist thought 
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focuses on strategic culture as: “[…] shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a 
degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, 
organizational or political environment”.68 As such, we can identify national strategic 
cultures based on observable trends in foreign and defence policy, which make state 
behaviour more predictable. Both theories offer empirically-grounded explanations about 
alliance behaviour that go beyond power considerations, an early challenge for an 
explanation premised on asymmetry.69 
Based on several studies, the US, the UK, Canada and Australia should benefit from 
a minimal level of cohesion due to a sense of shared identity. Threat perception has been 
depicted along the in-group/out-group distinction.70 As such, some strains of constructivism 
attempt to synthesize realist and liberal arguments by suggesting that threat perception is 
determined by the interaction of identity and power, although there is no consensus on this 
point. Where power differentials still matter in identifying sources of threats, a shared sense 
of identity can mitigate power as a source of threat. However, the end of the Cold War may 
make differences between in-group identities more salient. Ted Hopf argues that the end of 
the struggle between democracy and communism has led to an increase in ideological 
divisions between the United States and Europe, between American liberalism and 
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European social democracy. Some authors have even argued that a unified European Union 
could balance against the United States.71 Still, even the United States’ closest allies may 
express dissent. What kinds of strategies can these states use as leverage over the U.S.? Can 
allies affect the United States’ political capability to wage war, for example? 
Despite some gloomy prognosis, Western alliances, such as NATO, NORAD, and 
ANZUS, have been relatively stable over time, although New Zealand was excluded from 
ANZUS because it declared itself nuclear free in 1985, which conflicted with the American 
interpretation of the alliance. The fact that certain alliances have endured beyond the 50-
year mark, withstanding major shifts in the international system, deserves attention. The 
fact that ex-Soviet states are lining up to join NATO is even more significant. For core 
groups of states in long-standing alliances, the fear that “today’s friend may be tomorrow’s 
enemy in war” has been alleviated through practice, which is strong evidence for the 
constructivist thesis.72 This is reinforced by a sense of shared identity, where members of 
an alliance become an in-group, at the international level. For example, building on both 
liberal and constructivist claims, Owen argues that transnational affiliation, such as a state’s 
liberal identity, will structure how it interacts with other states in the international system.73  
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The main contribution of constructivism is that it attempts to problematize state 
interests. By responding to what is perceived as appropriate behaviour, states can pursue 
political goals beyond power and security.74 States may also be influenced by a variety of 
domestic or international actors. For example, Finnemore looks at the role of international 
organizations (IOs) and their sociological (and causal) interactions with states in a given 
issue-area. She argues that “… IOs socialize states to accept new political goals and new 
values that have lasting impacts on the conduct of war, the workings of the international 
political economy, and the structure of states themselves”.75 She uses the logic of 
appropriateness to explain why the United States abided by the norms of multilateralism in 
military interventions during the 1990s, making strong statements about the UN’s 
legitimating role: “That UN involvement continues to be a central feature of these 
operations, despite the UN’s apparent lack of military competence, underscores the power 
of multilateral norm.”76 This is an important argument to explain change, learning and 
adaptation by states, but may not be well suited for a research question that focuses on how 
states respond to American demands, or perceived expectations. Finnemore and Sikkink, 
commenting on military interventions in the 1990’s, attempt to address this question. They 
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argue that international norms made the United States more multilateralist.77 The wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, in contrast, suggest that alliance-seeking behaviour may not be 
amenable to such a generalization. In sum, the realist, liberal and constructivist literatures 
in IR make important contributions in explaining how power asymmetries may operate 
differently in longstanding alliances, but focus on the macro-level of explanation. For 
research questions on foreign policy decision-making, attention must be paid to domestic-
level factors as well.  
The most fruitful way, then, to address both ontological and epistemological 
questions in IR is to first reflect on the questions for which we are looking answers to. By 
comparing IR theories on their merits in addressing specific research questions as opposed 
to subscribing to one in particular. In fact, using the threat of military or economic 
sanctions against allies might prove utterly counterproductive by jeopardizing the very 
international arrangements that lock in American primacy. A majority of states subscribe to 
the post-WWII liberal bargain created by the United States, but the survival of this bargain 
is highly dependent on core support provided by these longstanding allies that benefit from 
the most privileged ties with the U.S. There are other practical reasons for not using 
coercion when dealing with allies. Salacuse mentions that domineering behaviour is risky 
for two main reasons: 
First, behaving exploitatively and flaunting power often leads the weaker side to 
become defensive and cautious, or indeed to avoid making any commitments until the 
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last possible minute… Second, demonstrating and using power may indeed result in 
an agreement with the weaker party, but that agreement may prove unstable in the 
long run.78 
 
The concept of asymmetry must account for interdependencies going beyond a narrow 
definition built on power differentials. When looking at security cooperation between the 
United States and its allies, it is clear that the US will take on a disproportionate share of 
the costs. Looking at power alone obscures the valued contributions of secondary states, 
making every ally look like a free-rider. To develop a more balanced and operable concept 
of asymmetry for burden-sharing, we must examine the requests made by the US. For 
example, if American expectations are minimal in terms of allied contributions, it would be 
a misnomer to call this free-riding. I suggest that we measure burden-sharing on the basis of 
requests made by the United States to its allies. Contributions should be judged according 
to operational needs and alliance expectations and not in absolute terms based on the size of 
those contributions alone.  
Moreover, qualitative indicators of asymmetric security cooperation make specific 
requests more intelligible. As will be discussed in the case study chapters, there is ample 
evidence that former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice suggested that allied troops would 
actually interfere with combat operations at the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003.79 The 
Bush administration valued allied commitments but in the framework of peace support 
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operations rather than the initial military engagement against Saddam’s army. In this 
context, it would not make sense to judge troop contributions in absolute terms. Instead, 
burden-sharing is best seen as a division-of-labor, with the dominant ally making specific 
requests about what is expected on the part of the contributing allies. Burden-sharing and 
the free riding hypothesis will be discussed at greater length in the following section. 
From IR Theory to a Theory of Foreign Policy 
So far, I have provided a summary of the relevant literature on asymmetric alliances, 
relying primarily on contributions from IR theory. To narrow the scope of the literature 
review, I will now turn to scholarship that focuses on asymmetry in specific foreign policy 
decisions. Since the aim of my research is to explain allied decisions in times of war, I 
concentrate on foreign policy decision-making as opposed to international outcomes. 
Zakaria makes a clear distinction between IR theory and foreign policy theory:  
…In accounting for international events, a theory of international politics cannot 
explain the motives of nations; it must instead make assumptions about them. By 
contrast, a theory of foreign policy explains why different states, or the same state at 
different historical moments, have different intentions, goals, and preferences 
toward the outside world. A theory of foreign policy sheds light on the reasons for a 
nation’s efforts – the search for allies, the attempt to annex a colony – but it cannot 
account for the results of those efforts.80   
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The logical starting point for this discussion is the literature on international negotiations as 
it sheds light on intra-alliance dynamics. The conditions under which allies participate are 
the product of a bargain with the dominant alliance partner.81 This literature draws on 
variables which are specific to the negotiation context, such as the negotiating skills of 
participants, the issue at hand, and cross-issue linkages.82 Zartman and Rubin also note that 
attitudinal predispositions between negotiating parties trump power considerations: “When 
negotiations take place under […] circumstances characterized by friendly relations and 
cooperative MOs [motivational orientations], these conditions predominate over any power 
structure and produce integrative results under symmetry or asymmetry.”83 Thus, 
asymmetric conditions at the structural level can be compensated for through comparative 
advantages held by individual parties at the negotiating table. At the same time, 
vulnerabilities are particularly salient when the United States chooses to act unilaterally, as 
legal countermeasures have been deficient in redressing grievances. For example, Canada 
has suffered under the protectionist trend undertaken by the United States in the spring of 
2002 with damaging consequences for the softwood lumber industry, despite the provisions 
under NAFTA’s Article 11.84     
                                                 
81 James Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Cooperation”, International Organization 52, 2 (1998), 269-
305. 
82 William Roberts Clark, Erick Duchesne and Sophie Meunier, “Domestic and International Asymmetries in 
United-States-European Union Trade Negotiations”, International Negotiation 5 (2000), 69-95. 
83 Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotation”. 
84 Matthew Thomas Simpson, Sleeping with an Elephant: A Canadian Defence against 21st Century U.S. 
Protectionism (MA thesis. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2004). 
  
 
41
The literature on international negotiation deals with different levels of analysis 
including both domestic and international factors. Domestic variables are comparatively 
understudied in the field of alliance theory and international cooperation more broadly.85 
Domestic politics-driven explanations may address several shortcomings associated with 
structural theories. Milner makes a case for the consideration of domestic variables in the 
study of international cooperation: 
First, domestic politics tells us how preferences are aggregated and national interests 
constructed…Second, domestic politics can help explain the strategies states adopt to 
realize their goals…Strategies may be suggested by a state’s structural position, but 
the nature of its political system, bureaucratic politics, the influence of special 
interests, and public opinion may ultimately determine which strategies states can 
pursue internationally. Third, the final step in establishing cooperative agreements 
occurs when domestic actors agree to abide by the terms negotiated internationally.86 
Domestic factors such as electoral cycles, changes in domestic coalitions, and interest 
groups influence the international bargaining game. The literature on public opinion and 
foreign policy can offer powerful domestic-level explanations in certain contexts. Indeed, 
public opinion evaluations provide a general guide for assessing the climate of foreign 
policy decisions. It is difficult to isolate public opinion as an explanatory variable, however, 
because political leaders seek to influence and control public opinion through framing. 
Though we should not underestimate the interdependence between public opinion, framing 
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and foreign policy decisions, the precise mechanisms operating within this relationship are 
not well understood.  
Entman’s cascading model illustrates how political information trickles down from 
political leaders through the media all the way down to the public, with the important 
caveat that while the relationship from top to bottom is straightforward, it is unclear how 
much public opinion can make its way up to political leaders and truly influence foreign 
policy decisions.87 There are several reasons for this: (1) the public draws a lot of  
information from framed discourse without ever having direct contact with political 
leaders; (2) political elites can never perfectly assess public opinion, meaning their 
interpretation will necessarily be a partial approximation; (3) there is a dynamic interplay 
between public opinion and political leaders because the latter will incessantly try to exert 
influence on the former over time.88 Finally, on certain issues or in crisis situations, public 
opinion can be evacuated from the decision-making process.89 This can be exacerbated in 
parliamentary regimes where the executive, under the Prime Minister’s leadership, makes 
important foreign policy decisions away from the public radar. This seems to have been the 
case in Canada, between 2001 and 2003, as successive governments defined a mission for 
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the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan with little parliamentary debate on the issue.90 For this 
reason, I focus on domestic constraints that are more likely to influence high-level decision-
making on foreign an defence policy issues: the level of government cohesion, since 
divisions can undermine executive leadership and its level of discretion, and military 
feasibility, since the executive relies on the advice of Defence when considering military 
options for international engagements. 
The structure of international negotiations also seems to impact the types of 
strategies available to secondary powers. Putnam’s two-level game offers a good example 
for this, where state officials leverage their domestic and international positions to increase 
their bargaining power.91 By appealing to domestic constraints when negotiating at the 
international level; or by appealing to international constraints when addressing domestic 
audiences, decision-makers can seek concessions. Drawing on cases of WTO negotiations, 
Drahos highlights the advantages of multilateral encounters as opposed to bilateral 
negotiations with the United States.92 In the multilateral context, smaller states can create a 
coalition to counter American pressures. Regardless of these advantages, however, weaker 
states remain consistently more responsive to threats made by stronger states. The record of 
asymmetric bargaining is mixed. Under what conditions can weaker states hope to benefit? 
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To explain the variation in intra-alliance behaviour, the literature on international 
negotiation brings us a step closer to uncovering the dynamics inherent to asymmetric 
bargaining. As Zartman and Rubin relate in their work Power and Negotiation, two 
different schools of thought represent the field of international negotiation. The first school 
argues that the negotiation process evens the playing field between asymmetric partners, 
while the second school argues that the more powerful players have a definite advantage 
and can influence the outcome in their favour.93  
The dilemma that these authors are concerned with is called the structuralist 
paradox and deals with the counter-intuitive finding that situations of asymmetry can in 
fact produce better agreements than symmetric negotiations, or as Zartman and Rubin put it 
“ … that the most powerful party in terms of force or resources does not always win at 
negotiation”.94 Zartman argues that under certain conditions, asymmetry can even result in 
better agreements for weaker states. He does this by rejecting realist definitions of power as 
force; and instead, focuses on persuasion, influence, leverage and pressure. A striking 
finding is that, although stronger states attempt to dominate weaker states, the latter do not 
act submissively. Instead, these comparatively lesser powers compensate for their relative 
weakness through several strategies, like appealing to principle or building coalitions on 
particular issues.95  
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It is also argued that international negotiations can be less effective and lead to 
worse outcomes for symmetric powers because both parties are sensitive to the gains made 
by the other, which would be consistent with the realist argument about relative gains. 
Commenting on China-US actions during the Korean War armistice negotiations, Fan 
argues that American and Chinese behaviour remain consistent with this model, leading to 
the parties being “… less effective in reaching agreement because both sides try to exploit 
gains as much as possible to maintain their power reputations”.96 Focusing exclusively on 
material power obscures other goals pursued by the alliance partners, such as institution-
building or prestige enhancement.  
Turning to economic theories of alliances, smaller alliance partners are portrayed as 
free riders.97 According to this logic, defense burdens are expected to be shared unevenly 
among allies, where the stronger partner bears the brunt of alliance costs while the weaker 
ally enjoys a free ride, the classic free-rider hypothesis.98 When allies perceive diminishing 
returns from the relationship, they can work to reform it or withdraw. Following 
Hirschman’s logic, the more enduring the alliance, the more likely it seems that partners 
will want to invest in upgrading the alliance rather than terminating it.99 An alternative 
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hypothesis from the economic tradition is that burdens are shared according to the benefits 
received by each ally.100 Given substantial power differentials, weaker allies can minimize 
the appearance of free-riding through certain concessions on their territory, like agreeing to 
the foreign use of military bases.101 Access to strategic territory has been especially prized 
by the United States in its efforts to combat terrorism abroad.102  
We can identify key resources held by weaker powers that make for situations of 
security interdependence: geography, capability specialization and legitimacy. States may 
also gain advantages that go beyond the alliance context. American allies may increase 
their influence internationally as a result of their ties with the United States. While the main 
cost to the allies is a loss of autonomy in foreign policy decision-making, the benefits are 
straightforward: enhanced deterrence, mutual defence obligations, potential influence and 
policy input with the allied state, and over time, the establishment of norms of cooperative 
behaviour.103 Nevertheless, Wilkins finds that bargaining positions are heavily determined, 
though not decisively so, by relative power capabilities.104  
This research focuses on the foreign policy options of secondary states when 
dealing with a much stronger alliance partner. The purpose is to identify the factors that 
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structure the commitments of secondary states when contemplating military cooperation 
with the United States. The calculations of these states are strongly influenced by where 
they stand vis-à-vis the dominant alliance partner. While the core state and its weaker 
partners do not face the same constraints, the outcome is not necessarily dictated by the 
stronger power. This section has provided an overview of the relevant literature regarding 
asymmetric alliances. The next section focuses on the core concepts for the theoretical 
argument. 
Conceptual Clarifications 
Sartori reminds us that “a concept is empirical if, and only if, it can be rendered in testable 
propositions that confirm it …”105 The concept of alliances as used here refers to its most 
basic and empirical sense, regarding treaty obligations between two or more states.  
Alliances, as defined by Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell and Long are “written agreements, signed 
by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a 
partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain 
from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international 
crises that create a potential for military conflict.”106 In focusing on asymmetric alliances 
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between special partners, I examine more closely the highly-institutionalized security 
cooperation between two unequal states, known as formal alliances.  
In the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset (1816-2000), 
the United States shares a defensive pact with Canada, Great Britain and Australia, which is 
a commitment “to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked.”107 
NATO’s Article V, the mutual defence clause, is another example. These more intrusive 
treaty obligations are symptomatic of a political commitment within the NATO alliance, 
also referred to as “… a political-military alliance that combines the key political function 
of guiding members’ foreign and security policy and providing a forum for alliance 
consultation with the operational function of ensuring that members can train and develop 
the capabilities to cooperate militarily.”108 Defensive pacts are different from less intrusive 
commitments such as neutrality and non-aggression pacts, or ententes. To this, we can add 
the qualification of special alliances, where allied states share intelligence and pursue 
military interoperability in a highly institutionalized way as a goal of defence force 
structure.  
                                                 
107 Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal 
Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000”, Journal of Peace Research 41, 2 (2004), 215. 
108 Renée de Nevers, “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era”, International Security 31, 4 
(2007), 36. 
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Figure 2.1: Alliances and Alliance Subtypes 
 
 
The diagram (Figure 1) featuring alliance subtypes is a visualization of the 
aforementioned concept. The outer circle represents alliances that are established by written 
agreements regarding neutrality or non-aggression ententes. These are less intrusive than 
alliances based on defensive pacts shown in the second circle.  These defensive alliances 
are based on commitments to intervene militarily, such as the commitment within the 
NATO alliance.    
The inner circle is reserved for the sub-category of special allies which is 
characterized by more far reaching and institutionalized security commitments, a long 
history of security cooperation, and security “privileges” such as shared intelligence 
arrangements.109 Cultural ties can further cement alliance relationships.110 This would 
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arguably make alliance behaviour more predictable. To the extent that military cooperation 
between special allies is still uneven in practice, theoretical explanations that can account 
for this variation may be applicable to more loosely defined formal alliances. 
Moving on to the concept of asymmetry, security cooperation between the United 
States and the UK, Canada and Australia must address the underlying gap in relative 
capabilities. The asymmetry is to be understood as both quantitative and qualitative. First, I 
rely on a standard definition of relative power as opposed to aggregate power based on a 
comparison of several attributes, such as “size of population and territory, resource 
endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence.”111 
As such, even a great power can be engaged in an asymmetric alliance, so long as it is 
superceded by a stronger state within the alliance. Such is the case between the UK and the 
United States, which share membership in several institutions where the US is always 
dominant.    
Second, the asymmetry is qualitative as it represents the types of gains made 
through the alliance. Here we can distinguish symmetric alliances, where “both allies 
receive security or autonomy benefits”, from asymmetric alliances, where “one ally gains 
security and the other autonomy”.112 This leads us to the autonomy-security trade-off 
model. According to Morrow, alliances thus provide states with two kinds of benefits. The 
first benefit, security, is defined as a state’s ability “to maintain the current resolution of the 
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issues that it wishes to preserve”; while the second benefit, autonomy, is defined as “the 
degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo”.113 Alternatively, the 
distribution of benefits may also produce asymmetry, where the party with a greater share 
of the benefits is the most dependent in the relationship.114 In the case studies that follow, 
all special allies are in a position of asymmetry vis-à-vis the United States. Gains made 
through economic and security arrangements only exacerbate this asymmetry, because they 
rely on the US bilaterally more than the US relies on them.  
As mentioned before, the way power is used between close allies is more specific 
than the definition of power used broadly in IR. Indeed, I am concerned with the 
application of power to a sub-set of states, states which have developed a tradition of 
military cooperation and have moved beyond the so-called security dilemma and do not 
necessarily see their relationship as a zero-sum game. As such, the definition of power 
introduced by Zartman and Rubin fits nicely within the research question since it can 
account for how power relationships are reiterated over time.115 They define power as “the 
perceived capacity of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that 
may involve the use of resources.”116  
                                                 
113 Ibid., 908. 
114 David Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis”, International Organization 34, 4 
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definition of power, see R.H. Tawney, Equality (London: Unwin, 1931/1952). 
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Although this definition was developed for the study of international negotiation, it 
can be transferred to the context of military cooperation, since burden-sharing arrangements 
between allies are the product of bargaining. The stakes are especially high since politicians 
are accountable for the military commitment made under such coalitions. Similarly, Touval 
highlights the importance of combining aggregate power, perceived power and action 
power into any conceptualization of power that looks at bilateral relationships (among other 
types of relationships).117 The cases presented in the next chapters show that the bilateral 
relationship coexists, and often overlaps, with regional or multilateral settings. 
By focusing on the exercise of power, rather than aggregate material capabilities 
alone, I can then examine particular strategies deployed by the secondary allied states to 
overcome their asymmetric position vis-à-vis the dominant partner. Moreover, this 
definition allows us to concentrate on the perception of power as held by these states rather 
than on the more objective definition of power favoured by neorealists. Perceptions are 
important if we are to explain certain irregularities in how secondary states may behave. 
For example, there is a tendency for Canadian decision-makers to overestimate the extent to 
which the United States takes Canada into consideration when making foreign policy 
decisions. The implications of this misperception are important for my research question, 
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since I focus on the level of military participation, where commitments are made based on 
an evaluation of American expectations.  
The degree of institutionalization is equally important, as shown by the selection of 
cases, because it creates mutual expectations of support. The presence of multiple and 
sometimes overlapping security institutions can be used to leverage alliance partners. For 
example, both the United Nations and NATO have a self-defence clause, through Article 51 
and Article 5 respectively. However, the process of invoking one or the other entails 
different practical implications for the use of force. In sum, the durability and the highly 
institutionalized character of certain asymmetric alliances are due to complementary 
interests between the partners. Since the strong ally pursues autonomy and the weaker ally 
pursues security, the asymmetric partners have strong incentives to favour of a formal 
commitment, namely an alliance.  
A final comment to be made here relates to the level of interdependency between 
partners. Scholarly work done on international negotiation and coalition formation use 
models where the players are interdependent: they both need each other to achieve a 
satisfactory outcome.118 The level of interdependency varies across dyads. It is arguably 
different from one state to another or from one context to the next. Therefore, I find this 
assumption problematic and choose to do away with it altogether, since we are dealing with 
a sub-set of alliance partners: special allies. Although the UK, Canada and Australia, all 
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have important resources that make their involvement desirable to the US, it is reasonable 
to expect that their participation is unlikely to alter the course of American decision-making 
in one way or another. Therefore, in the decision-making model I propose, which focuses 
on the decision-making matrix of secondary states alone, moves made by these allies do not 
alter the options available to the dominant power. However, there are opportunities to 
adjust alliance expectations. 
Despite the presence of complementary interests, as embodied by the 
aforementioned security-autonomy trade-off, alliance partners may choose to renegotiate 
the alliance when particular issues arise. It is reasonable to expect that, when contemplating 
joint military action, allies undergo such re-evaluations of their interests and motives 
according to specific circumstances. Thus, within the broader framework of the alliance, 
where the overarching goals are complementary, there might be sequences when the 
motives vary (alignment vs. non-alignment on security portfolios). This will be reflected in 
my theoretical argument. What should be clear from the above discussion is that 
perceptions of threat matter and change over certain issues. Moreover, by dichotomizing 
alliance benefits, as either autonomy or security, preferences are built-in to the definition 
where secondary states are seen to prioritize security at the expense of autonomy. I propose 
an approach which allows for more flexibility to account for instances when secondary 
states favour autonomy over alliance requirements. 
By choosing threat perception as the point of departure for my argument, I 
recognize the potential conceptual and operationalization pitfalls of the term. Threat 
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perception has been said to be “one of the most primitive areas of statecraft,” as it can only 
offer a partial assessment of potential harm.119 Similarly, Robert Jervis has observed that 
“there is no easy way to determine the accuracy of perceptions.”120 There are multiple 
impediments to an accurate assessment of international threats, stemming from a lack of 
information, misperception, sudden changes in capabilities, preconceptions held by leaders 
and a host of bureaucratic proclivities. Threats can be overestimated or underestimated, 
confirmed or disconfirmed. The process of threat assessment is even more complex in the 
context of alliance relationships, as different states may come to different readings of 
international threats. 
How allies with different power capabilities overcome these disagreements about 
threats in crafting their foreign and defence policy is the central focus of this analysis. 
Although it is possible to rely on material indicators to evaluate and rank threats, it is 
important to recognize that non-objective factors blur these assessments. Schweller 
provides a useful subdivision of perceived threats, broken into three categories: actual, 
potential, and imagined.121 While actual threats are made unambiguous by the clarity of an 
opponent’s signals; imagined threats are identified, but not supported by the evidence. 
Finally, potential threats are early signals drawn from a change in an opponent’s 
capabilities or intentions that may materialize into an actual threat. Threat perception, in 
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sum, is “… an assessment of the actor’s capabilities and intentions but also an evaluation of 
its resolve and risk-taking propensities.”122 
A different approach is offered by Carter and Perry, who rank threats in terms of 
severity. The degree of severity is divided into three categories, where A-list threats 
threaten survival, B-list threats affect important strategic interests and C-list threats are 
important but bear no direct impact on core interests.123 A-list threats are unlikely to cause 
disagreements between allies because if survival is at stake for the United States, its closest 
allies are equally threatened. World War II corresponds to this first category. C-list threats, 
on the other hand, are particularly ambiguous because there is no direct strategic interest at 
stake. Instead, intervention is couched in terms of values or moral imperatives. It is unlikely 
that the US will opt for a unilateral response, since concerns for burden-sharing are more 
salient when there is no national interest involved. Interventions in Somalia and Bosnia are 
examples of this second category.  
B-list threats are the most interesting from a theoretical standpoint because they are 
likely to elicit disagreements between asymmetric allies, since these threats will be 
perceived primarily through the lens of the United States’ global responsibilities. Dominant 
allies, like the United States, have a qualitatively different assessment of threats given the 
global nature of their interests. As Renato and Dixon suggest, “The multiplicity of their 
interests leads major powers to perceive some utility even in other states’ conflicts and 
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makes them more likely to intervene in those quarrels.”124 Such interventions have included 
the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 War in Afghanistan and 
the War in Iraq. For these wars, the United States was the leader in building a coalition to 
respond to a regional threat to its interests. In these cases, the UK, Canada and Australia 
appreciated these threats on a different scale: as a test of alliance reliability rather than a 
direct threat to their strategic interests. Alliance expectations would thus strongly influence 
the types of military commitments that were be made, but the analysis should be 
complemented by including domestic-level variables. The selected case studies all belong 
to this latter category of strategic but non-vital threats (B-list). I will offer an explanation 
for allied responses to such threats when contemplating military cooperation with the 
United States. 
Another concept that deserves clarification is military cooperation. By focusing on 
the allied participation in US-led military interventions, the goal is to understand the 
conditions under which a commitment is made and to shed light on the nature, scope and 
implementation of that commitment. The first component of the concept is fairly 
straightforward: by military, I mean that there is coordination between the armed forces of 
the United States and other countries. The second part, cooperation, deserves more 
attention. Cooperation occurs “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
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anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”125 Cooperation 
can be the result of a natural convergence of interests, it can be a negotiated outcome, or it 
can be imposed.126 In the context of asymmetric military cooperation, all three types of 
cooperation can arguably occur, although negotiated cooperation would be more frequent 
among special allies, since they have established channels to engage in negotiation and 
bargaining.  
Conclusion 
This chapter offered a discussion on the topic of asymmetric alliances in IR. By looking at 
the three main schools in IR, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, the intent was to 
define the main research question: military cooperation under conditions of asymmetry. 
Through this discussion, I recognize that IR theories have made important contributions 
that shed light on asymmetric security cooperation. However, macro-level theories may 
prove insufficient in studying foreign policy decisions. Understanding the decision-making 
processes leading to military cooperation thus requires a shift to a more micro-level 
approach, where domestic-level variables are introduced in the analysis. Combining these 
levels of analysis, as suggested by neoclassical realists, is the appropriate framework for the 
research question under investigation.  
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In this chapter, we also considered theories on bargaining in order to clarify the 
dynamics of asymmetry and how weaker parties can deploy strategies to overcome 
structural disadvantages. A recurring puzzle for scholars in alliance theory is to identify the 
situations and attributes that enable secondary states to influence their dominant alliance 
partner. My interest is in how secondary states engage in military cooperation with a more 
powerful allied state. How alliance partners negotiate the parameters of military 
cooperation represents a theoretical challenge. The literature on international negotiations 
presents the advantages that can be gained by a weaker party engaged in asymmetric 
bargaining. The issue at hand, the specific context of the negotiation, and the skills of 
negotiators, may redress the underlying power asymmetry.  
Beyond these context-specific factors, can we generate testable hypotheses about 
alliance decision-making between asymmetric partners? The next chapter will outline the 
theoretical framework and research design employed to address asymmetric military 
cooperation between the United States and its closest allies: the UK, Canada, and Australia.   
 
  
-2- 
A Theory of Asymmetric Security Cooperation 
This study examines the effects of power asymmetry on military cooperation 
between the United States and its special allies: the UK, Canada and Australia. More 
specifically, the main objective is to explain the foreign policy behaviour of these alliance 
partners by looking at their level of participation in military cooperation with the United 
States. It explores how threats, as perceived by central decision-makers, are mediated by 
both alliance expectations and domestic constraints. Special allies, due to the proximity of 
their security relationship with the US, make military commitments according to US 
expectations, but face domestic constraints set by the level of government cohesion and 
available military capabilities. Examining the decision-making processes leading up to the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the research will also show how secondary states deploy 
strategies to overcome the effects of power asymmetries. Previous analyses may have 
overestimated the extent to which the United States holds a “leash-like grip” on its allies.127 
Why focus on these states? These special relationships are characterized by a high 
level of dependence, a high degree of institutionalization and a well-established tradition of 
cooperation. By either realist, liberal or constructivist accounts, military cooperation 
between the United States and its special allies should produce an aligned foreign policy 
when the use of force is at stake (whether coercion-based, interest-based, or value-based). 
However, history shows us that these special allies have sometimes proven to be unreliable 
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partners to the United States. Why did the UK opt out of Vietnam, Australia turn its back 
on Kosovo and Canada refuse to send troops to Iraq, while in some instances, they joined 
hands with the US? Why is their behaviour so unpredictable when these states rely on, 
thrive under, and support American leadership? This project addresses these questions by 
investigating the UK, Canada and Australia’s level of participation when contemplating 
military cooperation with the United States after 9/11. 
In chapter 2, I presented a discussion of the major contributions in the IR literature 
on the topic of asymmetric alliances. The theoretical approach presented in this chapter will 
build on these contributions by introducing a decision-making model of asymmetric 
security cooperation from the perspective of secondary states. The goal is to map out the 
decision-making matrix of allied states that are militarily engaged with the United States to 
gain insights on asymmetric alliance interactions. I have examined the UK, Canada and 
Australia, traditional US allies, to control for a host of political, cultural, and identity-based 
factors.  
Before moving on to the core argument, it may be useful to summarize key points as 
they relate to the United States and its special allies. First, there is a profound asymmetry 
between the United States and its closest allies, which can translate into different 
evaluations and responses to the international security environment. Second, when such 
disagreements arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by 
the stronger power. To investigate this dynamic, I must take into account that close US 
allies face an additional hurdle in the realm of foreign policy decision-making: weighing 
the trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner and not 
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appearing weak when dealing with the United States. In other words, secondary states must 
manage both the United States’ expectations and those held by their domestic audiences. It 
is important to consider both domestic and international factors when explaining the foreign 
policy options of the UK, Canada and Australia when they are contemplating military 
cooperation with the United States. While the political decision on participation is strongly 
influenced by US expectations, the level of military cooperation appears primarily driven 
by the domestic constraints we have previously identified: the level of government 
cohesion and military capacity. By breaking down the decision-making stages in this way, 
we can understand the relative importance of domestic and international factors. 
Table 3.1 Military expenditure of the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
Military expenditure in constant (2005) US$ m.  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
USA 344, 932 387, 303 440, 813 480, 451 503, 353 511, 187 546, 786 
UK 48, 786 50, 963 57, 140 60, 018 60, 003 59, 595 59, 705 
Canada 11, 709 11, 771 11, 984 12, 441 12, 986 13, 588 15, 155 
Australia 11, 038 11, 609 12, 008 12, 638 13, 122 13, 885 15, 097 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database, 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009). 
 
By all material indicators of power, the relationship between the United States and 
its closest alliance partners is asymmetric. Whether one looks at quantitative or qualitative 
measures of power, the United States by far outmatches any other country in the world.128 
Comparing military assets alone offers a telling portrait. American military expenditures 
(Table 3.1) have grown steadily in the period after 9/11, dwarfing even the UK, America’s 
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strongest military ally. In 2001, UK military expenditures were about 15% of US military 
expenditures, while in 2007, they fell below 11%.  
Table 3.2 Military personnel for the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
Military Personnel 
 USA UK Canada Australia 
2000 1,372,352 207,620 59,360 50,755 
2001 1,385,116 205,650 58,852 49,763 
2002 1,411,200 204,680 59,249 51,365 
2003 1,423,348 206,920 61,595 51,791 
2004 1,411,287 207,020 62,012 52,242 
2005 1,378,014 201,100 61,715 51,185 
2006 1,371,533 195,850 62,779 50,887 
2007 1,368,226 190,400p 63,779 51,187 
2008 1,402,227 187,060p 64,403 53,149 
2009 1,412,529 188,370p 65,890 54,748e 
p Provisional number 
e Estimated number 
 
Sources : US Department of Defense. 2009. “Active Duty Military Personnel by Service, by Region/Country”. 
Military Personnel Statistics. Online. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm 
(Consulted September 17, 2009);  
United Kingdom. Defence Analytical Services and Advice. 2009. “TSP 1 –UK Regular Forces Strengths and 
Changes”. Historical National Statistics Publications. Online. 
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/www/index.php?page=67&pubType=1&thiscontent=30&date
=2009-05-28 (Consulted September 18, 2009); Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2008. “National 
Defence” Departmental Performance Report.Online. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2007-2008/index-
eng.asp?acr=50 (Consulted September 21, 2009); National Defence and the Canadian Forces. 2009. 
“Recruiting and Retention in the Canadian Forces”. Backgrounder. Online. 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2865 (Consulted 
September 18, 2009); Australian Government Department of Defence. 2009. “Budget”. Statutory Reports. 
Online. http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/index.htm (Consulted 18 September 2009) 
 
Australian and Canadian military expenditures are between 2% and 3% of American 
military expenditures. Comparing the data on the size of the armed forces (Table 3.2), the 
asymmetry between the US and its special allies is equally astounding. The United States 
has over 1.4 million in military personnel in 2009, compared to less than 200 000 military 
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personnel for the UK. Canada and Australia have much smaller numbers, with 65 890 and 
54 748 military personnel respectively. 
Table 3.3 GDP for the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
National GDP (2008 est.) 
 USA UK Canada Australia 
GDP (official exchange rate) $14.26 trillion $2.67 trillion $1.51 trillion $1.01 trillion 
GDP – Per Capita (PPP) $46,900 $36,500 $39,100 $38,100 
GDP – Real Growth Rate 1.1% 0.7% 0.4% 2.3% 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (Consulted September 28, 2009). 
 
Table 3.4 Population in 2008 for the USA, UK, Canada and Australia 
USA UK Canada Australia 
304,059,724 61,383,000 33,441,300 21,644,000 
 
Sources: United States Census Bureau. Population Division. 2002. Annual Estimates of the Resident 
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (NST-
EST2008-01). Online. http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (Consulted October 5, 2009); 
United Kingdom. National Statistics.2009. Population Estimates: UK population grows to 61,4 million. 
Online. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=6 (Consulted October 5, 2009); Canada. Statistique 
Canada. 2008. “Estimations de la population canadienne”. Le Quotidien (Ottawa). December 19, 2008. 
Online. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/081219/dq081219b-fra.htm (Consulted October 5, 2009); 
Australia. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2009. Australian 
Demographic Statistics (3101.0). Online. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0M
ar%202009?OpenDocument (Consulted October 5, 2009). 
 
Non-military values are consistent with the profound asymmetry in capabilities. Gross 
domestic product (GDP) figures put the United States, the most powerful economic power, 
far ahead of its special allies (Table 3.3), with a value of $14.26 trillion for 2008, more than 
six times the UK’s GDP. Finally, comparing the data shows that, even when we account for 
population size (Table 3.4), material indicators of power for the United States are 
impressive, outmatching its strongest ally by far. 
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The point of presenting this comparative outlook of military and economic power is 
to represent the asymmetry quantitatively. Even if the UK is a great power, which is 
apparent when we compare the figures with Canada and Australia, there is a sizeable 
difference between British and American economic and military power. To refine the 
concept of asymmetry we also need to look at other indicators which may mitigate, increase 
or decrease the effects of asymmetry on alliance partners. Looking at the interactions 
between the United States and its special allies, we cannot exclude their history of military 
cooperation from our understanding of asymmetry. For example, the Canada-US dyad is 
sufficiently dissimilar from the Pakistan-US dyad, that it precludes any meaningful 
comparison. In contrast, this project proposes a careful account of special alliances which 
belong to a specific sub-set of formal alliances.  
Special alliance relationships are characterized by a history of integrated military 
cooperation through interoperability, common military exercises and intelligence sharing. 
Alliance theory teaches us that such alliances have been particularly enduring because they 
are based on complementary interests.129 While asymmetry between alliance partners 
provides a solid basis for longstanding cooperation, it is also responsible for basic 
differences in foreign policy priorities. How these differences are negotiated in practice is 
not well understood and deserves further analysis.   
Asymmetry can translate into different assessments of international threats on the 
part of allies. Gideon Rose argues that the scope and ambitions of a state’s foreign policy 
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are first and foremost influenced by relative power.130 However, recognizing that relative 
power is only part of the story, he points to neoclassical realism which emphasizes that 
state power has a very indirect and complex impact on foreign policy. Thus, we must 
uncover how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. In the 
context of special relationships where security concerns are also operationally linked, there 
is an expectation of mutual support when the use of force is considered. In this regard, the 
United States has arguably more raw leverage potential over its allies than the other way 
around. How secondary states respond to the expectations of their dominant alliance partner 
while managing domestic constraints is thus the central question.  
 
Decision-making and Asymmetric Military Cooperation 
This section expands on the core claim: that special allies, due to the proximity of their 
security relationship, have strong incentives to engage in military cooperation with the 
United States. Decision-making processes solicit evaluations of US expectations and 
domestic constraints. Secondary states engage in bargaining and can resort to strategies to 
overcome power asymmetries. When allied states choose to forgo participation altogether, 
they can look to compensatory strategies in an effort to salvage their reputation with the 
dominant ally. This section on decision-making and asymmetric military cooperation has 
two parts: the first focuses on threat perceptions, showing how asymmetric alliance partners 
may disagree over security priorities; the second presents the main variables, alliance 
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expectations and domestic constraints, with the resulting hypotheses on asymmetric 
military cooperation. 
To uncover the decision-making matrix of secondary states, I refer to threat 
perception as an important contextual variable. Threat perception is understood here in a 
way consistent with Walt’s, as outlined in Origins of Alliances, where “…states ally to 
balance against threats rather than against power alone.”131 Walt also recognizes that 
dominant states and secondary states hold different conceptions of threat perception. By 
comparing the behaviour of the United States and the USSR with the behaviour of regional 
powers in the Middle East, he finds that regional powers are generally not preoccupied with 
the global balance of power.132 Another important point which speaks to the asymmetry 
between alliance partners pertains to bandwagoning. Walt argues that weak states are more 
prone to bandwagoning behaviour because they can seldom affect the outcome in the 
resolution of international security issues and they are particularly prone to pressures, given 
their relatively limited capabilities.133  
The UK, contrary to Australia and Canada, possesses the military capabilities to 
alter such an outcome. Cooperating closely with the United States and making sizeable 
contributions to US-led coalitions at least hold the promise of influence on their American 
partner. Although benefits in influence are elusive, opting out of military cooperation with 
the US implies unacceptable exclusion costs. Although the UK’s behaviour can still be 
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characterized as bandwagoning, this explanation comes up short when trying to explain the 
behaviour of long-standing allies. First, special allies are partially shielded from the 
pressures discussed by Walt, since they do not risk the survival of the alliance by staying on 
the sideline. Second, following this logic, one could argue that the UK, Canada and 
Australia have been bandwagoning since the end of World War II, diluting the explanatory 
power of an approach that so heavily focuses on relative capabilities in the causal 
mechanism. As Evelyn Goh points out, realist thinking is indeterminate when it comes to 
explaining the behaviour of secondary states.134 To analyze decision-making processes 
under asymmetric conditions, one must first examine how alliance partners may sometimes 
disagree over security priorities. 
Asymmetry and Threat Perception 
For intra-alliance bargaining, it is important to differentiate between conditions that 
motivate alliance formation and conditions that shape subsequent interactions. Walt’s 
discussion on the sources of threat highlights four factors to consider that are important for 
alliance formation and future interactions. Indeed, allied states appraise aggregate power, 
geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions beyond the initial decision 
to ally.135 Therefore, both commitments and threats are re-evaluated over time when states 
contemplate the use of force. 
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Allied states may have different assessments of threat, especially when it comes to 
identifying aggressive intentions. I argue that this is amplified by power asymmetries.136 
The United States, for its part, has the status of a superpower and global interests to match. 
As a dominant state in the international system, it has the capacity to project its power 
across different regions of the world.137 Global interests translate into a more expansive 
definition of what could constitute a threat to the United States.138 A state of secondary 
rank, on the other hand, is not necessarily driven by global ambitions and may perceive 
international threats accordingly by ordering security priorities differently.  
Even within the United States, there is no foreign policy consensus on threat 
assessment and threat response. Barry Posen, writing shortly after 9/11, outlined four 
American grand strategy alternatives which represent competing strategies to approach the 
threat of terrorism (see Table 3.5).139 The first approach, labeled “neo-isolationist”, stands 
                                                 
136 In the case of symmetric allies, shared threat perception should lead to a joint cooperation plan, where the 
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for a strong retaliatory response through military means, but is generally non-interventionist 
and cautious when it comes to post-conflict nation-building projects and limited 
international involvement.  
Table 3.5 Post- 9/11 American Grand Strategy Alternatives 
Grand Strategy Description 
Neo-Isolationists - Strong military retaliation  
   for 9/11 attacks 
- Limited international involvement 
Liberal Internationalists - UN-driven strategy against terrorism 
- Favours diplomacy over military action 
Primacists - Broader campaign against enemy states 
- US should act unilaterally if necessary 
Selective Engagement - Extended counterterror war, with al-Qaeda as the main target 
- Limited, balanced objective 
Source: Posen, The Struggle against Terrorism, 53-55. 
The second approach, labeled “liberal internationalist” argues for an UN-driven campaign 
against terrorism and minimizes military action in favour of a trial-based strategy to 
apprehend individual terrorism and diplomacy. The third approach, labeled “primacist” 
advocates a broader, all-or-nothing strategy whereby the United States should confront all 
of its enemies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf simultaneously to consolidate American 
primacy in the region. The fourth approach, labeled “selective engagement” would lead to a 
campaign against al-Qaeda but does so according to limited objectives, adopting a long-
term strategy of “extended counterterror war.”140  
Although this is not a perfect categorization of foreign policy alternatives, this 
typology is useful to compare the foreign policy inclinations of the United States with those 
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of its allies. By studying the parliamentary debates and official policy statements in the 
London, Ottawa, and Canberra, it is possible to carve out which strategy these three 
governments favoured and how closely their positions match the American assessment and 
response to international terrorism, as well as other threats in the period following 9/11. In 
reality, what has emerged is a modified version of the primacist approach, whereby the US 
national security strategy argued for an aggressive and American-driven (read unilateral-if-
necessary) war against terror where nation-building efforts could be delegated to coalition 
partners or a UN initiative.141  
The UK’s behaviour is most consistent with selective engagement, as it balanced a 
sizeable response to the War on Terror, but appealed to other states and international 
institutions in an attempt to rein in the superpower.142 Canada opted for a strategy that 
maximized the role of the UN and emphasized the procedural and legalistic aspects of the 
War on Terror.143 Australia, for its part, matched the American primacist grand strategy 
with an ambitious agenda to control rogue regimes, especially North Korea, and also 
demonstrated full support for regime change in Iraq, and an adherence to the Bush Doctrine 
and its emphasis on pre-emption.144 
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The preceding discussion illustrates how allied states may perceive and rank 
international threats differently because of underlying power asymmetries. How allied 
states overcome these differences remains unclear. This would appear especially 
challenging for secondary states in the alliance, as they must cope with an influential 
partner. US expectations are indeed important in the decision-making matrix of secondary 
states but are mitigated by domestic-level constraints. 
Alliance Expectations and Military Cooperation 
For the United States’ special allies, the choice between participating in an American-led 
coalition and opting out bears important consequences. Whereas participation entails 
autonomy costs, non-participation can lead to exclusion costs, where the ally is temporarily 
sidelined.145 Given the asymmetry in power, joint action translates into a substantial 
curtailment of the alliance partner’s autonomy, due to its reliance on the United States’ 
overwhelming material capabilities. It is not a decision based on convenience, but rather on 
necessity.146 As a contextual variable, threat perception gives us clues on the likelihood of 
participation or non-participation, but cannot explain the content of specific policies. It is 
necessary to look at how threat perception interacts with alliance expectations and domestic 
constraints to produce a given foreign policy response when military cooperation is on the 
table. It is also important to differentiate between substantial and token military 
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commitments, by evaluating the type and scope of military commitments made by allies. 
Depending on the level of military cooperation, from no military cooperation to a 
substantial commitment of troops, decision-makers can engage in strategies to minimize the 
drawbacks of the chosen option, whether these are felt at the domestic or alliance level.  
Furthermore, by focusing on domestic-level constraints, we can refine our 
understanding of how burdens are shared. As discussed in chapter 2, smaller alliance 
partners are often portrayed as free-riders, where the stronger partner bears the brunt of 
alliance costs.147 An alternative hypothesis is that burdens are shared according to the 
benefits received by each allies.148 Given substantial power differentials, weaker allies can 
minimize the appearance of free-riding through certain concessions on their territory, like 
agreeing to the foreign use of military bases.149 Access to strategic territory, for instance, 
has been especially prized by the United States in its efforts to combat terrorism abroad.150 
The point is that asymmetries can be mitigated by interdependence, going beyond a narrow 
definition built on power differentials.151 When looking at security cooperation between the 
United States and its allies, it is clear that the US will take on a disproportionate share of 
the costs. However, focusing on power alone obscures the valued contributions of 
secondary states, making every ally look like a free-rider. To have a more balanced and 
operationalizable concept of burden-sharing, we must examine how individual 
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commitments are negotiated and how they measure up to US operational needs in a given 
context. 
What are the factors driving the level of participation of allies? Literature on the 
topic is strongly influenced by Putnam’s two-level game, where allies can maximize their 
bargaining leverage by using domestic constraints at the international level and 
emphasizing international constraints when facing a domestic audience.152 Domestic dissent 
can be used as a resource in bargaining, where allies can appeal for concessions from the 
dominant ally by citing unfavourable public opinion. It becomes apparent that a complex 
political game illustrates intra-alliance dynamics, where alliance expectations and domestic 
constraints impact the level of participation of allies in US-led military intervention. These 
domestic constraints are the level of government cohesion (GVT cohesion) and available 
military capabilities (MIL capabilities).  
How are American expectations understood by decision-makers in allied countries? 
The United States’ closest allies are confronted with the weight of American actions, 
which, to a considerable extent, structures their foreign policy options. When the use of 
force is on the line: 1) There are strong incentives to act as a reliable partner when the 
United States calls for allied support; 2) At the domestic level, there are two sets of 
constraints: a) There is pressure not to appear submissive to American will. A strong 
executive with the backing of government will determine the extent to which there will be 
deferral to American leadership in military cooperation. This variable is labeled 
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government cohesion; b) Military options are limited by a state’s available capabilities, a 
variable la beled military capabilities. In general, the nature and scope of military 
commitments appear relatively shielded from public discussions preceding the initial 
decision on military cooperation. Decision-makers tend to rely on the advice of the military 
when weighing these options out. Through the combination of these important variables, 
we can specify the main causal mechanism which will be tested through the case study 
analysis (Figure 3.1).       
Figure 3.1 Causal Mechanism 
 
 
 
Turning to the application of this decision-making model, the situation that emerged after 
9/11 is mystifying: several allies volunteered military contributions which were not used by 
the United States in the early phases of the war in Afghanistan. Traditional burden-sharing 
explanations are indeterminate in such cases, because far from free-riding, allies are being 
turned away and asked to temporarily wait on the sidelines. In order to evaluate allied troop 
commitments, it is imperative to consider the United State’s propensity to delegate to allies 
and its operational needs. Kreps addresses this issue by arguing that short-term security 
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challenges and the nature of the intervention influence the role given to allies in US-led 
military coalitions.153 Looking at the case of Afghanistan, she notes that: 
With regard to the allies it [the United States] did incorporate, it did so bilaterally 
and almost exclusively after or outside combat operations rather than multilaterally 
and during the early phases of combat. U.S. military and civilian commanders made 
it clear the United States was unwilling to engage in the vagaries of coalition warfare 
while still in the midst of combat operations.154 
 
The 2002 and 2006 US National Security Strategies provide further support for the United 
States’ new attitude toward its allies, arguing for coalitions of the willing rather than 
deference to international institutions or consensus-based decision-making. The 2006 NSS 
states that “international institutions have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the 
willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term”.155 
Instead of investigating why the US intervened unilaterally, my research question focuses 
on the incentives of allied states in providing a military contribution that reflects American 
expectations. The main argument translates into the following three hypotheses so as to 
make specific predictions about the timing, scope and type of military commitment by 
allies: 
Decision-makers’ assessment of US expectations determine the type of military 
commitment made by allies 
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The more cohesive the government, the more allies defer to the dominant ally  
 
Available military capabilities determine the scope of military cooperation 
 
In sum, I begin with the observation that threat perceptions, a contextual variable, illustrate 
how secondary states have their own assessment of international threats which may differ 
from their dominant alliance partner, the United States. This poses a dilemma when having 
to contemplate military cooperation: join the US on its terms, bearing the domestic costs, or 
take an autonomous course of action and suffer reputation costs with the US. I suggest that 
allied commitments are a function of American demands, or how decision-makers perceive 
expectations from the alliance. Alliance expectations are then mediated by domestic 
constraints. As we have seen, the two domestic-level variables are the level of government 
cohesion and available military capabilities.  
Strategies 
When states participate in US-led coalitions, they deploy different strategies to maximize 
their autonomy; when they opt out, they deploy compensatory strategies to minimize the 
impact of their choice on their bilateral relationship. When allies share the same perception 
of threats, it is to the secondary state’s advantage to reveal its support for the US early on, 
to negotiate concessions and communicate conditions bilaterally. When allies hold 
divergent perceptions of threat, they have incentives to postpone publicly stating their 
position, to minimize diplomatic frictions with the dominant alliance partner. Whether there 
is disagreement or agreement on the perception of threat, allies will seek strategies that will 
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increase their freedom of maneuver, either with their dominant alliance partner, or 
domestically.  
Table 3.6 Typology of Allied Strategies 
 PARTICIPATION 
(political support and military 
cooperation) 
 
NON-PARTICIPATION 
(opting out of military cooperation) 
ALLIANCE-
LEVEL 
• Taking the initiative or 
demonstrating leadership 
(expertise edge) 
• Issue linkages: through 
concessions, side payments, or 
agenda-pushing 
 
• Attention-getting: resistance, 
appealing to rules; 
• Use of third parties or “soft 
balancing” coalitions; 
• Stalling, or failing to articulate a 
clear position on military 
cooperation. 
 
DOMESTIC-
LEVEL 
• Negotiating high-profile role in 
intervention, key posts 
• Capitalizing on timing, 
maximizing or minimizing 
visibility of commitment. 
 
• Rhetoric evoking moral principle,  
international norms and procedures; 
playing public opinion at home 
 
In other words, strategies can be used by secondary states to mitigate the effect of power 
asymmetries. To illustrate this, I propose a typology (Table 3.6) of strategies for 
asymmetric security cooperation. Having a typology will allow for a more systematic 
comparison of the cases.156 
In the case of participation, allied states provide political support and military 
cooperation.  The strategies are geared to maximize the visibility of military cooperation for 
both international and domestic audiences by negotiating a high-profile role or key posts at 
the alliance level. The allied state may also obtain side payments or succeed in agenda 
pushing. In cases of participation, where states are caught between either pleasing the US or 
pleasing their domestic audience, officials will opt for strategies that allow them to 
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minimize the visibility of the commitment while reassuring the United States about their 
reliability as an ally and their ability to make concessions. Non-participation is a 
particularly vulnerable position. In such situations, states must justify their decision at the 
alliance level; they are likely to deploy strategies such as stalling, appealing to rules and 
uniting with other dissenting states. On the domestic level, the non-participating ally is 
likely to play up the rhetoric at home for political gain.  
Competing Hypotheses on Asymmetric Security Cooperation 
As stated in chapter 2, states join alliances as a strategy to counter external threats, but 
alliances can also live beyond the threat that motivated their creation.157 Enduring and 
deeply institutionalized alliances represent a unique challenge for alliance theory, since the 
patterns of military cooperation of the world’s closest and most interdependent allies are 
uneven at best. In this section, I introduce competing hypotheses on asymmetric security 
cooperation. Two neorealist explanations address regional insecurity and changes in the 
international security environment. Another hypothesis from liberal institutionalism is 
presented to assess the importance of institutional norms when states appeal to the UN for 
the use of armed force. A final hypothesis deals with domestic politics, focusing on the 
political opposition and public opinion. The alternative explanations discussed will be 
tested against my theory through the hypotheses presented below. The cases show that 
these competing factors are not decisive in the decision-making processes leading to 
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military cooperation. Let us now turn to each hypothesis as they relate to the specific cases 
under investigation. 
The United Nations:  Constraints on the International Use of Force  
The United Nations proceedings in the fall of 2002 attracted a lot of international attention. 
Deliberations leading to the achievement of Resolution 1441 giving Saddam an ultimatum 
on WMDs combined with the process of the UN weapons inspections team led to a period 
of optimism. This momentum came to a halt with France’s threat to use its veto should a 
second resolution be put on the table, explicitly authorizing the use of force.158 That the UN 
became an important tool of international bargaining is evident. Did the UN process 
directly influence decision-making of state leaders in favour or against participation? The 
following hypothesis suggests that UN support does influence military cooperation: 
When the use of force is not supported by a UN resolution, states are less likely 
to commit troops to military cooperation 
 
Looking at official statements made by leading figures such as UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair or his Ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, it seems fairly obvious that 
going to the UN was a tool to bring other states on board, rather than the final arbiter on the 
possibility of using force against Saddam’s regime.159 Going to the UN was a strategy to 
buy more time for bilateral bargaining with the United States. On the German side, 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroëder had made strong statements against the use of force in Iraq 
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long before the UN process was underway, hinting at other important factors in the balance. 
Past behaviour can also cast doubt on the constraining effects of norms, such as US-led 
NATO operations in Kosovo, where these same allied states assisted the United States 
without appealing to the UN process in the forceful manner that they did in 2002. The UN 
mainly seems to provide leverage for secondary states when their policy positions differ 
from those of the United States. This competing hypothesis is discussed in the Canadian 
case, as the Chrétien government refused to commit troops to the war in Iraq, making 
constant references to the UN.  
Domestic Politics: Government Opposition and Public Opinion 
The argument on domestic politics states that certain foreign policy decisions are based on 
the political calculations of the decision-makers. Certain domestic factors are likely to 
impede government efforts to build a foreign policy consensus, such as the presence of a 
minority government, a strong and influential opposition, upcoming elections, or low 
approval ratings. A basic hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
Strong dissent, as expressed by the opposition and public opinion, will  
undermine a state’s ability to support military cooperation 
 
Several of these factors were present in Germany in 2002. Indeed, that the German 
opposition to the Iraq War was primarily driven by domestic factors is a convincing 
argument. Chancellor Schröder was preparing the ground for his electoral campaign, 
capitalizing on a German public opinion that was already vocal about its opposition to a 
potential war in Iraq. Similarly, Canada’s role at the UN, which attracted a lot of criticism 
from the United States, is often presented as being primarily driven by domestic 
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concerns.160 Not only was Canadian public opinion generally opposed to a war in Iraq, but 
opposition was especially strong in Quebec where a provincial election was looming. 
Although Prime Minister Chrétien has always firmly denied basing his foreign policy on 
domestic concerns, these factors may have placed additional pressure on the government to 
withhold its support on the use of force in Iraq.161  
Although the domestic explanation is convincing for the German case given 
Schröder’s precarious position, the same cannot be said for Canada. Chrétien’s position was 
nowhere near precarious, despite internal divisions within his government. In the Canadian 
case, it was not domestic politics, but the level of government cohesion that had a bearing 
on foreign policy-making. Moreover, decisions related to military cooperation, like in the 
UK and Australia, are largely the prerogative of the executive and thus, not often submitted 
to a vote in Parliament unless it is at the Prime Minister’s own initiative as in the British 
case. The domestic politics explanation does not appear to hold much water in the three 
cases under study, especially since the British and Australian governments supported the 
US notwithstanding growing manifestations of dissent at home.  
In sum, several factors undermine the domestic politics hypothesis. One is the claim 
that decision-makers are more likely to shape public opinion than the other way around, as 
demonstrated by the literature on foreign policy and public opinion.162 Another factor is 
that the three countries studied are parliamentary democracies, where there is strong 
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tradition of executive leadership on foreign policy issues. Also, in the case of Afghanistan 
specifically, commitments were made early on, leaving little time for the public or the 
opposition to express dissent. Furthermore, the post-9/11 climate generated displays of 
solidarity for the United States, rather than criticism against joining the military effort in 
Afghanistan.  
Regional Insecurity 
The literature on the topic is built on the proposition that an alliance is asymmetric to the 
extent that there is no disagreement about which member-state is dominant.163 The 
condition of asymmetry may then interact with both internal and/or external factors that can 
exacerbate the initial condition of asymmetry between alliance partners. For example, 
Womack argues that asymmetry, combined with geographical proximity, exacerbates the 
asymmetric dynamic because of the relationship’s salience for each state.164 The case of 
Canada comes to mind. Canada has been extremely sensitive to intrusive security measures 
imposed by the United States at their common border since 9/11.  Since 80% of Canadian 
exports are bound for the American market, Canada is generally more vulnerable to 
changes in border security management, bearing a disproportionate share of the cost when 
security measures take precedence over trade.165  
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On the other hand, geographic isolation may exacerbate the fears of abandonment 
felt by the weaker party. Turning to the Australian case, the ANZUS treaty, shared by 
Australia and the United States, is often interpreted as a mutual defence treaty, while its 
formal provisions only stipulate an obligation to “consult” if a common threat arises in the 
Pacific region.166 Alternatively, geographic isolation may exacerbate the fears of 
abandonment felt by the weaker party. The implications of geography can be tested if 
formulated in a way that allows for variance. Geography can be best understood as a state’s 
regional environment, where security concerns vary according to threats posed in the 
immediate vicinity. To measure the effect of regional security concerns on the special 
allies’ willingness to support the United States through military cooperation, I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
As regional security concerns rise, special allies will be more inclined to lend 
support and resources to a US-led coalition.  
 
Regional security concerns can be more or less salient when we consider the following 
factors: (1) the involvement or presence of the United States in the immediate region of the 
ally where a strong presence would alleviate these concerns and disengagement exacerbate 
them; (2) the level of threat understood as the number of criminal and/or hostile incidents 
close to the state’s borders; and (3) fluctuations in military expenditure which can impact 
the degree of reliance on American security guarantees.   
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Looking at regional security makes for an interesting comparison because the three 
states under study have very different security concerns in their vicinity. According to 
Kelton, regional security concerns contribute to an explanation of Australia’s unambiguous 
support for American foreign policy.167 I would add a note of caution to how one analyzes 
the impact of regional security concerns on alliance dynamics. There should be an attempt 
to distinguish between a state’s long term goals, its strategic posture, and short term 
requirements, such as the secondary state’s capabilities and ongoing military operations 
elsewhere in the world. In the Australian case, it is worth noting that its traditional reliance 
on the UK as a guarantor of its security shifted in favour of the United States after World 
War II. Providing for its regional security autonomously has also been part of the national 
discourse on defence because of the great geographical distance between Australia and its 
closest allies.168  
Canada’s relatively quiet neighbourhood on all sides of the border has made these 
security concerns manageable and may influence decisions related to military cooperation 
with the United States outside the realm of continental defence. The Cold War made 
Canada’s perimeter less secure because of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Canadians 
were concerned about Russian missiles coming from the North.169 Similarly, the UK also 
relied on the United States to face the threat posed by the USSR. After the end of World 
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War II, these concerns were promptly voiced by Winston Churchill who advocated a strong 
American role to deter the Soviet Union and to prevent another devastating war in 
Europe.170 For both Canada and the UK, their respective security concerns were answered 
by strong security guarantees on the part of the US, which were institutionalized through 
NORAD. Such guarantees mitigated the fears of abandonment felt by the Unites States’ 
allies, as these states sought and prioritized American security guarantees over autonomy 
concerns.  
Dependence on the United States 
Despite the potential for both abandonment and entrapment, alliances also provide 
important benefits. For secondary states, the major benefit of military cooperation with the 
United States is an increased ability to “punch above [their] international weight.”171 In 
other words, the alliance acts as a power multiplier, enhancing security through better 
deterrent capabilities and providing access to intelligence and military technology. 
Drawbacks include minimal input when the asymmetry is pronounced, no guarantees on 
American protection, and finally, intelligence sharing which can be intrusive and a way for 
the dominant power to control its weaker allies.172 In sum, the more closely a state engages 
in military cooperation with the United States, the more constrained it becomes. There are 
opportunities to influence the United States by extracting certain concessions from 
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participation, but generally speaking, the relationship is highly asymmetric and dependent. 
Influence yielded by allies over the United States, if any, is context specific.173  
Dependence of secondary states on the United States is difficult to assess in a period 
where international tensions are low for Western states. The likelihood of major interstate 
war appears unlikely, but certain indicators can provide useful information about 
asymmetry understood as security dependence between alliance partners. The degree of 
dependence on the United States can be measured as a function of systemic conditions 
where secondary states will rally in favour of the dominant power when the security 
environment is uncertain or threatening. As stated in chapter 2, a change in the security 
environment can increase or decrease an ally’s dependence on its dominant partner.174 
Indicators for the nature of the security environment include the density of institutional 
security arrangements, the scope of American security guarantees through the existence of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, as well as reliance on American military technology. This 
leads to a hypothesis on dependence leading to an increase in the probability of support, 
when military cooperation is solicited: 
 
When special allies rely heavily on the security provisions of the United States 
due to an uncertain or threatening security environment, they will be more 
likely to engage in military cooperation in times of war. 
 
All three countries, the UK, Canada and Australia, rely strongly on the security provisions 
of the United States. It is important to look at the evolution of this variable since the end of 
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the Cold War, and try to identify the causes of these changes and their implications for the 
overall alliance relationship. The events of 9/11 represent a significant shift in the security 
environment and precipitated major changes in the United States’ strategic posture. As 
such, allies had to react to these changes and respond to updated alliance expectations and 
requirements. 
This section has addressed the merits of alternative explanations to explain 
asymmetric military cooperation. Two explanations appear particularly convincing from the 
preceding discussion: hypotheses on regional security and the level of dependence, which 
feature in the case study chapters. Turning to the individual level of analysis, the cases 
being studied display strong leadership on the part of key decision-makers when 
contemplating the drastic foreign policy options offered to them.175 Byman and Pollack 
argue that certain conditions cause an individual leader to have more influence on the 
course of events. These conditions are the concentration of power in the leader’s hands, 
conflicting institutions, and changes in the international system.176 If two of these three 
conditions are present, there should be an attempt to identify idiosyncrasies or exceptional 
domestic processes, which could account for residual variance. In the cases studied, 
conflicting institutions and systemic change are both present. This is a point I will take up 
in the case study chapters with the method of structured, focused comparison. While I will 
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not engage in a description on the decision-making style of individual state leaders, I will 
identify how disruptions in the policy-making process can lead to an enhanced exercise of 
leadership, especially given the parliamentary democratic systems of the UK, Canada and 
Australia. 
Evidence 
The next three chapters are in-depth comparative case studies. To test my main argument, I 
focus on key decisions involving the United States and its allies. To narrow the range of 
options, I have selected foreign policy decisions with a high degree of salience, namely, the 
urgency of the issue at hand, the degree of public awareness and the high stakes involved in 
the decision, broadly understood as blood and treasure.177  
The selection of cases was further motivated by the following two criteria: First, I 
have chosen US-led coalitional initiatives, where opting out was a credible outcome.178 
These are rare occurrences, generally speaking, but they represent high constraint situations 
for close allies since there are expectations of participation on the part of the United States 
when building a coalition of willing states. The fact that special allies have a high degree of 
interoperability with the United States makes their contribution particularly attractive, since 
it implies lower transaction costs than with other allied states. Although specific promises 
                                                 
177 Low priority issues, such as routine surveillance activities, are typically handled by standard operating 
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and obligations ratified within the framework of an alliance treaty are reliable indicators for 
what is expected on the part of alliance partners, special allies achieve their privileged 
status through close integration with the United States and the pursuit of interoperability.179  
The second criterion is the prospect of troop mobilization for war. This possibility 
results in substantial costs for the ally both in terms of investment and sovereignty. When 
the deployment of troops is involved, we can expect that an implicit recognition has been 
made on the part of allied decision-makers, namely that their troops might fall under US 
command. The size of the commitment made is the result of a trade-off between alliance 
expectations and domestic constraints. Even when these factors are considered, the wars 
which occurred after the Second World War are all limited wars for the United States, 
meaning that they did not threaten its survival. This will have implications at the domestic 
level, where these asymmetric wars are not perceived as vital and so, are subject to the 
guns-vs.-butter trade-off debate.180  
I have identified the universe of cases for the United States’ special allies, the UK, 
Canada, and Australia (Table 3.7). These cases, involving participation (substantial or 
token) and non-participation in US-led military interventions, offer considerable variation 
on the dependent variable given the broad range of military commitments offered by allies. 
Despite the limited number of cases, variation on the dependent variable can improve 
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small-N research designs by increasing the number of observations.181 In three of the cases, 
allies decided to opt out, not sending troops to these coalition war initiatives. In the other 
cases, there seems to be considerable support on the part of American allies, including 
troop contribution. Still, the variation in terms of the level of participation is key.  
Table 3.7 Universe of Cases 
 Participation Non-participation 
Korea (1950) Australia; Canada; Britain --- 
Vietnam (1965) Australia Canada; Britain 
Gulf War (1991) Australia; Canada; Britain --- 
Kosovo (1999) Canada; Britain Australia 
Afghanistan (2001) Australia; Canada; Britain --- 
Iraq (2003) Australia; Britain Canada 
 
I will provide in-depth case studies of the most recent cases: British, Australian, and 
Canadian decisions leading up to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future research 
is needed to broaden the analysis to the universe of cases, or alternatively, to study other 
allies as additional case studies. In order to multiply the number of observations, I will 
disaggregate decision-making according to different phases of military cooperation. By 
looking at different phases of military deployment, there are more observations to test the 
hypotheses. To analyze the selected case, I use the method of structured, focused 
comparison, which can be summarized as follows:  
 
The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that 
reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under 
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study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic 
comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 
“focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases 
examined.182  
 
Thus, to compare is to control “whether generalizations hold across the cases to which they 
apply” and the comparative method is well suited for small-N analysis, where the 
researcher is confronted with many variables but few cases.183 This comparative method 
has the advantage of allowing maximum flexibility in considering ideas and data because it 
allows investigators to “combine causal analysis, interpretive analysis, and concept 
formation in the course of their studies.”184 In sum, this approach demonstrates that the 
theory-building enterprise is an iterative process.  
Looking at the vast literature on alliance theory, it is apparent that the number of 
potential explanations to address intra-alliance decision-making is infinite. This research 
design, based on a careful case selection, is meant to address this challenge by controlling 
for an important number of conditions. These conditions are not assumed to be absent, but 
they are assumed constant, meaning that they do not vary. This most-similar research 
design shows that the UK, Canada, and Australia are similar in most respects but for the 
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explanatory variables, with variance on the dependent variable.185 The dependent variable, 
the level of participation in military cooperation with the United States, is understood as a 
continuum: non-participation, political support with no troops, minimal military 
contribution, and full military cooperation. In my view, this comparative case study 
approach strikes the right balance between generality and context-specific understanding, 
considering the research question driving the inquiry. 
In carrying out the case studies, I analyze primary sources of data concerning 
security policy between the United States and its special allies, namely, diplomatic 
statements, the original text of alliance treaties and defense policy statements, as well as 
secondary sources, in order to contextualize each decision. I also rely on interviews to 
clarify the link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints. 
The interviews reveal important negotiation strategies of asymmetric alliance interactions. 
Some of the key questions under investigation are: Do decision-makers mention the United 
States when justifying a certain course of action? Are concerns over alliance requirements 
and domestic audiences justified in terms of a trade-off? If so, how does this trade-off play 
out in practice? How do they define their own perceptions of threat? 
 Although I recognize that the selected cases each have unique characteristics, I 
proceed with a common set of questions for the comparison which can yield valuable 
causal inferences about asymmetric alliances and the conditions under which the weaker 
partner can increase its leverage domestically and internationally:  
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- What was the perceived balance of interests between the allies? 
- What motives did the weaker partner have in opting for the chosen  
      course of action?186 
- What were the anticipated costs/gains from the chosen course of action 
(reinforcing the alliance vs. provoking reprisals)? 
- What are the specific strategies pursued by the ally? 
- What specific conditions favoured compliance or non-compliance  
      with American requests? 
- How do the alternative explanations measure up in each case? 
 
 
In the parliamentary political systems of Great Britain, Australia, and Canada, the executive 
plays a strong role in foreign and defence policy decision-making, while the legislative 
branch plays a minor role.187 Senior civil servants from the Foreign Service and Defence 
are equally important actors in decision-making when the use of force is contemplated. The 
comparison is structured in a way that leaves this variable constant. Ultimately, British, 
Australian or Canadian prime ministers can go their own way with or without the full 
support of government, providing they are heading a majority government. This is in sharp 
contrast to the American system where, according to the 1973 War Powers Act, the 
President must get the support of Congress for any military action.188 The case studies 
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investigate the interactions within government and between governments (US vs. ally) to 
show how international threats are processed by state actors into specific foreign and 
defence policies, and to illustrate the policy trade-offs between alliance and domestic 
expectations.  
Overview of Case Studies 
The three case study countries, the UK, Canada, and Australia, provide a unique 
comparative context for making sense of American foreign policy following 9/11. These 
states, often referred to as special allies, share close military, political, economic, cultural 
and historical ties with the United States. Since the end of World War II, the United States 
has been the dominant and most important partner for all three states. American security 
guarantees are of particular interest, as they have been formalized through alliance treaties 
and practice. Although the bilateral relationships between the United States and its closest 
allies are asymmetric, there are mutual expectations of support on key issues. How these 
allies respond to US military action is the main focus in the following case study chapters. 
Several scholars have commented on the unilateral turn in American diplomacy 
under the Bush administration.189 The first term of this administration was characterized by 
a display of unlimited goodwill by the international community, following 9/11, and, then, 
a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment during the lead-up to the Iraq War. This period 
is important in making sense of the complex relationship that was negotiated between the 
                                                 
189 Nye, The Paradox of American Power; Art, A Grand Strategy for America; Walt, “Beyond bin Laden: 
Reshaping U.S. Forein Policy”. For an assessment of the NSS’ performance, see Jeremy Pressman, “Power 
without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East”, International 
Security 33, 4 (2009), 149-179. 
  
 
96
United States and its allies for two very different wars. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
should not be conflated. Although both can be conceived of as part of the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT), allied support for the invasion of Afghanistan was justified as a treaty 
obligation under NATO. The war in Iraq can be seen as an application of the Bush 
Doctrine. The elaboration of the Bush Doctrine as a national security strategy is a different 
response to the new security environment that emerged after 9/11. Some scholars have 
argued that the Bush Doctrine represents a shift in American foreign policy, insofar as “...it 
adheres to a vindicationist framework for democracy promotion, in which the aggressive 
use of U.S. power is employed as the primary instrument of liberal change”190. 
The overarching threat for the United States since 9/11 is undoubtedly the threat of 
international terrorism. In comparing allied perception of threat, it is not clear if each 
individual state shares the American interpretation of the GWOT, or the national and 
international responses devised to implement it. In general though, the threat of 
international terrorism has been identified as an important strategic concern by NATO 
allies since the 1990s, following terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Yemen.191 For 
instance, de Nevers argues that the American approach to counterterrorism is offensive, 
while NATO’s is defensive, pointing to its role as a supporting organization to the United 
States.192 
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Another important consideration relates to burden-sharing, as mentioned in the 
theoretical discussion on alliances. Sometimes, accounts of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have belittled allied contributions. It is argued that the initial military campaign in 
Afghanistan was mainly a U.S. effort with a handful of Special Forces from other allies.193 
In fact, the American presence in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was limited to Special 
Forces with airpower support. The bulk of conventional forces were actually provided by 
the Afghan army.194 Therefore, allied contributions should be understood in this specific 
context, with a balanced view of the campaign’s operational needs and the demands placed 
on alliance partners. On a separate but related note, the Afghan model became possible as a 
result of dramatic improvements in military technology since the Gulf War, where 
precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were introduced successfully on the battlefield in a 
conventional confrontation. The combination of high-tech airpower and Special Forces 
could have been carried out by the US alone. To the extent that allies did participate, the 
only allies that were interoperable enough to fit this model were the UK, Canada and 
Australia. Andreas describes the early successes of Operation Enduring Freedom, by 
emphasizing this synergy: “Coalition airpower transformed the Northern Alliance into a 
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lethal fighting force […] In short, new technology available to SOF [Special Operating 
Forces] and airpower transformed the nature of conventional war in Afghanistan”195.   
Conclusion 
As one would expect, an asymmetric military alliance involves much higher stakes for the 
weaker partner. Perhaps this is not reflected in burden-sharing, but certainly in terms of 
what the alliance entails. The weaker partner must acknowledge the possibility that security 
cooperation might be under US control. Transferring authority in such matters requires 
strong justifications. The worst fear is automatic involvement in any US conflict, the fear of 
entrapment referred to earlier. Therefore, secondary states must manage expectations held 
by the dominant ally about their level of commitment. The following three chapters are 
detailed case studies of the UK, Canada and Australia’s foreign policy following 9/11. The 
theoretical argument focuses on decision-making processes leading up to the military 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The argument presented in this chapter offers several contributions to alliance 
theory. First, it presents decision-making leading to military cooperation from the 
perspective of secondary allied states, rather than that of the dominant alliance partner. 
Alliance theory affirms that secondary states can engage in balancing and bandwagoning 
behaviour but is indeterminate with regards to foreign policy decision-making. Second, the 
literature on burden-sharing, to the extent that it discusses participation by secondary states, 
oversimplifies the benefits of military cooperation between asymmetric allies. My 
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argument emphasizes the need to take into account the United States’ operational needs and 
willingness to delegate to its allies and the comparative advantages inherent in a state’s 
contribution. In other words, contributions must be assessed qualitatively, not just 
quantitatively. Third, the case studies will contribute to the development of the typology on 
asymmetric strategies. By identifying the range of alliance-level and domestic-level 
strategies for both instances of participation and non-participation, the typology clarifies the 
foreign policy options of asymmetric security cooperation.  
  
-3- 
Exceeding Expectations: the UK’s Role in the War 
against Terror 
 
From the time Churchill made reference to it in 1946, the Anglo-American Special 
Relationship (AASR) has been an enduring concept for Britain. Even with the growing 
influence of the European Union, the UK has continuously reinforced the transatlantic link 
and its commitment to the United States. Is there a natural convergence of interests between 
the two states? One observer notes that “it is remarkable how routinely British and 
American leaders have found that their nations’ self-interests were parallel, if not 
identical.”196 During the Cold War, episodes such as the Suez crisis or the Vietnam War 
posed serious challenges to this view, but the real test to the relationship came in 1991, as 
the main common threat disappeared, along with the Soviet Empire. Still, the special 
relationship was reaffirmed, despite a more European orientation of British foreign policy, 
and reinforced with the arrival of Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997. Throughout the 
1990s, the UK retained a relatively independent foreign policy, though never completely 
autonomous from the United States. The UK has carefully managed periods of 
disagreements with the United States, never compromising their long-standing alliance. 
Yet, the relationship is still asymmetric and characterized by a strong degree of reliance on 
American security guarantees.  
                                                 
196 Warren F. Kimball, “The ‘Special’ Anglo-American Special Relationship: A Fatter, Larger Underwater 
Cable”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 3, 1 (2005), 1-5. 
  
 
101
Between 2001 and 2003, the threat posed by terrorism and Saddam Hussein’s 
regime dominated the foreign policy agenda. The perception of threat was closely aligned 
between the UK and the US, which translated into early signals of support by the British. In 
the case of Iraq, Britain answered American expectations but also had a vested interest in 
increasing the pressure on Saddam Hussein’s regime. US expectations, as perceived by 
British decision-makers, structured London’s response to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Concerns over being the first among allies drove the UK to make a substantial 
commitment, having impressive military capabilities, but to leverage its contribution to the 
benefit of its bilateral alliance with the United States. Pledging British support early on can 
be understood as a strategy to maximize the visibility and impact of the military 
commitment made.  
In the early phase of the War on Terror, in 2001-2002, there was strong deference to 
the United States for the conduct of the military response due to the level of government 
cohesion. The UK took part in the early combat operations in Afghanistan and was in 
charge of the initial postwar reconstruction of the country, coordinating allied efforts. 
Available military capabilities translated into British involvement in every facet of the 
conflict: the bombing campaign, special operations, as well as stabilization and nation-
building. As internal divisions within government came to the fore in the fall of 2002 and 
early 2003, the Blair government increasingly imposed conditions on its participation to the 
US-led coalition. For the Iraq war, the Blair government pushed ahead with a very public 
demonstration of support in favour of the American position, while managing an 
increasingly fragmented government. Domestic politics played a greater role here than 
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acknowledged by my theory. This is due to Blair’s public relations campaign on Iraq: the 
use of public dossiers, the initiation of Parliamentary debates, and submitting the decision 
up for a vote are anomalous when looking at past decisions to commit British troops. The 
case study analysis reveals another anomaly: the circumvented nature of the policymaking 
process leading up to Iraq, which made possible the adoption of this controversial policy 
stance, as the government’s high level of cohesion began to erode, a point which will be 
addressed in a separate section. 
This chapter is divided into six parts: the first section discusses the Anglo-American 
security relationship to discuss the systemic variables relevant for the posited causal 
mechanism; the second section discusses the variables on US alliance expectations and 
domestic constraints in the context between 2001 and 2003; the third deals with the 
decision-making processes leading up to the British commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq; 
the fourth considers the aforementioned anomalies in the decision making process; the fifth 
explores alternative explanations, while the concluding section addresses British strategies 
of asymmetric security cooperation.  
The Anglo-American Security Relationship  
It is important to consider the broader context of the Anglo-American alliance in order to 
understand how systemic conditions influence the two countries’ security priorities. How 
allies perceive and respond to threats is informed by their relative standing in the 
international system. Underlying power distribution and changes in the security 
environment can lead to changes in alliance commitments. As mentioned in chapter 3, 
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watershed events, such as 9/11 are opportunities for secondary allies to update information 
about their commitments vis-à-vis their dominant ally. From a comparative standpoint, this 
examination also provides an assessment of foreign policy trends leading up to the period 
under study. The UK stands apart as an ally that has repeatedly adjusted its foreign policy 
to meet the requirements of its alliance with the United States. 
Although the UK is a great power in its own right, the US-UK special relationship 
evolved through a consistent belief expressed in British foreign policy, that the American 
alliance was of utmost importance for its national security. This point was constantly 
reiterated in British Defence white papers since the end of World War II and is evidence to 
why such a close alliance has been desirable from the British point of view. At the basic 
level, the security-autonomy trade-off applies, as the UK has made some concessions to the 
United States through the use of air bases on British soil or on protectorates throughout the 
Cold War. For the UK, its alliance with the United States represents a power multiplier 
through which “British policy makers have traditionally sought to enhance British 
international prestige and influence.”197 Stated differently, the Anglo-American relationship 
has served to prop up Britain’s declining power after the end of the Second World War.  
The UK, being dependent on the United States to uphold its great power status, has 
invested heavily in the Anglo-American alliance. It has responded to several American 
demands since the end of the Cold War. For instance, Britain has maintained its military 
capabilities when other European states were cutting theirs and it has played a strong role in 
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NATO, when the relevance of the alliance was being put into question in the 1990s. The 
UK values the idea of being a reliable partner to the United States because it is a way to 
manage omnipresent fears of abandonment, or of lessening American interest. As Walt 
notes, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the threat that led to the 
creation of NATO, close US allies may question the credibility of US commitments 
abroad.198  
Maintaining great power status is thus an important consideration when looking at 
the benefits of the alliance for the United Kingdom. This is also a constant feature of 
British foreign policy, despite the occasional and rare rift in the relationship like the Suez 
crisis. A recent account of British foreign policy argues that the UK is a pivotal power, 
comparable with powers such as Australia. “Pivotal powers,” according to Tim Dunne, “are 
regional great powers with the capacity to project their military forces in their near 
abroad.”199 This definition offers a more narrow reading of British influence than the 
traditional term “great power.” In addition, an increasing reliance on the United States since 
World War II, and more definitely, after the Suez Crisis, has anchored the importance of 
the special relationship for British international security policy. How does this general 
inclination translate into specific foreign policy decisions? Are the English and Americans 
perfectly in tune when it comes to evaluating their interests and corresponding threats? 
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Watershed events, such as 9/11, represent critical junctures where alliance expectations are 
updated. 
The events of 9/11 were of momentous importance to the world community with 
major consequences for the future of American foreign policy. That certain states saw these 
events as a window of opportunity to reassess their strategic relationship with the United 
States has been confirmed by history. The UK’s posture, acting as the transatlantic link is 
unique in this regard, bridging European and American views through diplomatic 
interactions.200 Britain has taken some credit for its leadership in getting NATO to invoke 
Article V on October 4, 2001, with the caveat that NATO did not appear as a strong player 
for the United States in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.201 Britain, for its part, 
wanted to be seen as a strong player by the United States. Blair undertook a European 
diplomatic tour to enlist the unconditional solidarity of other European leaders, with 
moderate success. With time, there is no doubt that deep divisions emerged in Europe, 
especially on the matter of Iraq. Blair’s diplomatic efforts with France and Germany never 
produced a durable alliance at the UN after the adoption of UNSCR 1441. The significance 
of British foreign policy between 2001 and 2003 is dominated by its bilateral interactions 
with the US. 
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The predominance of American influence over British foreign policy-making 
evolved from a “strategic belief in working with the United States as a necessity to the 
U.K.”202 The cost of not supporting the US appeared higher than risking political backlash 
at home. British decision-makers “were strategically and politically not prepared to go 
against the United States”.203 This belief was clearly heightened with 9/11 as Britain 
reverted to its Cold War stance of committed Atlanticism.204 Quoting the Second Report of 
the British Foreign Affairs Committee in 2001, after 9/11, the importance of the United 
States for the UK is unequivocal: “…There is no more important relationship for the United 
Kingdom…The United States is the United Kingdom’s foremost political and military ally, 
its single greatest trading partner, its largest source of investment, its largest recipient of 
investment, and the world’s remaining superpower.”205 The tone of this report expresses the 
longstanding and far-reaching nature of the US-UK relationship, as well as the UK’s 
unmatched response to 9/11, as a testimony of the special relationship.  
The report is also blunt in acknowledging the benefits of being the first to act in 
favour of the United States: influence. While influence is intangible and certainly difficult 
to measure, it is cited as a goal of British foreign policy and as the prime motive for 
identifying closely with the US on high security matters. The report states: “Influence on 
important decisions, then, is suggested as the main consequence for the United Kingdom of 
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its decision to identify its interests with those of its ally.”206 To achieve this, building a 
consensus on international security policy is deemed to be the strategy for tackling the 
threat of terrorism, and for keeping the United States engaged multilaterally. The most 
senior civil servant at the British Ministry of Defence (MOD), Kevin Tebbit, asserts that the 
UK needs the US to remain a global power, but that influence operates mostly indirectly 
and through informal bilateral channels.207  
This perception is prevalent in the academic literature as well. The inherent trade-
off between the costs and benefits of the special relationship is also acknowledged by 
academic experts in British foreign policy. Dunne summarizes the underlying bargain of 
the Anglo-American security relationship: “... Britain pledges its loyalty to the United 
States in return for influence over the direction of the hegemonic power’s foreign 
policy.”208 How can one gain insight on the extent of British influence over US foreign 
policy? It is arguably imperceptible where security policy between the US and UK is 
perfectly aligned. Areas of divergence can potentially shed light on the UK’s special 
relationship. An important area of disagreement between the two countries relates to the 
war plans drawn up by the Pentagon, for both Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been reported 
that the UK insisted on there being a post-war phase, but that British officials were met 
with resistance.209 Brian Burridge, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) Strike Command in 2002-2003 and Commander-in-Chief of the RAF Strike 
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Command from 2003 to 2006, states that the UK did at least exert some leverage over the 
US on the ground, vetoing certain targeting decisions, for example.210 Overall, the UK 
appeared to influence the timing of the decision rather than having any substantive impact 
on US policy.211 At first glance, it seems that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq placed 
incredible demands on the UK. Going beyond systemic factors can help to uncover what 
drove the UK to make such high-stake military commitments.  How did British decision-
makers perceive US expectations and how did this mould Britain’s engagement in 
Afghanistan and Iraq? 
Balancing Alliance Expectations and Domestic Constraints 
This section will first analyze in detail how the main variables are operationalized in 
this case study analysis. Since this is a comparative exercise, a set of common questions 
will lead to an evaluation of each variable in the proposed causal mechanism when critical 
decisions on military cooperation are made. To gain insight into intra-alliance dynamics 
between asymmetric partners, actions undertaken by American allies should be judged 
according to American expectations in the period between 9/11 and the Iraq War. Alliance 
partners also face important constraints at the domestic level. States can only actualize 
alliance commitments to the extent that they have the military capabilities to do so and that 
the government has support to implement such a policy, as measured by the level of 
government cohesion.  
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Alliance expectations are defined first, by prevailing treaties between allied states. 
In the British case, both the UK-USA security agreement on intelligence sharing and the 
North Atlantic Treaty, the founding treaty of NATO, reveal information about the 
expectations of mutual support.212 Second, expectations are defined by past experiences. 
British commitments to past American-led coalitions offer some cues on the likelihood of 
UK support for a particular initiative. The UK’s role in Iraq, from the Gulf War in 1991 to 
Desert Fox in 1998, demonstrates its engagement with the US against Saddam’s regime. 
Finally, alliance expectations are defined by operational requirements. As states embark on 
military cooperation, the dominant partner will create a division of labour according to its 
operational needs. 
In structuring the comparison between the UK, Canada, and Australia, we have to 
adjust for disparities in their capabilities which affect US expectations in a general way. 
Accordingly, the expectations placed on the UK may be greater than for other allies. Britain 
is, by a considerable extent, the most militarily capable ally when compared with Canada 
and Australia. Though Britain’s military expenditures have remained constant as a 
percentage of GDP, strong and consistent economic growth resulted in considerable 
increases in defence spending (Table 4.1):  
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Table 4.1 Comparative Military Expenditure of the UK [2000; 2008] 
 
 2000 2008 
Local Currency m.pounds 23,301 35,320 
US $m. 47,778 57,392 
As Percentage of GDP 2.4 2.4 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009). 
 
There are also qualitative indicators of military power which are important for the Anglo-
American alliance. Previous campaigns have revealed the extent to which military 
interoperability is an important consideration for the United States when contemplating 
military cooperation with allies. For example, the Kosovo campaign in 1999 showed some 
European states incapable of working alongside the Americans, because of the 
technological incompatibility of their militaries.213  
The UK, beyond having a high level of military interoperability with the United 
States, has other great power assets of value to the Americans. Britain has been a strong 
supporter of the United States in the Security Council, possesses nuclear weapons, and has 
interests that span beyond its immediate region, due to its colonial past. Élie, for example, 
has argued that the US-UK special relationship has contributed to American soft power in 
Europe.214 The value of Britain as an ally is thus high. American officials made this point 
clearly, as they tried to recruit the support of other states for their War on Terror, according 
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to the British ambassador to Washington at the time Christopher Meyer.215 The UK also 
took the leading role in the implementation of the International Stabilization and Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in December 2001. The UK directly addressed and fulfilled US expectations 
and demands, by taking on a role US troops did not want in Afghanistan, heading nation-
building efforts, and, then, by providing key political support and troops for the War in 
Iraq.  
The next section explores the interaction between the American and British 
governments, emphasizing perceived expectations on both sides to assess how military 
cooperation was negotiated between the two alliance partners for the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. The analysis of domestic-level constraints is also introduced: first, I show that the 
level of government cohesion declines if we compare the period from 2001-2002 with the 
period of 2002-2003. This led London to impose greater conditions on its involvement 
rather than defer to the US. Second, available military capabilities led to military 
cooperation with the US which was broad in scope in both cases.  
The War on Terror: British Foreign Policy Responses 
The UK was a high profile partner in the American War on Terror. Between 2001 and 
2003, British officials were party to frequent bilateral interactions with their American 
counterparts and were able to communicate British interests accordingly. As explicitly 
stated in government documents, being the first among allies is an end in itself, as the 
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benefits are often hard to identify in the short term. Indeed, many British demands placed 
on their American ally were met with some resistance. For example, the Bush 
administration was not keen on delaying the war in Iraq in favour of a second resolution at 
the UN, which was first and foremost, a British initiative. In this section, I detail the most 
important allied interactions between the United States and the UK, between 2001 and 2003 
(Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Decisions on Initial Military Deployments of British Forces: 2001-2003 
 
Date Decisions 
October 7, 2001-ongoing216 Operation Enduring Freedom 
Initial commitment: 6000 British troops 
December 20, 2001- ongoing Creation of ISAF (under British command) 
1800 British troops 
March 2003-April 2009 Operation Iraqi Freedom: Iraq War begins 
45 000 British troops 
  
My intent is to look at the impact of alliance interactions on specific military commitments. 
Another related goal is to uncover British strategies used to leverage their military 
commitment in the context of their bilateral alliance with the US. Strategies will be 
discussed in the concluding section of the chapter. 
Afghanistan 
To understand the motives of British decision-makers in committing troops to Afghanistan, 
American expectations must be weighed against the domestic constraints faced by the Blair 
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government. Domestic constraints are defined as the level of government cohesion and 
military feasibility. These factors were crucial in determining the extent of British military 
cooperation with the United States as of October 2001. How can we make sense of British 
participation in Afghanistan and the evolution of the UK’s commitment from 2001 to 2003, 
as American attention shifted toward Iraq? 
 Parallel to British diplomatic efforts, the international community’s response to 9/11 
was immediate both within the UN and then through NATO. Responding to alliance 
requirements, the British gave its support to a UN Security Council Resolution drafted by 
the French condemning the attacks. This Resolution was voted unanimously within 24 
hours of the attacks. NATO’s article V, invoked on October 4, 2001, entailed allied 
retaliatory measures against the perpetrators. Both versions, the first emphasizing the right 
to self-defence, and the second, the clause of mutual defence, are significant in the 
immediate timing of their adoption. The process unfolded almost automatically and 
achieved broad consensus. The British strategy after 9/11, the first priority was to quickly 
reach out to the Americans. The UK’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, 
concedes that the British chose to closely align with the American strategy, noting that it 
would “put us immediately in the front line where we wanted to be”.217 The UK’s emphasis 
on Blair’s bilateral diplomacy translated into more consultations, but not necessarily more 
influence 
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At the outset, the intervention in Afghanistan proceeded in two phases: 1) the 
military campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime, the American-led campaign code-
named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); 2) the UN multinational force to bring stability 
to the capital of Kabul, through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF 
was initially aimed at the twin goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying al-
Qaeda’s training camps. ISAF was introduced in December to initiate postwar stabilization 
in Kabul and to coordinate nation-building tasks. The two missions had very different aims 
for the US administration, wanting to focus exclusively on combat operations under OEF 
and expressing reluctance over the necessity of ISAF: “U.S. government officials also 
want[ed] to maintain U.S. military flexibility to operate in Afghanistan with minimal non-
U.S. interference. The administration limited ISAF operations to Kabul, where the force is 
removed from immediate contact with the ongoing U.S. war effort and staffed by personnel 
from other nations.”218 Britain, for its part, participated in both US-led military operations 
and the international peacekeeping force, which was placed under its command during its 
inception. 
 Fresh from an electoral victory in the fall of 2001, Tony Blair’s government enjoyed 
a solid position. The level of government cohesion was at its highest, with few constraints 
to implement the quickly drawn-up plan for Britain’s contribution to military cooperation. 
There was a strong degree of deferral to the US in defining the UK’s role in OEF. The 
government was also held together by necessity. Government ministries and agencies were 
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forced to adapt and often, accept new positions in response to 9/11. Ad hoc structures were 
created to deal with the novel challenges presented by the rapidly unfolding events. As 
military operations evolved in the fall of 2001, there was little public scrutiny over the 
decision-making process, as the British government, whether in the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was still in “emergency mode,” 
circumventing many of the normal policy-making procedures.219 Furthermore, strong 
bipartisan support for the war in Afghanistan shielded the British commitment from any 
controversy.220     
From September 11 on, frequent emergency meetings between British Cabinet 
ministers, officials, and the Prime Minister were held in Cabinet Office Briefing Room A 
(COBRA). COBRA meetings delineated the contours of the British response to 9/11, both 
domestically and in terms of foreign policy. COBRA meetings were preferred over Cabinet 
meetings and the Prime Minister exerted strong executive leadership and relied on his close 
advisors.221 The Chief of Defence Staff, Michael Boyce, outlined the military options. It 
was decided that the initial contribution would consist of the British submarines Triumph 
and Trafalgar armed with Tomahawk missiles, and access to bases in Pakistan which was 
being negotiated. These capabilities would be readily available for fast deployment. The 
rest of the commitment would require more planning and a better understanding of 
American operational needs. The British government also published a dossier on the 
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Taliban, in order to bring the public on board.222 This document, entitled “Responsibility 
for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States,” was prepared by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) to make the case against the Taliban regime and to justify military action 
in terms of self-defence. It establishes the link between Bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, confirming their capability to undertake major terrorist 
attacks worldwide, and claiming that they are seeking acquisition of nuclear and chemical 
materials for their terrorist activities.223 This response was launched in a matter of weeks. 
The use of public dossiers is a distinctive feature of the Blair government and New Labour. 
This initiative was a first attempt to make foreign policy more transparent and available to 
the public. 
In the months following the September 11 attacks, the main priority was to offer 
assets to the Americans and deploy them in a very narrow timeframe. The commitment to 
OEF was enlarged to include “reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling flights; troops on the 
ground engaged in operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban elements; and Royal Navy 
participation in submarine and interdiction support operations in the Arabian Sea.”224 
Ground troops, the deployment of a Commando group totalling 1700, represented the 
largest deployment for war fighting operations since the Gulf War.225 The British 
commitment to OEF in Afghanistan was executed in a way true to the strategy of being the 
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first ally to stand by the United States. Military contributions to OEF were announced as a 
response to formal requests by the United States for particular assets.226 The UK’s 
contribution to the War against Terrorism is described by the US Department of Defence as 
“… the first nation to send military representatives and campaign planners to CENTCOM. 
They have deployed the largest naval task force since the Falklands War to support OEF. 
Additionally, they have provided the only coalition TLAM platforms to launch missiles 
during the commencement of OEF hostilities. Great Britain assumed the lead for the ISAF 
operation.”227 British military cooperation in early fall 2001 was driven by immediate 
concerns over military feasibility, rather than the product of internal debates. By having 
readily available assets in response to American operational needs, London made sure it 
was involved in every aspect of the war. It even took on a role the US did not want by 
assuming leadership for stabilization operations under ISAF, after the Taliban’s demise.  
 The UK offered to lead ISAF in December 2001, setting out to patrol Kabul, train 
the new Afghan National Guard and undertake humanitarian aid projects.228 According to 
Greenstock, Tony Blair pressed Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi to accelerate a UN-led 
peace building process. Greenstock recalls that “within six weeks at the end of military 
action an agreement passed. This was a remarkably effective piece of international and UN 
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diplomacy”.229 The UK had a strong leadership role in implementing the Bonn Agreement 
which resulted from the UN consultation. The UK, in a sense, filled the vacuum left by the 
American administration. By 2002, Washington was not supplying the resources necessary 
for the administration of Afghanistan.230 The British commitment to ISAF in Kabul, at that 
time, was of 1800 British troops out of a total of 4600 coalition troops from 18 different 
countries.231 The US did not offer troops to ISAF, preferring to leave peacekeeping and 
nation building efforts to allies.232  
As for OEF, the UK contributed air assets, which were particularly important in 
supplementing the United States’ air refuelling capability, naval assets, and Special Forces. 
Special Forces were crucial to the military ground effort in the first phases of the war in 
Afghanistan and were in high demand by the United States. British Special Forces, along 
with the Australian and Canadian contributions, were integrated seamlessly within special 
operations conducted by the Americans with the Northern Alliance. Military feasibility is 
thus an important factor in determining the scope of allied commitments. The Americans 
were the main driving force, providing the bulk of air support for the Special Forces units 
on the ground, but were assisted by the UK, while other European powers were entirely 
absent from this phase of the war.  
Within ISAF, asymmetric military cooperation was replicated with the UK acting as 
the dominant partner. British expectations over the self-sufficiency of other allied 
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expeditionary forces show that expectations precede concerns over the availability of 
military capabilities, as laid out in the causal mechanism. Following the fall of the Taliban 
regime, Sir Stephen Wright, Director General for Defence and Intelligence in the FCO, 
notes that “ISAF became the principal focus of the foreign policy response by the U.K.”233 
Not only was the UK in a leadership position to implement ISAF, in close coordination 
with the UN, but it imposed some conditions on the participation of other allies.  Wright 
adds that “participating forces had to be self-sufficient in all capabilities, in logistics 
especially... Many countries had ground forces that were ready and available but they had 
nothing to carry them”.234 To that end, the UK turned down Canada’s offer of military 
support after ISAF was created.235 
It can be argued that the UK yielded some influence once the military operations 
were underway, but the overall plan for both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was crafted by 
the Americans. In the case of Iraq, some authors have put it rather bluntly: “The decision to 
oust Saddam was an American initiative, not a joint decision.”236 This is not to say that 
recruiting allies was unimportant to the United States. It had appeal insofar as assent from 
allied states served a legitimizing function, but it was not viewed as a necessary condition 
for involvement. 
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              To summarize the British commitment in the first phase of its involvement in the 
War on Terror, the immediate reaction of the government was to be the first on board, to 
demonstrate the significance of the Anglo-American alliance. In November and December 
2001, the UK kept a close eye on the political compromise that would be the basis for 
nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. It then took ownership of ISAF and coordinated 
efforts among coalition countries for its first command. If one had to pinpoint when the 
post-9/11 consensus began to erode, it would be in early 2002, as American attention 
shifted away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq.  
Iraq 
In discussing the Iraq war, the focus will be kept on the political decision leading up to the 
initial commitment of troops by the UK, in March 2003. Several sources report that Bush 
successfully presented the case for invading Iraq to Blair on April 6, 2002 during a visit in 
Crawford, Texas, getting the Prime Minister’s support on a forthcoming war.237 The 
decision-making process was a long and controversial affair, playing out domestically, 
bilaterally and at the UN. By demonstrating political support early on, the UK obtained 
certain concessions but limited its autonomy with its dominant ally. The case study analysis 
reveals an additional variable at the domestic level, namely anomalies in the policy-process 
making that inadvertently served to strengthen the executive’s leadership on decision-
making over Iraq.  
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Whether or not Saddam’s WMD capabilities were really seen as an imminent threat 
by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair is secondary in understanding the interactions 
and decision-making processes that prevailed in 2002 and 2003. The roots of British 
foreign policy toward Iraq were based on a reading of the threat that closely matched the 
American view, as mentioned before. The framing of threat by Washington and London 
matched closely. Blair, like Bush, connected rogue regimes with weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism, as explicitly stated during Bush’s speech at West Point Academy 
in 2002. Indeed, “according to people close to him, Blair, like Bush and many other 
Americans, concluded from the September 11th attacks that the potential linkage between 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction was the strategic issue of our time and required 
decisive action”.238 The language of prevention became part of Blair’s discourse on security 
threats.239 Furthermore, the weight of Britain’s involvement in the Middle East throughout 
the 1990’s contributed to its stance in favour of making an important military contribution 
to the Iraq War. Such motives were absent from Afghanistan. This, combined, with the 
strategic significance of the Middle East created areas of convergence where the United 
States and the UK perceived Iraq and Saddam’s WMD capabilities as an urgent security 
concern. 
Consistent with my hypothesis on alliance expectations, the UK’s involvement in 
Iraq throughout the 1990s fostered an expectation of support in Washington. It is 
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noteworthy that Britain resorted to the use of force several times between 1998, with 
Operation Desert Fox, and in 2003, during the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  
The Middle East also has a strong strategic significance for the British. Britain’s historic 
ties to the region can explain the attention given to Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. Operation 
Desert Fox is a significant event that set the UK apart from other allies, such as Canada and 
Australia, which had also participated in the 1991 Gulf War. From 1996 to 1998, Saddam 
continuously denied access to the UN weapons inspectors, which brought about a series of 
UN Security Council Resolutions (1060, 1115, 1134, 1154) condemning Iraq’s behaviour, 
and ultimately leading to the threat and the use of force. On August 5, 1998, Iraq 
announced it would cease to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Three months later, 
on November 5, Resolution 1205 was passed in response to Iraq’s declaration, ordering full 
cooperation with the UNSCOM and the IAEA. After failing to reach a diplomatic solution 
in the fall, the United States and the UK launched Operation Desert Fox on December 16, 
1998. The air strikes targeted suspected WMD sites and were justified on the basis of 
existing UN Security Council Resolutions. Throughout this process, not only was the 
framework for weapons inspections in Iraq unravelling, but so was the political consensus. 
The Security Council began to be divided among two camps.  
As the UNSCOM head, Richard Butler had reached an impasse with the Iraqi 
authorities. Tensions began to mount between the P5 countries.240 As early as 1994, Russia, 
China and France were advocating that the sanctions that had been put in place after the 
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Gulf War be lifted. The US and the UK were adamantly opposed. Disagreements continued 
through to 1998 about Iraqi compliance and the possible use of force. Russia even 
denounced Desert Fox, creating a diplomatic fuss in Washington and London. After Desert 
Fox, the policy of containment was expanded by the US and the UK, maintaining the 
patrols in the no-fly zones, but also allowing British and American aircraft to respond in 
self-defence under any circumstances. Significant attacks were carried out from 1998 to 
2002. The no-fly zones, established after the Gulf War, were patrolled by the US, the UK, 
and France, but were mostly enforced by the US and UK alone. They were meant to 
prevent air attacks by the Iraqis, thereby protecting the Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq and 
Shi’a areas in the South. In December of 1999, the Security Council was further divided 
when France, Russia and China abstained from voting on Resolution 1284, which replaced 
UNSCOM with the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC), after allegations that UNSCOM had been cooperating with Western 
intelligence agencies. UNMOVIC started to map out the remaining disarmament tasks in 
2001, in case weapons inspections would resume. As late as June 2002, the US and the UK 
engaged in Operation Southern Focus (OSF), a limited bombing campaign in Iraq.241 OSF 
was justified as a response to violations of the no-fly zones, but was also meant to pave the 
way for the war, according to General Mosley, then Chief Allied War Commander.242 
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The policy of containment, as understood by the British government, was 
summarized in official documents as “enforcing the no-fly zone and supporting the 
sanctions against Iraq indefinitely if possible, thereby constraining Saddam’s 
aggressiveness as well as the development and production of WMD”.243 This policy was 
later criticized by both Bush and Blair in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War. Due to close 
bilateral ties and frequent interactions between British and American officials on Iraq, US 
expectations on the type of military commitment that the UK could offer became clear. 
Turning to the level of military capabilities, several options were feasible for the 
UK.244 The first one was to continue with the status quo and to keep the strategy of 
containment. This is essentially a three-pronged strategy consisting of economic sanctions, 
the enforcement of no-fly zones and limited military action, avoiding any escalation. This is 
a low risk and low cost strategy that does not quite fit the rhetoric coming from the Bush 
Administration during 2002. The second option was the implementation of coercive 
weapons inspections, where UNMOVIC and the IAEA would have military assistance. The 
use of force would be authorized on the advice of the Security Council, making for a 
lengthy process to identify and respond to non-compliance. The third option was to launch 
a limited air campaign of the same scope as Desert Fox. Air strikes would be used to 
enforce compliance. Unlike the previous option, the decision to launch air strikes would 
remain in the hands of the Americans and the British.  
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 The next four options which were considered represent a shift away from the status 
quo to more ambitious retaliatory measures. The fourth option was an extensive air 
campaign to inflict serious damage to Iraqi military facilities and suspected WMD sites. 
This option relied on American military technology to deliver victory without any boots on 
the ground.245 The fifth option was to replicate the campaign in Afghanistan and assist 
indigenous forces in Iraq to topple the regime. US and Allied air strikes would be launched 
in support of troops on the ground. Though the Afghan model was used to a certain extent, 
its merits as a successful approach are still debated.246 The sixth option was to launch an air 
campaign with limited ground intervention. This was the option preferred by the Pentagon 
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This option would require less than 100 000 
troops on the ground with the expectation that the regime would collapse in a matter of 
months. The final option would replicate Desert Storm of the Gulf war, with a massive air 
campaign and over 250 000 ground troops. It would differ from Desert Storm in that the 
aim would be to topple Saddam’s regime. 
 Kevin Tebbit, the British Permanent Undersecretary (PUS) for Defence states that 
from the seven policy options, only two options were given serious consideration: the first 
was an enhancement of the containment policy and the second was forceful regime 
change.247 This not only resembles the American assessment of options on Iraq, it also casts 
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doubts on the significance of the UN process, which was at the root of the original 
containment policy and deemed unsustainable. 
The causal mechanism shows how US expectations are prior to concerns of military 
capabilities. Given Britain’s already considerable role in Afghanistan, concerns were 
expressed about the sustainability of two wars for the British forces, especially with regards 
to the demands placed on the Special Forces and the resources needed for post-war 
reconstruction efforts in two unstable countries. On the Special Forces, the FAC report 
notes that: “It is feared that a major operation in Iraq could divert resources away from 
Afghanistan where the situation remains extremely fragile. In particular, Special Operations 
forces have been in heavy demand in Afghanistan and for operations against al-Qaeda in 
other countries across south and south-east Asia. They are expected to be used extensively 
in any military action against Iraq”.248 US demands prevailed. 
A further constraint related to military feasibility can be identified here. Although 
the capabilities and operational tempo of British Forces could adapt to a second war, the 
main impediment was legal. The commitment of British troops needed assent from the 
Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, on the legality of going to war in Iraq, a necessity for 
the British military. The military would strongly oppose any operation that had not been 
cleared by the Attorney General. The rationale for establishing a legal basis for the use of 
force in Iraq, as presented by Goldsmith, rests on previous UN Security Council 
resolutions, specifically, resolutions 678 and 687 from the first Gulf War in 1990 and 1991 
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respectively. In Lord Goldsmith’s view “resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the 
authority to use force under resolution 678”.249 Under these conditions, resolution 1441, 
unanimously adopted by the Security Council on November 8, 2002, revives the provisions 
on the use of force under resolution 678. Thus, Iraq’s failure to comply with UNSCR 1441, 
as acknowledged by the Attorney General, provides legal justification for the use of force.  
To complete the picture on the decision-making processes leading to the 
commitment of British troops in support of the US-led coalition, another set of domestic 
constraints impaired a swift implementation of the short-listed policy options: the level of 
government cohesion. Domestic constraints evolved simultaneously, in pace with the 
diplomatic tours of Blair, his advisers and his Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw and Secretary 
of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon. The two domestic-level variables of interest, the level of 
government cohesion and military feasibility stalled the decision-making process and led 
the Blair government to impose many conditions on British participation. First, although 
Blair was able to secure the support of his Cabinet, even after two resignations, divisions 
within the Labour Party undermined the cohesiveness of the government. As a result, the 
UK could not defer to the United States on Iraq; it was a politically unsustainable course of 
action.  
In response to this position, the Blair government needed to stake conditions on 
British support of the US on Iraq. To this end, David Manning, Blair’s special advisor, 
communicated to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and President Bush that: 
                                                 
249 Lord Goldsmith, Iraq: Legal Position Concerning the Use of Force (London: Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2003) A copy of this opinion and letter from Jack Straw, Defence minister, can be found in Annex 1. 
  
 
128
“The UN would need to be part of that process as far as the UK was concerned”.250 The UK 
saw this condition as vital to achieve the support of NATO allies and the European Union, 
making its political position more manageable within government. Blair also pleaded for a 
commitment by Bush to a road map for peace in the Middle East.251 As the UN process was 
coming to an end, in March 2003, this new condition was brought forth with the realization 
that the upcoming war in Iraq would not be UN-sanctioned. This was presented to the 
Parliament as an American promise of goodwill, along with a commitment that the UN 
would be involved in the postwar reconstruction plans.252 These moves by the Blair 
government were primarily driven by the need to restore government cohesion.253 
Ultimately, Blair turned the decision over to Parliament and achieved a majority as the 
result of a vote on March 18, 2003, with the support of 412 votes vs. 149 dissenting.254  
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Since 2001, Blair had undertaken a strategy that would strengthen the special 
relationship by making several symbolic visits to Washington. Recruiting supporters for the 
coalition against terrorism, and finally, by taking on a significant role in Afghanistan.255 In 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11, prior to Bush’s State of the Union speech of January 
2002, where Iraq was singled out as a threat to international peace and security, the British 
position on Iraq had not changed since its pre-9/11 iteration. Commenting on its continued 
engagement in the Gulf alongside the United States, the Foreign Affairs Committee 
interprets the Anglo-American position in the following way: “We share the policy 
objective of re-integrating Iraq into the international community through compliance with 
the UN Security Council resolutions.”256 
American expectations may have been more difficult for the UK to decipher   
immediately after 9/11. What matters more is how the British government perceived these 
expectations and translated these expectations into policy. Insofar as specific policy 
initiatives are triggered by US actions, we can infer that they are shaped by US 
expectations, or how they are perceived by British decision-makers. These expectations, as 
the British government interpreted them, involved immediate support for OEF, strong 
actions against terrorism through domestic and international legislation and enforcement, 
and to display both the willingness and capabilities to engage in post-conflict operations in 
Afghanistan leaving the United States to focus exclusively on combat operations, as it 
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preferred. Let us now turn to an additional variable to shed light on the nature of the 
decision-making process leading to the decision on Iraq.   
Disrupted Policy Process 
An additional variable was uncovered in the process of conducting the case study analysis: 
disruptions in the policy process leading to the British commitment in Iraq are studied here. 
The decision-making process can be heavily influenced by state-level processes, as pointed 
out by neoclassical realist authors.257 In the British case, certain anomalies mitigated the 
impact from the loss of government cohesion. The literature on crisis decision-making 
points to contextual factors which may alter the normal channels of foreign policy decision-
making. For the Iraq War, it is the informal nature of the policy process which tipped the 
balance in favour of a commitment in Iraq. Though Iraq was discussed many times within 
Cabinet, the Butler report notes that the normal policy process was circumvented, for 
example, by sidelining Cabinet committees. The report expresses these concerns directly:  
We are concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the 
Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making towards 
Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgment. Such risks 
are particularly significant in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts 
are inherently difficult to come by and the quality of judgement is accordingly all 
the more important.258 
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The Butler Report is an important source of evidence, since it was compiled as a result of 
testimony provided by the key ministers and officials from 10 Downing Street and the 
Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and 
members of the intelligence community.259  
 Further evidence of irregularities in the decision-making process can be found in a 
report tabled by the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), which 
investigated the decision to go to war in Iraq.260 The FAC is tasked with reviewing the 
policy and practices of the FCO. The report expresses concerns over the process which led 
to the publication of two public dossiers, detailing the evidence of WMDs in Iraq, by 
making reference to British intelligence. The first, referred to as the September dossier, was 
published in 2002 and was approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The dossier 
is described as using language that “… was in places more assertive than that traditionally 
used in intelligence documents”.261 The dossier is a description of Saddam’s WMD 
capabilities and makes a series of threat assessments about them. Following its publication, 
the September dossier underwent much public scrutiny and was criticized for making 
exaggerated claims.  
The second, referred to as the February dossier, or “dodgy dossier”, was published 
in early 2003. The allegations made against the February dossier were more serious, since it 
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was found that whole segments were plagiarized from an American scholar’s work. 
Alastair Campbell, Chief of Communications for Prime Minister Blair later took sole 
responsibility for the dossier, which was meant as a briefing note for the media. The FAC 
report is very critical of the February dossier: “By producing such a document the 
Government undermined the credibility of their case for war and of the other documents 
which were part of it… […] it was fundamentally wrong to allow such a document to be 
presented to Parliament and made widely available without ministerial oversight.”262 This 
controversy suggests that the normal channels between the intelligence branches, the 
Foreign Service and the Cabinet were disrupted, since the dossier was not signed off by the 
JIC Chairman. The report is clear in establishing that there was a “lack of procedural 
accountability” in producing and publishing this dossier.263  
 That there were intelligence failures in building the case for war in Iraq is now a 
widely recognized fact. Not only was intelligence extremely hard to gather in Iraq after the 
UN weapons inspectors were indefinitely expelled from the country in 1998, but the UK 
may have been over-reliant on the United States for its intelligence. Because both countries 
share intelligence to the extent that they do, a unique feature of their special relationship, it 
is sometimes difficult to separate the source of raw intelligence data. These shortcomings 
are acknowledged both in the FAC report and in Minister Robin Cook’s personal account 
of that period.264 More damaging for the intelligence agencies were allegations of political 
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meddling made against the JIC. To that effect, the report summarizes the Committee’s 
impressions: “We are concerned that a meeting to discuss a document which Ministers had 
asked the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare was chaired by the 
Prime Minister’s Special Advisor”.265  
 Finally, beyond the scrutiny placed on the intelligence and security agencies of the 
British government, there is also evidence that Cabinet decision-making was not thorough 
in debating the options for war in Iraq. Some individuals who attended Cabinet meetings, 
such as International Development Minister Clare Short and a former senior FCO official 
Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, were especially vocal in expressing criticism about Cabinet 
meetings during 2002 and 2003. Both testified to the FAC and stated that Iraq was not 
discussed in great detail during this period.266  
Alternative Explanations 
In chapter 3, I outlined several explanations in the IR literature that address the topic of 
allied behaviour under conditions of asymmetry. It is also important to address explanations 
that come up in the case specific literature, for example, the individual-level explanation, 
which focuses on Blair’s strong leadership qualities and his personal friendship with 
President Bush, as potentially confounding variables. In the British case, what stands out is 
Prime Minister Blair’s insistence, along with Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon and Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw, that the UN be the decision-making forum for the fate of Iraq. In this 
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section, I will first discuss the role of the UN: did it have an independent impact on British 
foreign policy, or, was it a platform used to sway domestic and international public 
opinion? The answer has important implications for both liberal institutionalist and 
constructivist theses, which stress the UN’s importance in setting institutional constraints 
on states267 or providing appropriate norms of behaviour.268 
What can explain such unwavering support even in the face of opposition from 
domestic and international audiences? The argument for institutional norms was quite 
prevalent in the media and public debates during the time of the Iraq War. Since the United 
States was not successful in gaining a UN mandate for a war in Iraq, critics questioned the 
legitimacy and the legality of the intervention.269 The same argument was made in Britain, 
where Blair suffered the political cost of an unpopular war. Did institutional norms 
constrain British foreign policy? Was the concern for legitimacy a predominant influence 
after 9/11?  
There are many examples of P5 states acting forcefully without the authorization of 
the UN, of which the American interventions in Vietnam, Grenada and Panama during the 
Cold War. The 1991 Gulf War, and arguably, the end of the Cold War, marked a shift in 
how states resort to the use of UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII. As 
Voeten notes, only two such resolutions were adopted during the last fifteen years of the 
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Cold War, compared to 145 such resolutions being adopted between 1990 and 1998.270 The 
war in Kosovo and the war in Iraq stand as the two contemporary examples where military 
operations were carried out without UN authorization.  Blair’s argument was similar in both 
cases, claiming that one should not let the Security Council come to a standstill because a 
member of the P5 is bent on blocking a resolution. A reproach aimed at China and Russia 
in 1999, was aimed mostly at France in 2003. However, in both cases, there was a clear 
attempt to give the UN process a chance, by bringing the issue to the Security Council.271 
Voeten suggests that this may be more a reflection on the costs of a particular intervention 
rather than concerns over its moral legitimacy.272  
 For the British, resorting to the UN process was a condition of the UK’s support of 
the United States, no matter the resulting resolution. Not only did Tony Blair invest a lot of 
personal effort in the process, but he can be given some credit for convincing the Bush 
administration to present its case for war to the international community, which it had 
previously shunned.273 Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, for his part, had stated 
publicly that bypassing the UN was an acceptable course of action.274 However, it is 
noteworthy that as the UN process unravelled, in March 2003, Tony Blair questioned the 
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legitimacy of the process by pointing the finger at France, which had threatened to veto any 
second resolution that would make an explicit reference to the use of force.275 That the UK 
rejected the outcome of the UN process suggests that UN approval was not a necessary 
condition for the commitment of British troops in Iraq. Appealing to the UN became a 
platform for Blair’s two-level game: the UN served to appease domestic public concerns 
over US unilateralism, while buying him more time to deal with the US over the war in 
Iraq. Thus, appealing to the UN is best understood as a strategy employed by the Blair 
government to increase its leverage at the alliance-level and the domestic-level. 
 In the case of Afghanistan, which was much less controversial, the UN served as an 
important lever for British leadership, especially in implementing the initial tasks of 
building the International Assistance and Stabilization Force (ISAF), in late 2001 and early 
2002. ISAF gave the UK an important role in coordinating coalition troops in Afghanistan. 
Although the endorsement by the UN for the intervention in Afghanistan was immediate, 
following the attacks of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was not conducted by 
UN guidelines, as ISAF was. Between 2001 and 2003, OEF operations were in the hands of 
the US and allied troops had to conform to American demands.  
While the decision to go to Afghanistan was immediate and taken amid public 
demonstrations of solidarity all around the world, the decision to invade Iraq dragged on 
and came under public scrutiny. Opposition on the domestic political front, especially when 
looking at public opinion constantly made headlines. Shifts in public opinion did not alter 
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the course of British foreign policy. In Britain, 79% of the population supported the first 
phase of the War on Terror, but quickly turned against Bush and Blair in 2002-2003.276 Do 
these domestic-level factors have causal weight? In addition to massive public protests, 
there were resignations from Blair’s cabinet and many defections from the government 
when the Parliament voted on Iraq.277 If ever domestic pressure could have changed the 
course of foreign policy, those were such circumstances. That Blair submitted the decision 
to go to war to the Parliamentary vote is significant in that it is a unique occurrence in the 
British Parliament’s history. The implications of the vote were grave but the outcome 
banal: failing to get a majority on the issue would have forced the Prime Minister to resign 
and would have de facto withdrawn the UK from the coalition of the willing and 
participation in Iraq, but Blair was able to secure a strong majority, despite 139 dissenting 
votes from his own party.278 It is noteworthy that even President Bush would have been 
willing to let the British commitment go so as to safeguard Blair’s political career.279 
The Prime Minister was on his second term in office with a strong majority from the 
2001 election. New Labour Party was enjoying popularity and Tony Blair’s diplomatic 
response to 9/11 was well-received around the world. Moreover, the Conservative 
opposition, led by Iain Duncan Smith, supported British participation in the event of 
military action in Iraq. An Op-ed in the Sunday Times summarized his views, as he stated 
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that a war in Iraq would be in Britain’s interests.280 Unlike Canada, Britain’s governments, 
whether Labour or Conservative, have consistently recognized the primacy of the United 
States as an ally, with strong displays of bipartisanship.281 In the final analysis, it appears 
that Blair was not dissuaded by public opinion. It should be reminded that the Prime 
Minister was also able to restore government cohesion.  
Looking at the individual-level of explanation, certain analysts point to the close 
personal relationship that developed between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair.282 It 
is argued that their sharing similar moral and religious convictions, rather than ideological 
similarity, were powerful bonds leading to an alignment of American and British foreign 
policy on Iraq.283 Where Blair and Bush differed was in the importance given to human 
security as a motivation for intervention. For Blair, strong parallels were made between 
Iraq and Kosovo, where inaction in the face of a brutal dictator was equivalent to 
appeasement. In a speech delivered in Chicago in 1999, Blair declared that “many of our 
problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men – Saddam Hussein and 
Slobodan Milosevic. Both have been prepared to wage vicious campaigns against sections 
of their own community. As a result of these destructive policies both have brought 
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calamity on their own peoples.”284 This doctrine of liberal interventionism has been 
described as a manifesto arguing for the moral superiority of liberalism.285 Blair had 
previously outlined what the justification for any international military action should be for 
the international community: 
 
First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting 
humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing 
with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? […] Third, on 
the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we 
can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? 
[…] And finally, do we have national interests involved?286 
 
Moreover, the dangers of appeasement were often reiterated and used as a justification for 
the NATO military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the Iraq War.287 Finally, another 
alternative explanation is situated at the individual-level, grounded in psychology. It 
suggests that Blair fell victim to “self-deception” whereby he would perceive events and 
facts according to his moral system.288 This would explain Blair’s seemingly 
disproportionate attention to foreign policy issues between 2001 and 2003, devoting much 
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effort to gather diplomatic support internationally and as he multiplied efforts to turn the 
tide of British foreign and defence policy. Though plausible, it is hard to submit this 
proposition to the empirical test. 
Conclusion 
With the shock of 9/11, Blair seized the opportunity to lay out an alternative grand strategy 
for the United States. He argued for an internationalist foreign policy and warned against an 
isolationist America. Britain would do its part in securing this outcome. This was consistent 
with Blair’s approach to foreign policy throughout the 1990s, where he took the initiative to 
strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities as a way to second the burden of international 
military involvement with the United States. The British perception of threat was more 
closely matched with that of the United States, than with the rest of Europe. Tony Blair 
relied on the same discourse in favour of decisive action, with an emphasis on seeking out 
terrorists and the states that harbor them. In fact, the British government had set a goal for 
itself to become the United States’ closest ally in the war on terrorism. 
The UK’s military contribution to OEF began on October 7, 2001, a few days after 
Tony Blair declared his support for American military operations in Afghanistan against the 
Taliban regime. From that point on, the UK made it its priority to be the United States’ 
closest ally in the Global Coalition against Terrorism. This point was explicitly stated in 
numerous official documents from the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence (MOD). 
This policy was also confirmed through various statements by British politicians and senior 
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officials.289 Following the initial operations under OEF, the UK supported and invested in 
the process which culminated in the creation of ISAF. More than any other country, the UK 
carried the UN project through, setting the basis for reconstruction and nation-building 
efforts following the collapse of the Taliban regime. But UK officials were often 
disappointed by their inability to convey the importance of nation-building to their 
American counterparts.290  
A prominent strategy was to be the first among allies. This was strengthened by 
speeches and statements immediately following 9/11, to show that threat perception was 
aligned between the United States and the UK. In fact, the UK worked hard to coordinate 
its message with the Americans. Prime Minister Blair also saw this time of crisis as an 
opportunity to shape American foreign policy. He is reported to have written a note to 
President Bush, after their first telephone exchange on September 12, to plan a response to 
the attacks.291 Four main points stand out: delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban, building 
international support for action in Afghanistan, engaging diplomatically with Pakistan and 
Iran, and restarting the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).292 In the months to come, it 
became clear that the United States would come up short in some areas: building 
international support, diplomatic engagement with Iraq and restarting the MEPP. The UK, 
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under Tony Blair’s leadership, attempted to compensate for these shortcomings, taking 
leadership where the Americans did not.  
To advance the British position and strengthen its alliance with the United States, 
the Prime Minister made numerous high-profile public appearances in Washington and 
encouraged bilateral exchanges at all levels. Shortly after the event, Blair was the only 
world leader to appear at President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress. To the 
Canadian media, the UK had gained favour to the detriment of Canada, which spurred 
criticisms of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Chrétien later remarked on Blair’s 
frequent visits to President Bush: “If Tony Blair wanted to be seen at Bush’s side in order 
to strengthen his position in Europe as the United States’ closest ally, that was his call, but 
it wasn’t in my character to try to spin some political advantage out of the innocent 
dead.”293 Not surprisingly, Blair saw his role differently. Visits to Washington were part of 
a broader diplomatic approach to curtail Bush’s reaction to 9/11. Rather than encouraging 
the United States to engage in multilateral forums, such as the UN or NATO, the UK acted 
as the intermediary, soliciting support from world leaders and articulating the main motive 
for action against the Taliban in Afghanistan: self-defence. From the outset, Blair spoke to 
his European counterparts, German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder, French President Jacques 
Chirac, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Alaistair Campbell, the 
aim was to “mobilize solidarity for the US” against the current trend toward anti-
Americanism that prevailed in reaction to the Bush presidency.294 In November 2001, Blair 
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visited both Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, showing his intention to tie the problem of 
terrorism with a solution for the MEPP, a point which was lost on the American side. 
Did the UK reap tangible rewards from its military commitment? To assume so 
would be to overstate the impact of British influence on American foreign policy decision-
making, in spite of a large military contribution. One author notes that “such hopes were 
generally disappointed, notwithstanding a few concessions on British citizens held in legal 
limbo at Guantanamo and on Blair’s African aid agenda.”295 If influence there was, it was 
in setting certain conditions to its support on Iraq, like convincing the Bush administration 
to commit the US to the UN process in the fall of 2002. As previously noted, the UK also 
had some influence in the details of the military operations. Britain could use military 
channels to put its counterinsurgency experience to use in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In an effort to sort out the most important factors in British foreign policy decision-
making, in response to the US agenda, this chapter tests the causal mechanism laid out in 
chapter 3. By recounting the events leading to the commitment of British troops in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the goal is to provide an explanation to better understand British 
military cooperation with the United States. Moreover, the case study analysis reveals that 
there was an additional variable to complement my explanation on US expectations: the 
circumvented nature of the policy-making process on Iraq. When weighing the different 
options for military cooperation with the United States, from 2001-2003, the Blair 
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government was most concerned with being and remaining the closest ally in the War on 
Terror.  
  
-4- 
Canada-U.S. Relations and the War on Terror 
Canada is in an enviable and unenviable position: it is geographically tied to the 
world’s most powerful state and economically bound to it. Canada and the United States 
share the longest undefended border in the world. Since the creation of the Permanent Joint 
Board of Defence (PJBD) in 1940, the two states have closely interacted on matters of 
national and international security. Bilateral defence institutions such as the PJBD and 
NORAD were created to ensure continental defence with a focus on interoperability, joint 
threat assessment and bilateral consultations and training exercises.296 Canadian military 
cooperation with the United States has been strongly reactive to international events, but 
also incredibly routine, due to shared defence structures. From Pearl Harbour to 9/11, crises 
have precipitated arrangements to further institutionalize this bilateral security relationship. 
These arrangements have typically been accompanied by Canadian reservations and mild 
grumbling over the impact of such measures on the autonomy of its foreign policy. There 
are many examples of Ottawa going against the wishes of Washington, despite depending 
on its Southern neighbour for its economic livelihood and its physical survival. How do 
Canadian decision-makers cope with this asymmetry in shaping an autonomous foreign and 
defence policy?  
Endowed with a relatively secure region, Canada’s major military engagements are 
pursued through its alliance with the United States. Frequent interactions between the two 
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countries’ militaries are seen as a viable way to boost its special relationship with the US. 
Canada-US military cooperation has reinforced this tendency, as Canada strives to be 
increasingly interoperable with its American ally.297 This case study chapter focuses on 
Canadian military cooperation with the United States between 2001 and 2003. I argue that 
low American expectations about Canada’s ability to make a military contribution explain 
the level of Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan. The security priority for both 
states was at the border following the shock of 9/11. As such, systemic factors account for a 
great portion of alliance interactions. In the case of Afghanistan, few domestic constraints 
operated: Chrétien was heading a cohesive government and made military commitments 
that were proportional to the military capabilities that were available.  
In the Iraq case, US expectations of allied support were considerably higher, and 
perceived as such by Canadian decision-makers. However, domestic constraints, defined 
here as the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities, had changed. 
Indeed, during the Fall of 2002, the Chrétien government received a request from the 
United States for a renewed commitment in Afghanistan.298 Ottawa accepted, signalling 
that its remaining military capabilities would preclude further commitments in the short to 
medium term. During that same period, Chrétien’s position was being undermined by his 
main competitor, Paul Martin, which undercut the government’s cohesion. Chrétien’s 
retirement seemed imminent. Given these circumstances, a Canadian commitment to the 
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war in Iraq appeared unlikely. Ottawa devised strategies to make the most out of its 
situation: playing the UN game for international prestige, publicly criticizing the Bush 
government for domestic political gain, and finally, rallying ‘round the American flag, once 
the military engagement in Iraq began. 
I will focus on the period from September 11, 2001 to the beginning of the war in 
Iraq, in March 2003, to analyze the key political decisions and interactions surrounding the 
possibility of Canadian military cooperation with the United States. The first section of this 
chapter details the systemic factors that explain the management of security priorities 
within the Canada-U.S. security relationship. The second section will examine the impact 
of American expectations and domestic constraints on the decision-making process 
between 2001 and 2003, when contemplating military cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The third section describes the Canadian response, in light of the main explanatory 
variables. The fourth section will discuss alternative explanations where the case-specific 
literature and the IR literature intersect, focusing on strategic culture, security communities, 
domestic politics, and the legitimizing function of the UN.  The final section presents a 
summary of the chapter and focuses on Canadian strategies of asymmetric security 
cooperation. This chapter demonstrates that Canada has leveraged its bilateral relationship 
with the US to enhance its international influence and prestige, while acknowledging that 
acting independently from the United States has been immensely difficult.  
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Canada-US Security Relations 
In this section, the focus is on the systemic factors underlying the Canada-US alliance and 
how these structure security priorities between the two countries. The United States and 
Canada’s shared security concerns are a permanent feature of their alliance relationship. At 
the international level, the asymmetric capabilities of the two states are more palpable: the 
US manages international commitments around the world while Canada has more limited 
resources to invest in power projection. Canadian decision-makers sometimes have to 
contemplate the use of force abroad, though it is rarely, if ever, as a result of their own 
initiative. Military cooperation is mostly considered through the prism of their alliance 
relationship with the United States. 9/11 marks a turning point in Canadian foreign policy. 
As one Defence official notes “Canada could no longer sit on the sidelines. We needed to 
do more”.299 The climate that dominated Foreign Affairs and National Defence was one of 
nervous anticipation, waiting for the United States’ response to 9/11 with the certainty that 
any shift in American foreign policy would impact Canada directly. There could also have 
been an opportunity for the Canada-US security relationship to be updated, according to 
new standards. 
Surprisingly, the new contours of a clear foreign and defence policy have not been 
formulated through the publication of a white paper, even after the events of 9/11. Canada’s 
international priorities have recently been defined as: the centrality of the Canada-US 
relationship in defining Canadian national interests, the issue of Arctic sovereignty and the 
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threat of WMDs. In 2008, the Harper government published a Defence policy statement, 
Canada First, articulating post-9/11 security concerns with a budget to match.300 As 
mentioned before, Canada steadily increased its defence capabilities since 2001 (See table 
5.1) thereby improving its standing within organizations such as NATO. Canada had 
previously been labeled as “the odd man out,” trailing behind other NATO allies in terms of 
defence spending and keeping a low-profile when American forces were deployed. For 
example, though Canada supported the Gulf War in 1991, it did not deploy ground forces, 
as part of the 500 000 strong American-led commitment. The Canadian contribution was 
exactly “26 fighter aircraft, three ships and a field hospital” with “some infantry, which 
provided security at the Canadian positions and some army gunners used to bolster the air 
defences of the Canadian warships”.301  
Table 5.1 Comparative Military Expenditure of Canada [2000; 2008] 
 
 2000 2008 
Local Currency m.dollars 12, 326 20,583 
US $m. 11,412 15,940 
As Percentage of GDP   1.1 1.2 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009). 
 
Overall, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan drove the increase in defence spending, as 
clear needs were identified by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), especially under the 
leadership of General Rick Hillier. 
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Other military investments are planned for the next twenty years, as part of the 
Canada First strategy (See Table 5.1). A budget of 490 billion Canadian dollars is 
promised over a 20 year period, in order to increase the number of troops and update 
military equipment. By 2025, military spending should grow from 19 to 28 billion dollars. 
Even if we take into account this projected increase in defence spending, Canada could 
never realistically “catch up” with the United States. 
Figure 5.1 Defence Funding 
 
Fiscal Years 1986-2028 
 
Source : National Defence, Canada First  
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first-premier/defstra-stradef-fra.asp  
 
Strongly reliant on the US to make up for this gap in capabilities, Canada is faced 
with a dilemma: it is dependent on the United States for its security and the protection of its 
territorial integrity, but does not necessarily share the global ambitions of its closest 
security and economic partner. International responsibilities are simply not measured on the 
same scale. In the various iterations of its foreign and defence policy, Canada has 
circumscribed its international commitments to the extent that these are first and foremost 
defined by American interests and its commitments abroad. Canada is generally inclined to 
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support American endeavours, but must manage American expectations due to its limited 
capabilities. 
 Canada has sought to enhance its international visibility through both bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements. For the defence of its territory, Canada has reinforced its own 
capabilities through regional security arrangements with the US that include comprehensive 
security guarantees. NORAD is the embodiment of the longstanding and deeply integrated 
security relationship between the two countries. With the addition of a new maritime 
dimension in 2006, NORAD has become emblematic of the dense security links uniting 
both countries. Canada and the United States also share more than 80 treaty-level defence 
agreements, over 250 defence memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and 145 forums to 
discuss defence issues.302 Though Canada was publicly criticized at home and in the United 
States for cutting its defence spending in the 1980s and 1990s, 9/11 and Canada’s 
involvement in Afghanistan turned things around, at least enough for Canadians to notice. 
Overall, Canada’s priority is undoubtedly the North American perimeter and it has few 
objective strategic interests abroad.  
 In contrast to the British case, the cost of not supporting the United States 
internationally is relatively low. As seen in the previous chapter, the UK is not strategically 
inclined to go against the United States and seeks bilateral leverage by positioning itself as 
the first among allies. In Australia, discussed in the next chapter, there is a pragmatic 
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bilateral policy with the United States where a series of precise conditions are exchanged 
for Australian support on issues that matter to the United States. The Canadian strategy is 
different. What is striking about the Canada-US security relationship is how each issue is 
managed separately. There is no overarching approach to manage the bilateral relationship.  
Other scholars have commented on this dynamic, implying that this is a conscious 
choice made by Canadian decision-makers. Richter argues that Canada has a preference for 
ad hoc institutions and issue-specific arrangements as a way to structure the bilateral 
relationship.303 Kitchen points out that this administrative approach is chosen as a way to 
increase Canada’s leverage in bilateral negotiations.304 The case of NAFTA shows Canada 
to be a strong player in asymmetric negotiations.305 What is intriguing from an IR 
standpoint is how Canada levelled the playing field through the use of various strategies. 
As Winham and DeBoer-Ashworth note, “Canada, as the weaker power, had an interest in 
engaging the United States in a rules-based rather than a power-based relationship, and it 
viewed a strong dispute settlement mechanism as one way to achieve this”.306 Also 
important is the comparatively greater amount of resources and time that Canada devoted to 
these negotiations, in contrast to the United States. Can similar tactics be applied to the 
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security realm? When one looks at the Canadian stance on foreign policy issues, one is 
struck by the lack of consistency in the overall policy toward the United States. 
Furthermore, some leverage may be lost since the possibility of obtaining concessions from 
issue-linkages is foregone.  
In other instances, Ottawa has had to simply adapt to Washington’s policy changes. 
For Canadian defence, this was felt with the creation of Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) in 2002 and the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 (DHS). These 
new structures challenged pre-existing arrangements: NORTHCOM now has overlapping 
jurisdictions with NORAD when it comes to the defence of North American airspace, while 
DHS has taken over centralized border management and enforces new security measures 
along the American border with Canada. In 2002, a Canada-US High Level Working Group 
was established to discuss North American security challenges in the post-9/11 
environment. The Canadian representatives were tasked with presenting the Canadian 
position as these changes were being implemented, a mission which can be summarized as 
“protect[ing] the sovereignty of Canada and the policy independence of Canadian 
government...”307  
Between 2001 and 2003, Canadian security concerns were dominated by the 
Canada-US border. After 9/11, Canada needed to take a more active part in the struggle 
against terrorism, as part of its bilateral relationship with the US. Following 9/11, both 
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Canadian and American observers pointed to the Canada-US border as a gateway for 
terrorists.308 Both the Canadian and American governments saw as a priority the 
enhancement of security on the North American perimeter. In Canada, billions of dollars 
were allocated for border security. There are powerful economic incentives for Canada to 
respond quickly to American security concerns on its border. Indeed, keeping the border 
open for business is a top priority for any Canadian government, crisis or not.309 In this 
sense, Canada literally cannot afford to be perceived as a security liability to the United 
States. To uphold its commercial interests, Canada needed to address American security 
concerns. A related argument views Canadian and American interests as so intrinsically 
linked that opting out of defence arrangements or coalitions with the United States is more 
often than not detrimental to Canadian national interests.310   
For some, close security integration with the United States translates into a loss of 
sovereignty.311 The fear is that integration will undermine Canadian independence in 
foreign and defence policymaking to the benefit of American interests. A stronger 
argument in this camp maintains that, should Canada fail to provide adequately for its 
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security at the border, the United States would then take on the task unilaterally.312 This is 
known as the defence against help thesis. Roussel points out several features that can cause 
alarm in Canadian decision-making circles: the degradation of diplomatic relations with the 
US; the American perception of Canada as being part of their territory; American military 
presence in Canada and the coordination of national security policies.313 What about 
Canada-US military cooperation abroad?  
The initial commitment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan is almost a perfect 
embodiment of the foreign policy trade-off that asymmetric allies face: fulfill alliance 
expectations or pursue politically safe alternatives. The options are rarely dichotomized this 
way, but in the Fall of 2001, as the Chrétien government was reacting to the shock of 9/11, 
both options on the table reflected two familiar models of Canadian foreign policy. One, 
preferred by conservative elements, argues that Canadian national interests are 
fundamentally tied to the United States and should reflect this reality by being supportive of 
what our ally pursues. The other model is based on multilateralism, where Canada presents 
itself as an honest broker with a peacekeeping expertise and is consistent with Canada’s 
strategic culture.  
In sum, the fact that the 9/11 attacks occurred on American territory is of particular 
significance for an ally that is geographically tied to the United States. Not only did the 
event have important repercussions at the shared border, delaying the transport of goods 
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and services which are vital to the Canadian economy, but these events precipitated the 
reform of national and continental security arrangements. To be sure, Canada felt the need 
to increase its military capabilities as well, to keep up with Canada’s growing involvement 
in the war in Afghanistan. This section has presented the Canada-US security relationship 
to show how changes in the security environment after 9/11 impacted Canada’s alliance 
with the United States. Canada-US ties, through comprehensive agreements such as 
NORAD, make the relationship extremely responsive to security conditions in the North 
American perimeter. These concerns are closely tied to the two countries’ security 
preoccupations in the North American region, but have deeper implications when military 
cooperation is being contemplated abroad.  
Balancing Alliance Expectations and Domestic Constraints 
Going back to one of the basic claims made in this dissertation, a state’s international 
ambitions are first and foremost determined by its power, but state-level variables complete 
the equation.314 As mentioned in the previous section, Canada’s international interests are 
rather circumscribed. Major military commitments are usually made in response to 
American initiatives. Canada’s relative power in the international system is important in 
understanding how decision-makers evaluate threats when contemplating military 
cooperation with the United States. Referring back to the causal mechanism, an explanation 
of asymmetric security cooperation draws on additional variables, as secondary states must 
balance US expectations with domestic-level constraints. Military cooperation for Canada 
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is thus a function of American expectations, as perceived by decision-makers or as 
expressed through formal requests for military support. The scope of military cooperation is 
driven or impeded first, by military feasibility, where available capabilities structure the 
commitment which can be offered and second, by the level of government cohesion which 
determines the political feasibility of taking part in an American-led coalition. 
While Canada’s strategic interests are dominated by border and continental security 
management, its international profile is raised by its close alliance with the United States. 
The contours of Canadian foreign policy are defined by both internal and external factors: 
there is a strong American influence, but Canadian decision-makers emphasize the 
autonomous facets of their foreign policy to their domestic audience. This is reminiscent of 
Ignatieff’s comment about Canada-US relations, when he stated that “one of the great 
foreign policy challenges facing Canada is staying independent in an age of empire.”315 
This statement is echoed by two Canadian political scientists who summarize the basic 
equation Canadian decision-makers must solve when military cooperation with the United 
States is at stake: “What is the minimum level of commitment needed to satisfy allies, 
avoid domestic opposition and make a useful contribution within budgetary limits?”316 This 
is not an easy equation to solve by any government’s standards. Even if the United States 
and Canada share many security interests, as is evident by their deeply institutionalized 
security relationship, disagreements have occurred over international military engagements. 
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Before assessing Canada’s contribution to military cooperation with the United States, one 
must first determine how American expectations factor into Canadian decision-making.    
 How does Ottawa respond to Washington’s expectations when military cooperation 
is at stake? The exercise from the previous chapter is replicated here. Three main indicators 
contribute to assessments of alliance expectations between the two countries: defence 
arrangements including treaties and MOUs; past experiences of military cooperation; and 
finally, operational requirements that are specific to military engagement being 
contemplated. The expectations from Washington are fairly minimalist with regards to 
Canadian involvement. The burden thus seems to fall on Canada, based on a set of 
estimated parameters, to assess the kind of commitment that would best fulfill these 
expectations. The goal is to improve Canada’s international standing and its bilateral 
security ties with the US through politically feasible options. To that effect, the size of the 
commitment and the risks associated with a given mission are susceptible to raise the 
profile of an ally’s role for a given intervention. However, the credit gained or 
improvements in standing are tenuous at best and difficult to evaluate. Canada’s standing as 
a reliable ally for military cooperation was questionable after the 1990s. Several Defence 
officials mentioned that Canada had been deemed unreliable, or worse, a free-rider.317  
In this sense, Canada’s prolonged commitment in Afghanistan has challenged this 
view. If the War in Afghanistan was seen as an opportunity to redeem Canada’s military 
reticence, in the eyes of the United States, the contributions of October 2001 have more 
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meaning than the traditional burden-sharing approach would suggest. The next section will 
discuss the general treaty requirements that were invoked between 2001 and 2003, 
concurrently with requests made to the Canadian government by American officials. I will 
also refer to previous Canadian commitments to US-led coalitions. All these elements 
contribute to shaping American expectations of Canadian support and military 
contributions. I will focus on the decision-making processes leading up to the Canadian 
commitment in Afghanistan and examine why Ottawa opted out of the Iraq War.  
Expectations and Results: Afghanistan and Iraq 
The chronology leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq overlaps. Without 
conflating the two decisions or engaging in debates about the linkages between both wars in 
terms of burden-sharing, I have isolated three decisions for the exercise of structured, 
focused comparison. Since the focus of the study is on the initial decision-making process 
of the Canadian government leading to military cooperation, the period of interest is from 
2001-2003. Subsequent deployments, like the redeployment of Canadian troops from Kabul 
to Kandahar, in 2005, are excluded from analysis for two reasons: first, American 
leadership in NATO operations is less apparent, making it harder to address the bilateral 
Canada-US dynamic; and second, as of December 2003, there is a minority government in 
Canada, under Prime Ministers Paul Martin and then Stephen Harper, a potentially 
confounding variable that cannot be controlled for with my set of case studies. As an 
additional consideration, evaluations of a state’s reputation for reliability are best 
  
 
160
undertaken if there is no change in leadership, since a reputation for reliability or 
unreliability may or may not outlive each individual leader.318  
Table 5.2 Decisions on Initial Military Deployments of the CF: 2001-2003 
 
Date Decisions 
Fall 2001-Winter 2002 OEF deployment: Naval taskforce, Air support, Special Forces and JTF2 in 
Afghanistan: 2000-3000 military personnel319 
Winter 2003 Public stance against the War in Iraq by the Chrétien government. 
Summer 2003 ISAF command: 1-year commitment in Kabul 
 
Table 5.2 shows the timeline of these decisions. The deployment to Afghanistan in 2001 
resulted in the contribution of 2000-3000 military personnel. The commitment leading to 
the one-year ISAF command in Kabul took place the following Summer. Finally, Ottawa’s 
decision to opt out of Iraq was announced in March of 2003. Each decision is examined 
below. The first part of this section focuses on the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan, 
starting in October of 2001. The second part deals with Canada’s decision not to participate 
to the war in Iraq. 
Afghanistan 
Following 9/11, there was strong support in Ottawa for the American perception of threat. 
The connection between the terrorist attacks, al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was 
quickly recognized and government cohesion translated into an early signal of Canadian 
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support for the American position and the potential use of force in Afghanistan. Solidarity 
with the US was expressed across political parties in an emergency parliamentary session 
following September 11. As the United States’ neighbour, Canada felt the impact of the 
2001 terrorist attacks directly, launching Operation Support to assist the American 
government on September 11 and the following days. The main task was to host travellers 
and aircrew from re-routed flights at CF facilities. The second task included emergency 
response and humanitarian assistance.320 Canada also suffered economically from the 
attacks because of costly disruptions in commercial traffic at the land border. From the 
outset then, Canada was a committed partner to the US-led international campaign against 
terrorism.  
Canadian involvement in Afghanistan took two forms. The first commitment was 
part of Operation Enduring Freedom and was under American leadership. OEF is geared 
toward combat operations and targeted against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The second 
commitment was part of ISAF, which was tasked with post-conflict reconstruction and 
nation-building, but later transformed into a combat role as security conditions worsened. 
Canada also oversaw the transfer of ISAF to become a NATO operation. Ottawa’s initial 
commitment to OEF was to put 2000-3000 military personnel from the three services at the 
United States’ disposal for early military operations in the fall of 2001 and the first half of 
2002.  
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Were any specific requests made to the Canadians on the part of the Americans? 
The state of crisis meant that Canada had to broadly assess US expectations. Treaty 
commitments provided the first guide. By invoking Article V of its founding treaty, NATO 
identified the invasion of Afghanistan as an act of collective self-defence. As for the size of 
the initial Canadian commitment in Afghanistan, the scope of the military contribution 
“was not called into question, the US was happy with the contribution,” according to the 
Defence Minister’s chief of staff.321 Beyond the legally binding obligations of support as 
set out by Article V of the Atlantic Charter (and the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1368), Canada was not solicited for a specific material contribution, but was left 
to decide the scope and significance of its commitment.322  
As it turns out, a clear request may have been a lot easier to manage for Canadian 
officials. The Canadian government volunteered a contribution based on what the military 
advised to be operationally feasible. In the words of a defence official, “we were there with 
our thumbs out.”323  In essence, the Canadian contribution in the Fall of 2001 was there to 
fill the gaps and did not attract much attention. In fact, the presence of the Joint Task Force 
2 (JTF2), Canada’s elite Special Forces, were only made public after their deployment.324 
The financial implications of the deployment were also an important consideration since the 
budget was mostly allocated from annual appropriations rather than the regular defence 
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budget. American expectations of its Canadian ally were strongly focused on the border 
immediately after 9/11. As for the initial military commitment in Afghanistan, there were 
few domestic constraints: Chrétien had the necessary support from his government to make 
a respectable commitment according to Canada’s available military capabilities. 
The debate over Canada’s military engagement focused on the role that Canadian 
armed forces should take up in Afghanistan: the first option was to fight alongside the 
Americans in a combat mission in Kandahar. The second option was to side with the 
Europeans, engaged in peace support operations in the Afghan capital of Kabul. The ISAF 
mission was to take shape by December 2001 and though the outlines were not clearly set 
out, it seemed “tailor made” for Canada.325 The ambivalence resulted in circumstances 
dictating the right option for Canada, which would be to join the Americans in the South 
for a clearly-defined period of six months, under the OEF umbrella rather than the 
multilateral and UN-mandated ISAF.  
US-led military operations to destroy terrorist camps and Taliban military 
installations began early in October 2001. The Canadian and British responses were similar 
in many respects, with Britain’s commitment being greater in scope and more visible. The 
Canadian commitment to the war in Afghanistan was codenamed Operation Apollo and 
was under the operational command of Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia 
(CJTFSWA). The first American request made to the Canadian government concerned 
Canadian military personnel in exchange programs with the United States. In late 
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September 2001, Defence Minister Art Eggleton authorized CF personnel to serve with 
their host unit in the campaign against terrorism.326 On October 8, the first navy 
deployment was announced as the HMCS Halifax, operating with NATO, was directed to 
the Persian Gulf, with 230 personnel. In addition, a Canadian Naval Task Group of 1000, 
consisting of two frigates, a destroyer, a supply ship and Sea King helicopters was 
committed to the effort, along with HMCS Vancouver, to join the US Carrier Battle 
Group.327 The Air Force provided surveillance and airlift with three Hercules, one Airbus 
and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. On the army side, the Canadian government 
contributed its JTF2, Canada’s elite Special Forces. The Navy provided the first Canadian 
units to OEF, conducting operations in the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The Navy has 
benefited from a high level of interoperability working with the US Carrier Battle Groups 
in the Arabian Gulf in enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq for ten years. Moreover, the 
CJTFSWA is co-located with CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida.328 
The second American request for OEF came in mid-November, asking coalition 
partners to provide ground troops for stabilization operations. Canada’s contribution, 1000 
members of its Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)), came mostly from the 
battalions of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, the IRF(L). Government 
documents and statements from the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) are 
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clear on the command of assets: “CF assets always remain under Canadian command, 
operating under Canadian rules of engagement, and in compliance with Canadian law,” 
though daily tasking can be carried under coalition command.329 Moreover, Canada’s 
commitment of military support to the US-led coalition was justified in light of Article 51 
of the UN Charter, citing collective self-defence, as well as UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 
1373, condemning the September 11 attacks and restating the right to self-defence.330 Once 
these commitments had been made, at the request of the United States, the Canadian 
government stood by for further details on a deployment schedule for its ground forces, as 
well as the precise role troops would undertake in Afghanistan. During that period, a high 
level of government cohesion translated into deferral to the United States. US expectations 
and requirements, along with the availability of Canadian military capabilities were the 
driving factors behind the type and scope of the military commitment under OEF. 
Early on in 2002, the deployment of ground forces to Kandahar was confirmed by 
further American requests. For example, the capabilities of the Coyote were in demand for 
the planned operations. At this point the PPCLI Battle Group was to be deployed for a 
period of six months.331 The JTF2 was already in theater, engaging in combat operations in 
Afghanistan, but was low on the public radar, with little information available publicly. 
Canada’s Air Force, for their part, deployed a Strategic Airlift Detachment with one CC-
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150 Polaris (Airbus A310) strategic lift aircraft, a Long-Range Patrol Detachment, with two 
CP-140 Aurora long-range surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft and a Tactical Airlift 
Detachment in late January, from 8 Wing Trenton, consisting of three CC-130 Hercules 
transport aircraft to transport military personnel, equipment and cargo within 
Afghanistan.332 Further requests were made by the US throughout this period. For example, 
in March 2002, Canada added another infantry company to the 3 PPCLI Battle Group, for a 
total of 880 soldiers in the Kandahar region.333 
The first phase of Canada’s military engagement in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 
2002, was a contribution of almost 3000 military personnel, representing two-thirds of 
Canadian troops deployed worldwide, by far Canada’s biggest commitment abroad.334 In 
March 2002, the 3 PPCLI Battle Group engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda and 
Taliban factions moving from its Kandahar-based operations to Tora Bora for Operation 
Anaconda.335 Canadian soldiers had been part of the US Army task force, consisting of the 
187th Brigade Combat Team (187 BCT) from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 
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assisting in tasks ranging from airfield security to combat.336 After Operation Anaconda, a 
new mission was launched codenamed Operation Harpoon, described as “a joint Canadian 
–American assault using land and air forces to eliminate a specific pocket of Taliban and 
al-Qaeda resistance.”337 This was followed by Operation TORII in May 2002, also in the 
Tora Bora region, to gather intelligence and destroy enemy cave complexes.338 These 
American requests, and Canada’s ability to respond to them, are a fulfillment of allied 
expectations and a testament to interoperability across services. On May 21, 2002, the 
Canadian government announced that the 3 PPCLI Battle Group would return to Canada in 
late July or August with no replacement.339 This reduced the Canadian commitment to 
about 1300 military personnel by late 2002.  
The next phase of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was to begin in July of 
2003 with Operation Athena, the Canadian contribution to ISAF in Kabul. With a 
commitment of approximately 2000 military personnel, the timing of the decision, Fall 
2002, is auspicious. The announcement was made in February of 2003 at which time the 
Chrétien government had not yet announced that it would opt out of the Iraq War. Defence 
Minister McCallum made a connection between the new Canadian commitment under 
ISAF noting that, under such a high operational tempo, other engagements would be 
unlikely: “Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld welcomed the initiative, stating on February 
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19th that ‘Canada has been a solid ally in the global war against terrorism, and we thank the 
Canadian people for their support in defending freedom around the world. Mr Rumsfeld, I 
might add, is fully cognizant of the fact that this mission limits the deployment of Canadian 
land forces to other parts of the world for well over a year.”340 On March 25, 2003, a week 
into the war in Iraq, John McCallum announced the deployment of a Strategic 
Reconnaisance Team (SRT) to Kabul, three days earlier, in preparation for Operation 
Athena.341   
Iraq 
There is clear overlap between the second commitment in Afghanistan, decided in the Fall 
of 2002, and the Canadian decision to opt out of Iraq, in March 2003. How can we make 
sense of the decision-making processes over this period? Overall, the decision to go to Iraq 
did not motivate the loyalty of American allies in the same way the Afghanistan war did, 
which signals a break with the prevailing security framework which focused on the threat 
of terrorism as the overarching priority. The portrayal of Saddam Hussein as evil, the 
relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the impasses suffered at the United 
Nations all strained the United States’ ability to garner support for an intervention in Iraq. 
The perception of threat differed greatly on several issues: “…. The Bush team’s 
allegations of an operational relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq, in its insinuations that 
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the latter bore some responsibility for the September 11 attacks, and in its charges that Iraq 
was actively pursuing nuclear weapons components”.342 Few states adhered to this 
interpretation of the intelligence evidence.  
Canada’s response to the War in Iraq stands apart when compared with the British 
and Australian cases. Referring back to our causal mechanism can account for the variation 
in outcomes. By looking at US expectation, there is a noticeable shift in emphasis when 
Canada is concerned: while the United States and Canada were cooperating closely on 
issues of border security and management, Washington did not expect much from Ottawa 
in terms of international military commitments. As the scope of the War on Terror 
broadened and the possibility of war in Iraq became increasingly clear, secondary allies felt 
additional pressure to increase their commitment to assist in American efforts. For the Iraq 
War specifically, US expectations of Canada were minimal. In fact, no formal request was 
made by the United States for a Canadian commitment, according to Defence Minister John 
McCallum.343 It seems the only precise request which was made by the Americans to 
Canada was channelled from Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to McCallum and 
concerned Afghanistan rather than Iraq. “It caught us off guard.”344 It represented the 
optimal solution for Canada: acquiescing to American demands by taking a leading ISAF 
role, something that would play well domestically. In terms of the trade-off between 
expectations and feasibility, this option presented a perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the 
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Defence Minister McCallum made it clear that through this commitment, no troop 
contribution to Iraq would be possible.345 This option thus quickly garnered internal 
momentum in the Canadian government. 
At this stage, during the Fall of 2002, domestic constraints intervened. The first set 
of constraints, available military commitments changed quickly: by the end of the summer 
in 2002, Canadian troops were returning from their deployment in Afghanistan. However, 
not long after, new requests were placed on Ottawa for a renewed commitment in 
Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, the Americans alluded to the possibility of a 
Canadian command of ISAF planned for 2003.346 In that context, Canada would not have 
available capabilities for a new concurrent commitment, in Iraq or elsewhere.  
Further domestic constraints complicated the equation as the level of government 
cohesion was undermined by changes within the ruling party: the Liberal Party of Canada. 
Prime Minister Chrétien was in the midst of a third term in office and his political 
successor was eager for the transition. At the end of the summer 2002, observers were 
predicting a fierce battle between the two camps: “Who will win? Liberal history may be 
with Chrétien, but the hard numbers are with Martin. No sitting prime minister has ever 
been done in by an inside job, none have faced a popular rival with unlimited resources 
who’s been organizing for this moment the better part of a decade”.347 On both fronts, the 
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level of military capabilities and government cohesion, domestic constraints influenced the 
Canadian decision to opt out of a commitment in the Iraq War.  
One wonders why Canada’s refusal to support the military in Iraq came as a surprise 
to some American observers.348 One explanation lies at the bureaucratic level, as there were 
conflicting messages in the many bilateral channels of Canada-US interactions. The 
Canadian military was involved with the American military at the US Central Command in 
Tampa Bay, Florida, making for close contact between Canadian and American officials. 
When referring to Canada’s military capacity should the political commitment be made, it 
was mentioned by Canadian officials that 600-800 troops could be deployed.349 This 
assessment may have fueled American speculations that Canada would participate.  
Beyond the failures of the political campaign led by Bush to garner international 
support in Iraq, the expectations placed on Canada between 2001 and 2003 were squarely 
expressed in terms of providing legitimacy for the operation, rather than to fill operational 
needs. In situations when support is withheld, as made clear by Canada’s very public 
refusal to participate in Iraq, allies are likely to face diplomatic consequences. Though 
short-lived, the Canadian government suffered some backlash for coming out against the 
American intervention in Iraq: diplomatic lashings, door-slamming at the military level, 
and withholding privileges on intelligence sharing.350 
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Furthermore, it seems that Canadian intentions were not properly communicated to 
the Americans, making for unpleasant diplomatic exchanges in March and April of 2003. 
As will be discussed in a subsequent section which addresses the domestic political 
structure in Canada at the time, it becomes evident that the government’s policy was not 
clearly articulated between 2002 and 2003. Not only were politicians making contradictory 
statements but the leadership was undermined in its ability to confirm what Ottawa’s 
position would be. This left Cabinet ministers in the dark about Chrétien’s true position on 
Iraq.351 This seems to have been a consequence of worsening government cohesion, a 
context which could easily lead to contradictory signals from politicians.  
Canada’s refusal to lend diplomatic support to the war is more puzzling. As one 
commentator suggests, Canada “… could have supported the American action without 
involving any troops at all, only those that are already in the region.”352 Facing strong 
diplomatic pressures, Canada did not exactly stand firm on the issue.353 Ottawa appealed to 
several strategies to redress the situation: by making a financial contribution to the 
American effort, by pledging its support initially after the beginning of the hostilities and 
by making a contribution to stabilization operations, as part of Operation Iolaus.354    
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Alternative Explanations 
This section draws on the theoretical discussion of chapters 2 and 3. It presents an overview 
of alternative explanations to test their significance in the Canadian case. There have been 
volumes of academic writing on the topic of Canada’s military role in Afghanistan and its 
refusal to commit troops or lend support to the war in Iraq. Several analyses focus on the 
role of the UN, the special relationship between Canada and the United States, and the role 
of public opinion in swaying Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government, especially on the Iraq 
question. Various alternative explanations will be discussed with the main research 
question in mind: understanding asymmetric military cooperation in times of war.  
A prominent view in the study of Canadian foreign policy focuses on Canadian 
strategic culture and identity as important factors of decision-making. Canada, according to 
political scientist Stéphane Roussel, is guided by a strategic culture all of its own, which 
has been evolving constantly since the end of World War II. Canada behaves like a middle 
power, with good international intentions, with a preference for multilateralism, and a 
tailored expertise for peacekeeping.355 This presence of Canadian values in foreign policy 
seems well anchored in the general public’s perception of Canada’s international role. This 
view was most closely associated with two Canadian politicians: Lester B. Pearson and 
Lloyd Axworthy. Lester B. Pearson was Foreign Affairs Minister and then a Prime Minister 
in 1963. At the UN he is credited with mediating the consensus for the creation of the UN 
peacekeeping forces and on the domestic front he is recognized as having initiated the 
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peacekeeping turn in Canadian foreign policy. Following his mediation of the Suez Canal 
crisis in 1956 for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Lloyd Axworthy, 
who became Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996, for his part, is well known for 
his emphasis on human security as a pillar of Canadian foreign policy as a cost-efficient 
way of promoting Canada’s role abroad in a period of severe fiscal constraints and cuts in 
the defence budget.356 With their penchant for peacekeeping missions, both Pearson and 
Axworthy framed Canadian foreign policy as a quasi-moral enterprise, which appealed to 
the Canadian public.  
In terms of developing a theory of foreign policy, how do culture and identity 
measure up as independent variables? The constructivist school in IR has devoted attention 
to these topics.357 In the Canadian context, such arguments have emphasized the importance 
of being identified as a good international citizen as an important motivation in foreign 
policy decision-making.358 There are important payoffs to this approach which are 
measured in the currency of international prestige. The thorny issue of distinguishing 
between prestige as a motivator or as a result of foreign policy dilutes its appeal as a 
workable hypothesis. For example, both military power and the restraint of military power 
can be prestige-enhancing actions. Prestige can also be one of the main motivators for both 
types of behaviour. Another reason which makes such accounts of foreign policy 
                                                 
356 See Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership”, International Journal 52, 2 
(1998), 183-196 and Lloyd Axworthy,Navigating a New World (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). 
357 For example, see Finnemore and Sikkink, “International norm dynamics and political change”. 
358 Srdjan Vucetic, “Why Did Canada Sit Out of the Iraq War? One Constructivist Analysis” Canadian 
Foreign Policy 13, 1 (2006), 133-153; Lana Wylie, “Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign 
Policy and the International Criminal Court”, American Review of Canadian Studies 39, 2 (2009), 114. 
  
 
175
unconvincing is the fact that no state, except in extreme cases of rogue states, will 
purposefully attempt to become a bad international citizen. This predisposition would be 
particularly strong among American allies which have material interests in being seen as 
good international citizens.359  
Thus the fulfillment of Canada’s identity as a good international citizen, or the quest 
for prestige, produces few independent effects on Canadian foreign policy decision-making. 
At best, it acts as a macro-level theory, defining the context within which certain decisions 
can be made politically acceptable.360 Consequently, the internationalist identity of the 
Canadian population appears as a constant, rather than a variable which can account for 
specific foreign policy decisions. The importance of the identity-based or cultural 
explanations is made more salient when instrumentalized for political purposes, as was 
done during the Pearson and Axworthy eras. Claims about good citizenship are perhaps not 
as significant if they are not backed up by a certain level of hard power to enable the 
implementation of the international ideals promoted. Therein lies the third weakness of this 
approach: if Canadian foreign policy were strongly determined by the humanitarian 
imperative, we would have seen a steady increase in the financial allocations to human 
security rather than human security emerging in times of financial constraints. Indeed, 
when defence budgets soar, Canadian officials are singing a different tune.  
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A related but separate point concerns the role of the United Nations in Canadian 
military involvement internationally. Disregarding the fact that Canada participated in the 
war in Kosovo without UN approval, one could argue that Canada has made UN approval a 
condition to military cooperation with the United States. This seems consistent with the 
record: Canada chose to participate in the war in Afghanistan but opted out of the Iraq War. 
Referred to as the Chrétien doctrine, this strategy implies that Canadian foreign policy 
decisions involving the use of force should have the UN seal of approval.361 The mythology 
of Canada as the quintessential peacekeeper is consistent with this vision, but has been 
outdated at least since the mid-1990s. Canada’s initial military commitment in Afghanistan, 
as part of OEF, rather than ISAF, illustrates this point. I argue that insisting on drawing out 
the UN process was a strategy rather than a causal factor in Canadian decision-making. 
Canada, instead of siding with France at the UN, attempted to rival the British in proposing 
a second resolution.362 Furthermore, public statements show that the option of going to war 
without a second resolution was kept open. Chrétien only confirmed his position in the very 
end, in March 2003. 
Another popular interpretation for Chrétien’s decision to withhold support for the 
war in Iraq is based on domestic public opinion. This argument is less relevant for the case 
of Afghanistan, since the initial commitment of Canadian troops was made almost 
immediately.363 Moreover, opinion polls following 9/11 clearly indicated that Canada was a 
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full partner in the “war on terror,” and supportive of the military use of force.364 In the case 
of Iraq, however, the decision-making timeframe was much longer, giving ample time for 
domestic political forces to build their position on the issue. It is well known that public 
opinion in Canada was not favourable to Canadian involvement in Iraq without the 
approval from the UN Security Council. Opposition was especially strong in Québec, 
which may be of significance because there was a provincial election underway where the 
sovereignist Parti québécois was engaged in a tight race with the Liberal Party of 
Québec.365 This argument has several shortcomings. First, elections are rarely fought on the 
basis of foreign policy in Canada, and even less so in a provincial election. Second, there is 
no other evidence supporting this argument beside the fact that both events, the election and 
the public debate over Iraq, happened simultaneously. Finally, the claim has been 
vigorously denied by the Prime Minister and also dismissed by his close advisors.366 
Though not directly related to my research question, the Canadian experience 
nonetheless lends support to certain findings on public opinion and the use of military 
force. Indeed, we can observe an increase in the level of public support for the Iraq war 
immediately after the beginning of the hostilities. This is consistent with the thesis that both 
the objectives of the military mission – in this case, the removal of Saddam and the early 
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military successes in Iraq- determine public support.367 During this period, it seems that 
result was more important than the process, since the war could hardly qualify as being a 
multilateral effort. Public opinion can be characterized as reactive to such international 
events, rather than as an independent driver of foreign policy.   
Finally, we must consider the shift in Canada’s security environment in the new 
strategic importance given to the Arctic region. The end of the Cold War liberated the Far 
North from Russian ICBM threats but with the publication of alarming scientific models 
showing the accelerated melting of the Arctic ice cap, a host of new concerns have 
surfaced. These predictions, announcing the opening of Arctic Passages much sooner than 
expected, have prompted Canadian policymakers to come up with a Northern strategy, 
involving the military, to prepare for a navigable North West passage sometime before 
2050. Both the United States and Russia have already stepped up their presence in their 
respective (and overlapping) Arctic spheres. Whether or not the more alarmist accounts are 
borne out, policymakers have acted on this perceived threat in the circumpolar 
neighbourhood with plans to strengthen Canada’s military presence in the region. For 
Canada, as America’s Arctic neighbour in the North, this puts their special relationship to 
the test, as diplomatic tensions with the United States have been recurring on this issue.368  
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The increasing security concerns in the Arctic are relevant for the proposition on 
regional security mentioned in chapter 3. This proposition states that when regional security 
concerns increase, Canada should be more inclined to lend support and resources to US-led 
coalitions. The Arctic’s strategic profile was spotlighted by the Harper government with its 
decision to invest in Canada’s military capabilities to defend the Far North. In terms of 
Canada-US relations, the record is mixed. On the one hand, there have been several public 
statements on the Arctic, especially regarding US access to the waters of the Canadian 
archipelago, which have caused diplomatic tensions between the allies. On the other hand, 
growing Arctic concerns encouraged the expansion of NORAD to include a maritime 
dimension. Overall, although the Arctic may have encouraged greater exchanges and 
dialogue between the US and Canada, so far, these have not resulted in Canada showing 
greater deference to the United States.  
Conclusion 
Given Canada’s status in the international state system, holding the rank of middle power, 
certain strategies must be deployed to maximize Canadian power and leverage within 
bilateral and multilateral settings. As Robert Keohane points out, smaller states have a 
range of strategies at their disposal: using international organizations to lobby on particular 
issues, ad hoc building coalitions, or to negotiate concessions bilaterally.369 Different tactics 
hold different advantages. For example, on issues that are peripheral to American interests, 
Canada might apply pressure bilaterally because the United States is more likely to make 
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concessions. When the issue is high on the American agenda, Canadian officials should 
prefer multilateral channels where they can build on the support of other states to influence 
the United States.  
What should we make of situations where the United States values something more 
than the Canadians? Can it coerce its weaker partner into going alone with its plans? A first 
look at the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, suggest that these events represented high-
constraint encounters for Canada. Framing by Canadian politicians was aimed at narrowing 
the scope of the new War on Terror. Official speeches, both by Prime Minister Chrétien 
and Defense Minister Art Eggleton, framed the campaign against terrorism as a Canadian 
project, but remained cautious in revealing specifics about the military commitment. On the 
American side, rhetoric of bringing about justice presupposed a military solution. When 
President Bush spoke to the United Nations on November 10, 2001, he made his position 
clear: “The United States, supported by many nations, is bringing justice to the terrorists in 
Afghanistan. We’re making progress against military targets, and that is our objective”.370  
In contrast to Bush’s recurring promise of bringing terrorists to justice, Chrétien 
offers a Canadian echo, in pledging “…to bring them before the courts”.371 John Manley, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, seems to concur with his leader in emphasizing the role of 
international law in the war on terrorism: “…it is consistent with the policy of the 
Government of Canada to seek orderly and judicial ways to resolve matters of international 
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importance, including ensuring that there is not impunity for international crime”.372 The 
Canadian approach is reminiscent of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan call for “bringing 
the perpetrators to justice, in a clear and transparent process that all can understand and 
accept”.373 Overall, the government appears reluctant to identify the September 11 attacks 
as an act of war. More attention to international law is given by the government in its 
appeal to just war principles, but more specifically, to the proportionality of any military 
response. To put things in perspective, reports from the Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade show that the Canadian government has been mostly 
preoccupied with keeping the border open and the future of North American integration in 
the age of terrorism.374 
Finally, Canada has been a strong advocate of the UN as a way to engage with the 
United States. Using its diplomatic skills, it seeks out the role of a mediator to promote its 
international status. This was made apparent by the Canadian role in the international 
negotiations that unfolded at the UN in 2002 and 2003 over Iraq. Canada stayed involved in 
the UN-led process until the very end, apparently believing that French and American 
positions could be reconciled through a second resolution. In fact, two versions of this 
resolution were drafted in March 2003 by the Canadians but were unceremoniously rejected 
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by both France and the United States. Without the United States on its side, one can wonder 
about the international reach of Canadian influence.  
From the beginning, Chrétien was adamant about a UN resolution. However, when 
pressed for clarifications, he would often avoid a definite answer in one way or another: 
“throughout this period [Fall 2002-March 2003], the Canadian government’s position was 
poorly articulated and inconsistently applied, some days indicating support for the U.S. 
while on other days suggesting the opposite.”375 Chrétien was pushing for different 
strategies in manifesting Canada’s autonomy: stalling, vague terms, ambiguous stances, and 
alliance-seeking through the UN, all geared to achieve greater leverage when opting for 
non-participation. When the decision reached, why was Canada’s refusal to participate in 
the war in Iraq announced with such fanfare and so indelicately handled? This is puzzling 
on the alliance-level because what amounted to a series of political blunders aggravated the 
Bush administration unnecessarily. There was Carolyn Parrish’s indiscretion, Chrétien’s 
press secretary calling President Bush a “moron”, and the fact that the actual decision was 
announced in the House of Commons without giving any notice to the Americans. Then, 
after the initial phase of the war in Iraq, in April 2003, Chrétien suddenly adapted his 
discourse, offering political support for the coalition of the willing. Looking back to 
Canada’s experience during the Vietnam War, Bothwell mentions that Chrétien’s conduct 
in March 2003 could have used a dose of “quiet diplomacy,” not offering any military 
support to the US, but sitting quietly as the United States pursued its policy of regime 
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change.376 These tactics make sense if we consider them as part of a broader strategy. In 
situations where Canada withholds support from the US, as was the case in Iraq, politicians 
play up the moral impetus of the decision by appealing to principles. At the same time, they 
opt for compensatory strategies, such as offering political or material support to the United 
States. This was the case in Iraq, but also in Vietnam, where Canada provided millions of 
dollars in aid and equipment to the Americans.  
For some commentators, Canadian foreign policy is more the product of ad hoc 
decision-making than a clear vision of its national interests.377 Although there are some 
advantages to this approach, it fails on issues that are most important to the United States. 
The degree of independence afforded to Canada, as a special ally, is partly due to its 
geographic location. If we think back to the framework outlined by Ikenberry where 
alliance relationships invoke both fears of entrapment and abandonment, Canada is seems 
immune to both. Since it shares strategic territory with the United States, it does not risk 
abandonment, and since it can withhold support for American initiatives without fearing the 
threat of abandonment, it has done so without lasting consequences to the bilateral 
relationship. These systemic conditions are important to understanding how Canada and the 
United States assess international threat and order their security priorities. To explain 
specific foreign policy decision, the causal mechanism based on US expectations is well-
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suited and addresses the different foreign and defence policy paths special allies have taken 
between 2001 and 2003. For secondary powers like Canada, balancing US expectations 
with domestic constraints determines the scope and type of military commitments they can 
make. In the cases of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military capabilities and the level of 
government cohesion are important to explain how Canadian responded to US military 
actions and calls for support. 
  
Australia: Regional Power, Global War 
 Situated in the Southern Hemisphere of Southeast Asia, Australia faces unique 
security challenges far from its closest ally. In its immediate vicinity, Australia is willing to 
accept the lead responsibility in military interventions as it did in East Timor, for example. 
Australia is a major player in its region, a regional power, but a state of secondary rank in 
the global environment. For military interventions beyond the Asia-Pacific, Australia will 
invariably follow another state’s lead, in all likelihood the United States, and contribute by 
offering smaller and more tailored commitments. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is 
structured to respond to crises in its neighbourhood, as Indonesia and several smaller states 
cause constant security concerns. Part of Australia’s regional strategy is devoted to 
strengthening the United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific, as the keeper of the Asian 
balance of power. The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States of America (ANZUS) treaty, for instance, binds the United States to security 
commitments in the Pacific region.378 The bilateral relationship is vital to Australia: the 
United States is its most important partner for both security and trade, which is also the 
case for the UK and Canada. 
 The ANZUS alliance has been interpreted as a promise of mutual assistance in the 
Pacific region, but its original text is vague on the specific requirements.379 With the events 
of September 11, the treaty’s interpretation was expanded, as Prime Minister John Howard 
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moved to support the United States on grounds of collective self-defence even though the 
attack occurred outside of the Pacific region. Even during the Cold War, Australia has been 
a reliable ally to the US, fighting with the Americans in Vietnam, when the UK and Canada 
both refused to commit troops. Australia has consistently supported military cooperation 
with the United States. By doing so, it has been able to leverage its military commitments 
with the United States to further entangle its American ally in the Asia-Pacific, making it an 
interesting case for the study of asymmetric alliances.  
Indeed, unlike the UK and Canada, Australia has acute regional security concerns. 
Australia has traditionally relied on a strong outside power to provide security guarantees 
for its protection. Prior to World War II, those guarantees were provided by Great Britain. 
But when Japan attacked Australia during World War II, it became clear that Australians 
would have to fend for themselves. This marked a turning point for military thinking in 
Australia and sparked a debate on how best to structure the ADF in the post World War II 
era. With time, Australian defence policy turned to the United States to replace Britain as 
the great power guardian raising the profile of the Australian-American alliance and 
culminating in the signing of ANZUS in 1951. This is not to say that Britain did not remain 
one of Australia’s closest allies, only that the balance of power was taken into account as 
strategic thinking evolved in the 1950s and beyond. Australia now needed to factor in 
American expectations in crafting its new strategic posture, a reality that is just as relevant 
today. 
As a coalition participant in both the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, 
Australia has had its own political objectives for its alliance with the United States. Some 
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of these objectives have gone above and beyond the context of military cooperation, as in 
the case of the Free Trade agreement, which was implemented on January 1, 2005. Other 
goals focused on the Australia-US security relationship specifically, in an effort to deepen 
the ties and connections between the two countries’ military and intelligence communities. 
The Australian decision to participate in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was strongly 
influenced by its regional security concerns and threat perceptions having also experienced 
a terrorist attack during the 2002 Bali bombings. Being simultaneously engaged in two 
wars has proven challenging for a country of relatively small size with a population of a 
little over 20 million people. It should be noted that the ADF was also committed in East 
Timor and the Solomon Islands during the same period of time. The Australian 
commitment to the East Timor peacekeeping was 1250 strong, while the ADF contribution 
in Solomon was estimated at 1400.380 When taken together, these commitments and 
Australian contributions to the War on Terror imposed a high operational tempo on the 
ADF and represented a real strain on the country’s resources.  
 This chapter discusses the decision-making process leading up to the commitment 
of Australian forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, focusing on the period between 2001 and 
2003. I discuss Australia’s response to American expectations as the main driver of military 
cooperation between Australia and the United States between 2001 and 2003. By drawing 
on key decisions leading to Australian commitments, I can determine the impact of 
perceived expectations on the type of military commitment made by Canberra. I also show 
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that Australia was successful in leveraging its commitments to the War on Terror with the 
United States through various strategies, such as privileging the bilateral level of interaction 
to push its own list of security and economic priorities. These strategies are addressed in the 
conclusion of this chapter. The evidence demonstrates that the Howard government was 
careful in determining the scope of Australia’s military involvement, even refusing the 
American request for additional troops. Domestic-level constraints are part of the analysis 
to explain these shifts in the scope of Australia’s military cooperation with the United 
States. By examining the level of government cohesion and fluctuations in Australian 
military capabilities, due to concurrent military commitments, it is possible to explain the 
rationale for foreign and defence policy decisions taken between 2001 and 2003. The next 
section discusses the systemic factors underlying the Australia-US alliance and how these 
structure security priorities and threat perceptions. 
Australia-US Security Cooperation   
The overlapping security interests of Australia and the United States are less obvious than 
in the Canadian case. Yet, Australia can be introduced as the United States’ most reliable 
partner. Australia has fought with the United States in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Though many of these commitments have been described as token, 
with the notable exception of the Vietnam War, the objective has been to establish an 
expectation of mutual support between Australia and the United States. Australia depends 
on an American presence in Asia to uphold the regional balance of power. In fact, the 
alliance commitments and obligations of the United States are explicitly stated as reasons 
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for the Australian position on Afghanistan and Iraq.381 The Foreign Minister, for instance, 
justified Australia’s participation in the Iraq War as consistent with the security ‘insurance 
policy’ provided to Australia by the United States.382 This justification was also behind 
Australia’s support for American ballistic missile defence in 2003 which was formalized 
into a 25-year commitment as part of a 2004 MOU with the United States.383 This section 
examines Australia’s foreign policy options, relative to its American ally, shedding light on 
the system-level parameters of their asymmetric security relationship.  
The recent debates over Australia’s new defence policy, the 2009 White Paper, has 
focused on two options: structuring the ADF according to the precepts of the Defence of 
Australia doctrine or tailoring the ADF as an expeditionary force to enhance Australia’s 
ability to assist the United States in distant operations. This has been a recurrent debate in 
Australian defence policy. The Defence of Australia doctrine has been dominant since the 
Vietnam War but has been increasingly scrutinized as a result of the changed strategic 
environment and the open-ended nature of the War on Terror. Unlike Britain and Canada, 
Australian defence policy mentions the risk of an attack on its own shores as a probable, if 
not likely, contingency.384  
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ANZUS is the core treaty managing the security relationship between the two 
countries. Australia also benefits from privileged access to American defence technology 
and intelligence, as enshrined in the UKUSA Agreement (along with the UK and 
Canada).385 At the time the treaty was created in 1951, it signified a shift away from Britain 
as Australia’s foremost alliance partner, in favour of the United States. The US had not 
only become the world’s preeminent power, but was also increasingly engaged in the Asia-
Pacific region. American alliances with South Korea and Japan are often described as the 
linchpin of stability in the Asian theatre.386  
In terms of military cooperation, the War in Vietnam is a significant landmark in 
Australian-American relations and started with a successful request for troops by Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk. The Australian commitment to the war was substantial. Sending nearly 
50 000 troops, between 1962 and 1972, was a major achievement for a self-proclaimed 
middle power.387 Britain and Canada, though offering tacit political support, refused to 
commit troops. By performing well in counterinsurgency warfare, the Australian 
perspective on Vietnam is different from the American Vietnam syndrome: the United 
States, not Australia, lost the war in Vietnam.388 Vietnam is significant because it marked a 
shift in America’s approach to defending Asia. Nixon’s Guam Doctrine pushed Australia to 
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self-reliance, the Defence of Australia doctrine, which meant that Australia would abandon 
the idea of a great power protector.  
The other issue that has defined the relationship is the question of joint facilities, 
essentially satellite installations on Australian territory designed for ballistic missile early 
warning. Issued through the 1966 Pine Gap Agreement, these facilities have been 
controversial because of sovereignty concerns. Defending these as part of Australia’s 
burden-sharing responsibilities to its American ally, Kim Beazley, Defence Minister 
between 1984 and 1990, outlines the importance of these facilities for the Australian-
American security relationship:  
 
The three major facilities were incorporated into a logic which ran roughly as 
follows: North West Cape communicating with SSBN assisted an invulnerable 
American second strike capacity and therefore aided deterrence: Nurrungar’s early 
warning function was essential for crisis stability as it enabled correction of false 
alarms elsewhere in the system and gave a US President time to think in the event of 
Soviet attack: Pine Gap was crucial for arms control verification and any hope of 
arms reductions. Whatever other purposes the facilities served, these purposes were 
robust enough to sustain an argument for their presence.389 
 
Australia thus benefits from the protection of American extended nuclear deterrence. 
Beyond sovereignty concerns over these joint facilities, Australia’s strategic posture has 
abided by the concept of defence self reliance. The United States is only expected to 
intervene on Australia’s behalf in a situation where a major power would threaten the 
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territorial integrity of Australia, providing that this major power’s capabilities outweighed 
Australia’s.390 Nevertheless, Australia can rely on American security guarantees and 
benefits from the bilateral relationship through shared intelligence arrangements and by 
having access to American military technology.391 
As of 2001, terrorism is identified as a top security priority for Australia, expecially 
given its regional context. From the 2000 edition of the Australian Government’s Defence 
White Paper, entitled Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, to the 2003 defence 
update Australia’s National Security, there is an important shift in terms of the threats 
which are identified as priorities. These documents focus on three major threats: terrorism, 
the proliferation of WMDs, and security concerns in Australia’s immediate region. Though 
regional security has consistently been featured as a preoccupation for Defence, the 
emphasis on terrorism and WMDs is clearly a response to the changed strategic 
environment following 9/11. Like the United States, Australia has inherited a 
responsibility, albeit at the regional level, to respond to the threats of terrorism, WMDs and 
the instability of weak and failing states in the Asia Pacific. Although each state holds a 
different power position in the international system, they both rely on their ability to project 
power to address security threats. In this sense, their perception of threats often overlaps, 
especially in upholding the Asian balance of power. When their perception of threats does 
not concur, Canberra’s approach is pragmatic - pursue the goal of solidifying an 
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expectation of mutual support - while underscoring its reputation for being a reliable 
alliance partner. Coalitions of the willing have proven to be a convenient tool for Australian 
military cooperation with the US, offering greater flexibility to respond to international 
threats. Referring to the War in Kosovo, Defence Minister Robert Hill (2001-2006) praised 
the efficiency of such coalitions: “We allowed President Milosevic to murder Kosovars 
until the US-led coalition of the willing put a stop to it.”392 Even under the Rudd 
government, coalitions are emerging as a worthy alternative to other types of multilateral 
engagements where the ADF can make a tailored commitment according to Australian 
strategic interests: 
Coalitions are becoming increasingly important means of dealing with many 
security challenges, including insurgencies, terrorist networks and outbreaks of 
political and ethnic violence. Such coalitions are vehicles by which different 
countries can pool their resources according to their comparative military strengths 
and capacity to contribution. Being willing to contribute – even modestly at times – 
sends a message to allies and others alike that we are prepared to shoulder common 
strategic burdens.393 
  
Australia has also emphasized its bilateral relationship with China, especially in its 
2009 Defence White Paper where it is acknowledged as a security partner of rising 
importance. Economic interests are an important driving factor in the relationship. The 
2003 DFAT white paper encouraged the trend toward regional economic integration of 
Australia with Asia. A related concern is China’s rise and its impact on the regional balance 
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of power. In Australia’s latest iteration of its Defence policy, there are references to the 
possibility of a shift in the regional balance of power, resulting in eventual American 
withdrawal from its commitments in the Asia-Pacific. Specifically it states that, a 
redistribution of strategic power would be of concern insofar as it could lead to “...a 
diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilizing 
force.”394 Not only is American power important in the region but its alliance with Japan 
and the security guarantees it confers to its allies are seen by Australia as pillars in the 
security architecture of the Asia Pacific. If the US were to withdraw from the Southwest 
Pacific region, Australia could turn to China in upholding a new balance of power. In the 
event of a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, the idea that Australia 
would be expected to align itself with the US should hostilities arise is not longer accepted 
at the Russell Offices.395   
In sum, the regional balance of power is an important consideration when assessing 
the security priorities underlying the Australia-US alliance. In terms of explaining 
Australian foreign policy and decision-making processes that lead to military cooperation, 
systemic factors need to be complemented with other variables. In the next section, I build 
on my theoretical argument, showing that perceived alliance expectations drove the 
Howard government to make a strong commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the 
ability of Australia to respond to US expectations was mitigated by domestic-level 
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constraints: while the level of cohesion of the Howard government remained high between 
2001 and 2003, concerns over military feasibility were caused by acute regional insecurity 
in Australia’s own neighbourhood. The Bali bombings, by targeting Australians, and the 
intervention in the Solomon Islands for peace support operations, as well as ongoing 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor, translated into an increased regional role for 
Australia, which competed with its military participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, regions 
of little strategic importance for Australia.  
Balancing Alliance Expectations and Domestic Constraints 
In the previous section, I outlined how American and Australian perceptions of threat 
overlap despite having dramatically different power capabilities due to shared regional 
security concerns in the Asia-Pacific. Building on this general claim, other variables must 
be introduced to explain specific foreign policy decisions. Canberra turns to Washington 
for cues on what is expected as a contribution to military cooperation. These assessments 
are mitigated by two domestic-level constraints: the level of government cohesion and 
available military capabilities.  
How do Australian decision-makers assess American expectations of them 
regarding international security concerns? The first criterion is the Australian-American 
expectation of mutual support as enshrined in their defence treaty, ANZUS, the 
foundational document of the alliance. Another alliance-level factor rests on past 
experience. Because ANZUS has endured over fifty years, there is a historical legacy of 
military cooperation between the two countries. Although the treaty was evoked for the first 
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time on September 11, 2001, the ADF has fought with the US military on several other 
occasions, from the Vietnam War to the first Gulf War. Past experiences thus provide 
decision-makers with cues on areas of mutual importance and general expectations about 
each state’s strategic interests. Finally, alliance expectations are driven by US operational 
need. Contextual factors which are specific to a given security challenge will shape the 
nature of Australian military commitments.  
Prime Minister Howard invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in response to 
9/11. A Defence media brief dating back to September 18, 2001, states that “In accordance 
with Article IV, the Government will continue to consult closely with the US in relation to 
any response, military or otherwise, the US may deem appropriate.”396 For the first time, 
much like NATO’s article V, it was used as a pledge of allied support in the event of an 
attack on the United States. Indeed, the expectation was that ANZUS’ raison d’être was to 
protect Australia, rather than the United States. Furthermore, the security guarantees 
enshrined in the treaty were limited to the Pacific region. In the broader War on Terror, the 
threat of terrorism had appeal in Australia, as a central preoccupation for its national 
security apparatus. The October 2002 Bali bombings made Australia’s adherence to the 
GWOT that much stronger, considering that of the 202 casualties, 88 were Australian.397 
By invoking ANZUS in response to 9/11, Howard expanded the interpretation of the 
treaty above and beyond its original formulation. This represents an important precedent for 
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alliance expectations. Despite a long tradition of security cooperation through ANZUS and 
subsequent arrangements in intelligence, security and defence, Australian and American 
strategic interests are not as fundamental as those the US shares with Canada because of its 
contiguous border, or the UK through its deeply entrenched transatlantic relationship. In the 
Asian theatre, it is increasingly acknowledged that Australian and American interests may 
differ.398 This has led Australia to opt for a self-sufficient defence force while still 
benefiting from American military technology and a close overall security relationship. In 
terms of specific security challenges, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the Australian 
disposition has been accommodating of American security concerns, rather than being 
driven by strategic imperatives. 
Furthermore, American operational needs must also be considered through different 
phases of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. More specifically, it is important to differentiate 
between the types of military deployment, whether for combat operations or stabilization 
operations. For combat, the need for allies has been downplayed and contributions have 
been accepted only if the military resources are self-sufficient and interoperable. For 
stabilization operations, the United States has a greater propensity to delegate, preferring a 
division of labour approach, where American troops do the heavy lifting in combat 
operations and allies could take charge of certain reconstruction and nation-building tasks. 
Thus, assessing the specific needs of the American-led coalition sheds light on the resulting 
American expectations of allied commitments. 
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Australia seems to benefit from a realist appraisal of American operations in the 
Middle East.399 Though it has consistently offered political and military support to the 
United States in its Middle East endeavours, it has rarely made significant troop 
contributions, nor has it been expected to. In fact, one particular account notes that an 
Australian general sent to Iraq was given a title, deputy-chief of staff for operations with 
the Multi-National Force in Iraq but no job to match. In Major General Jim Molan’s own 
words, “The coalition was oversupplied with foreign generals who were there to show their 
countries’ interest in the war but little else.”400 Australia must assess the strategic return of 
its military commitments and also determine how these can best serve their American ally. 
An important criterion is thus self-sufficiency which infers that coalition forces should not 
depend on the American resources because they could be perceived as an impediment 
rather than as an asset. To this end, Australia has preferred to send Special Forces as its 
contribution to the US-led coalition with appreciated contributions from the Special Air 
Service Regiment (SASR).  
By studying Australian military cooperation with the United States in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, between 2001 and 2003, I draw on evidence for Australian 
perceptions of American expectations. The causal mechanism is further specified with 
domestic-level constraints, defined as concerns over military feasibility and available 
capabilities, which determine the scope of military cooperation with the United States. The 
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level of government cohesion also influences the extent to which Canberra will defer to 
Washington in implementing military plans. 
Australia in the War on Terror: Afghanistan and Iraq 
The events of 9/11 and the threat of terrorism have profoundly altered not only the thrust of 
American foreign and defence policy but the entire strategic environment. For Australia, 
assessing the expectations of its American ally about what the Australian response should 
be to these threats represents an essential element in the process of decision-making. On the 
issue of terrorism, there is strong congruence over the perception of threat between the 
United States and Australia, in part because of the Bali bombings where Australians were 
targeted and killed. The threat of WMDs is presented in similar terms in American and 
Australian political discourse. For Australia, this threat is of particular concern in the Asian 
theatre with North Korea. Finally, instability in the Asia Pacific neighbourhood represents a 
paramount preoccupation in foreign and defence policy. This regional insecurity is a 
dominant factor in understanding the Australian context compared to the relatively stable 
environment of the UK and Canada.  
A separate section will be devoted to Australia’s regional security concerns from 
2001 to 2003. Contrary to the competing hypothesis in chapter 2, it is an important 
mitigating factor that tempered rather than increased Australia’s response to the War on 
Terror and its military commitments to the war of Afghanistan and Iraq. The analysis of the 
decision-making processes leading to Australia’s engagement in the International Coalition 
against Terrorism is divided into three key phases reflecting the initial military deployment 
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of Australian Forces from 2001 to 2003 (Table 6.1). The Australian contribution to OEF in 
Afghanistan began in the Fall of 2001. By the Spring of 2003, attention had shifted to Iraq: 
the ADF had deployed 2000 military personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom and would 
maintain a presence for stabilization operations. 
Table 6.1 Initial Military Deployments of Australian Forces: 2001-2003 
 
Date Mission 
Fall 2001-Winter 2002 Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): 150 SAS Kandahar 
region and Operation Anaconda 
March-May 2003 Iraq – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF): Operation Falconer 
2000 military personnel, including Special Forces, and F-18s, naval 
warships, P3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, C-130 transports.  
July 2003- present Iraq – Operation Catalyst: 1200 military personnel for stabilization 
mission. 
 
 This section details Australia’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
with a focus on the political decisions made prior to each military commitment. I argue 
that, although American expectations and the high level of perceived threat were strong 
factors in Australia’s involvement, regional insecurity forced the ADF to make manageable 
commitments in both cases. To compensate for the modest numbers, Australia’s 
commitments were tailored to American needs by being self-sufficient, and open-ended. 
This approach empowered Australia to achieve certain concessions, though indirectly, as it 
Howard government’s access to the Bush administration improved. 
Afghanistan 
The threat posed by terrorism and al-Qaeda, in particular, is salient for Australia due to its 
geography. Concerned with extremism in Southeast Asia, counterterrorism for Australia 
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translated into regional initiatives, in addition to its initial and continued military 
involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, Australia’s neighbour state, Indonesia is the largest 
Muslim country in the world and has been grappling with political instability in its 
transition to democracy. The situation is closely monitored by Canberra, as radicalization of 
that country would translate into an increased terrorist threat in its immediate 
neighbourhood.  
The struggle against terrorism has been described by Australia as an ideological 
confrontation, akin to the war against communism during the Cold War. For example, the 
2003 Defence update states that the objective of modern terrorists is to “…roll back 
Western values, engagement and influence, and to weaken and ultimately supplant 
moderate Islamic governments.”401 What is interesting about the way Australian politicians 
framed the threat of international terrorism prior to their commitment in Afghanistan is in 
the global nature of the struggle, arguing that 9/11 was an attempt to “…re-order the 
international system…”402 There is also an attempt to enhance Australia’s commitment by 
highlighting the unconventional nature of the military confrontation, by referring to 
Australia’s commitment to Vietnam and putting the emphasis on Australian capabilities in 
terms of intelligence and Special Forces.403 On several occasions, terrorism is expressed as 
a common threat shared with the United States through ANZUS. However, the scope of the 
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relationship is clearly regional, as Australia is dependent on a consistent US presence in the 
Asian theater.  
In a speech given to the Australian Defence Association on October 25, 2001, Prime 
Minister Howard makes a statement in this regard: “we expressed the conviction that the 
alliance has been a pillar of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and I welcomed the 
President’s commitment to continued active US engagement in our region”.404 Soon after 
this declaration, Howard committed “two 707 aircraft refuelers, a 150-man SAS squadron, 
and an Orion Aircraft”.405 Australia also aligned its foreign and defence policy on 
American initiatives. For example, on September 21, 2001, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Alexander Downer and Minister for Defence Peter Reith (who was succeeded by Robert 
Hill in November) announced that it would lift punitive measures against Pakistan, its role 
in the struggle against terrorism as the main reason to reinstate defence relations between 
the two countries.406  
The first request made by the United States was to extend the Australian 
deployment in the Persian Gulf. On September 16 2001, Australia responded favourably to 
the request, ordering HMAS ANZAC to assist the US naval task group. The Australian 
frigate, with a crew of 164, had been in the Persian Gulf as part of the International 
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Coalition to enforce trade sanctions against Iraq.407 ADF personnel on exchange with the 
US, numbering 295, received the authorization to deploy with American forces, within and 
outside the United States.408 ADF exchange personnel with the UK, numbering 44, were 
also authorized to deploy as part of coalition counter-terrorist operations.409 The initial 
Australian commitment to Operation Enduring Freedom was announced in October 2001 
and included a Navy presence in the Persian Gulf with three rotations of 150 SASR troops, 
air-to-air refuellers, F/A 18’s, and P3Orions, as part of its supporting role in American 
combat operations with a total of approximately 2000 military personnel.  
The Australian military commitment in Afghanistan, code-named Operation 
Slipper, had a presence in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf. It had a significant 
leadership role through its maritime operations. Captain Peter Jones commanded the 
Multinational Interception Operations from an American ship, with an overall commitment 
of 400 Royal Australian Navy personnel.410 Special Forces Task Groups in Afghanistan 
operated at the Forward Operating Base Rhino in the Kandahar region and in Tora Bora, in 
the Fall of 2001 and Winter of 2002 respectively.411  
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The Australian commitment was designed to operate self-sufficiently, if needed, and 
had the benefit of full interoperability. In January 2002, Brigadier Gary Bornholt updated 
information on the Australian Defence Force operations in the Coalition against 
Terrorism.412 The naval taskforce would ensure a longer term presence and the SASR 
would engage in combat operations with the United States searching for al-Qaeda and 
Taliban pockets of resistance in the rough terrain near Pakistan’s border. This included the 
replacement of HMAS Sydney by HMAS Newcastle after 105 days in the Persian Gulf as 
part of Coalition maritime operations, along with HMAS Kanimbla and Adelaide. The 
Royal Australian Air Force F18 detachment also underwent a rotation of 80 personnel 
while continuing air operations. In terms of land operations, the Special Forces Task Group, 
operating in Southern Afghanistan, engaged in Operation Anaconda with 150 troops. The 
SASR are tasked with intelligence gathering through clandestine strategic reconnaissance 
tasking.413 Australian Special Forces operated with the US, in parallel with British and 
Canadian Special Forces.  
It is important to note that, as part of the International Coalition in Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the United States has been in control of all forward operating bases in 
Afghanistan.414 Operations in support of OEF have been conducted independently by the 
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ADF with the US or with other coalition special forces.415 The US called upon Australia’s 
SASR for long-range reconnaissance and surveillance activities, offensive operations, 
recovery operations and counter-terrorism during Operation Anaconda in February and 
March 2002. The Australian and British Special Forces were the only “…non-Americans 
who were fully equipped and didn’t need anything more from the American” which meant 
that the United States needed them more.416 In the Fall of 2002, the Bali terrorist attacks did 
much to strengthen Australia’s resolve as a member of the US coalition against terrorism 
and further united the Howard government as it considered participating in the Iraq War. 
In addition to US expectations as a determinant of Australian military commitments, 
domestic-level constraints complement the analysis. The first such constraint is related to 
the level of available military capabilities. Concurrent commitments of the ADF during that 
period of time were in East Timor and Bougainville, meaning that the ADF were sustaining 
a high operational tempo. Military overstretch and the need for flexibility in case of a 
regional deployment had a limiting effect on the scope of Canberra’s military contribution. 
Indeed the Australian government had invested in its regional approach to counter-
terrorism. Canberra has sought to position itself as a leader in the Asia Pacific region and 
assure its presence at the forefront of regional initiatives.  
Another domestic-level consideration, the level of government cohesion, was 
solidified through John Howard’s third term as Prime Minister. Strong support for US 
                                                 
415 Bornholt, “Australia’s Contribution to the Coalition Against Terrorism”. 
416 Greg Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard, 
51. 
  
 
206
actions in Afghanistan within the Howard government meant that Australia deferred to the 
United States for this first phase of military cooperation under the OEF umbrella.  Howard 
even ran his 2001 election campaign on foreign policy concerns, stressing the critical threat 
posed by terrorism. The next section provides an explanation for the Australian 
commitment in the Iraq War in March 2003 and for stabilization operations starting in July 
of 2003. 
Iraq 
The link between 9/11 and the war in Iraq came into being in a new strategic 
environment where rogue regimes were no longer to be tolerated, especially if the leaders 
of those regimes harboured WMD ambitions. Such was the case with Iraq, North Korea, 
and Iran. Although North Korea was not targeted by the United States to the same extent as 
Iraq, Australia has repeatedly pleaded the case of the nuclear threat posed North Korea. 
This threat was part of its own international security policy and was included as an 
Australian priority during its bilateral interactions with the United States. Australia’s 
approach to the threat of WMDs has been termed “layered defence,” which entails 
contributing to multilateral initiatives against the proliferation of WMDs and participating 
in military coalitions that punish non-compliant states and reinforcing domestic defence.417 
According to the terms of the May 2003 Non-Proliferation Regime, Australia has been a 
supporter of the CTBT, the 2002 NPT Review Conference, the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Convention, and the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and of 
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course, the Australia Group. This involvement in the Non-Proliferation Regime is cited as 
the backdrop for taking a harder stand against Iraq. This has also translated in Australian 
support for American missile defence.  
The Howard government also clearly positioned itself in favour of American action 
in Iraq. If the past can also serve as an indicator, Australia could be counted on by the 
United States to support it in Iraq. In September of 2002, Defence Minister Robert Hill 
acknowledged this by saying that “… you can look at the sort of contributions we’re 
making at the moment, and the contributions that we’ve made in the past to get a 
reasonable sort of assessment of what we might one day be able to do in the future”.418 On 
the same occasion, Hill also mentioned the difficulties such a commitment would impose 
on the ADF, pointing to the limited availability of their military capabilities: “We are very 
stretched. It’s almost an unprecedented level of operational tempo”.419 Although this would 
impose certain constraints on the scope of Australia’s military engagement to the war in 
Iraq, it did not dissuade Canberra. Howard’s firm backing from the government did not 
impose further constraints on engagement and the preparation of Australia’s commitment in 
the Iraq War. 
As early as January 2003, Australia had troops in the region to increase its readiness 
for the anticipated invasion of Iraq and to put additional pressure on Saddam’s regime. As 
an al-Jazeera journalist put it, Iraq is “a long way from home” for a country like 
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Australia.420 However, Australia’s involvement in Iraq is not exactly an outlier. Australia 
has been a consistent US ally in its involvement in the Middle East though the region is not 
directly tied to its national interests.  
Australia’s involvement in the Middle East can be traced back to the end of the Iran-
Iraq War. It sent 96 Australian soldiers as part of a peacekeeping mission in the late 1980s, 
along the Iraq-Iran border. Like Britain, Australia participated in the Gulf War and offered 
military forces to the Gulf in 1998, although these were not needed by the US in the end. 
Since 1991, Australia has also maintained a naval presence in the region, its longest 
running deployment. Canberra’s detachment from the region is clear, however. Unlike 
Britain, Australia has neither made attempts to build a strong connection between the Iraq 
War and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, nor did Canberra attempt to engage diplomatically 
on the MEPP. While the UK made it a point to negotiate progress on the MEPP as part of 
the conditions for its involvement in Iraq, Australia seldom made that connection or 
attempted to tie its commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq to immediate strategic interests in 
the region.  
Rather the threat posed by the Iraq regime has been consistently expressed in 
reference to the threat of WMDs. Echoing the United States’ justification for intervention in 
Iraq, the Howard government argued that 9/11 gave a new sense of urgency to the threat of 
WMDs. As mentioned before, the threat of WMDs was emphasized in the Asian theater. 
Preoccupied with Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, Australia wanted to bring focus to North 
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Korea in its bilateral exchanges with the Washington.421 On numerous occasions, the 
problem of North Korea was posed to officials from the Bush administration as the Howard 
government tried to push the issue higher on the agenda.422 This point was further discussed 
during the annual Australia-US Ministerial Meeting in Washington on October 26, 2002. 
Then, in dozens of speeches given by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in the Fall of 
2002, the threat coming from North Korea and Iraq are depicted with equal gravity. 
Forceful action against Iraq could then act to set a deterrent or a precedent for other regimes 
posing WMD threats. In an address to Parliament on February 4, 2003, Downer asks “If 
Iraq is allowed to develop weapons of mass destruction, what message does it send to 
countries like North Korea?”423  
In the winter of 2003, Howard saw domestic constraints increase against his support 
for the Iraq intervention with manifest divisions within his party. However, Howard 
managed to contain division by remaining elusive: “Parliament had not debated it…”424 In 
avoiding political debate on the issue, Howard relied on a key assumption, namely that 
American military capability, with its new weapons’ technology, would make for a quick 
and decisive victory as had been the case in 1991. Even in the aftermath of the WMD 
debacle, as no weapons were found, Howard stood firm on the idea that both Afghanistan 
and Iraq continued to represent key battlegrounds for global terrorism: “the most immediate 
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security threats to Australia in 2006 come from the interlocking networks of terror, arms 
proliferation and fundamentalist ideology… For Australia, Iraq and Afghanistan are both 
vital battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism.”425 The Iraq War gave Canberra a more 
visible commitment than Afghanistan, which was essential for the weakened Howard 
government. To consolidate its position, the government in Canberra had to appeal for a 
high-level role in Iraq, to demonstrate that military cooperation was not being dictated by 
the Americans with little Australian input. The level of deference to the US was contained, 
when compared with the commitment in Afghanistan. 
The initial Australian commitment to the Iraq War consisted of 2000 military 
personnel from all three services, including 500 SASR. The SAS regiment was on the 
ground on the first day of the Iraq war in the Western part of the country.426 Under code-
name Operation Falconer, Australia operated in support of British and American forces. 
Australia was also heading the multinational operations in the northern Persian Gulf under 
the command of Captain Jones, overseeing Australian, British and American ships.427 The 
stated goal of the mission was to remove the threat of WMDs. As early as April 28, 2003, 
at the Centcom base in Qatar, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, jointly with 
Australian Defence Minister Robert Hill, was announcing cuts in the number of military 
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personnel needed in Iraq.428 Citing that Operations Northern and Southern Watches were no 
longer necessary, that the stabilization phase would be less demanding, and that Iraq no 
longer posed a threat to the region, Rumsfeld discussed General Tommy Franks’ plans to 
adjust the size of the commitment, while the Australians would be sending a peacekeeping 
force.429 But in May 2005, given the worsening conditions on the ground after the initial 
military “victory,” the ADF deployed 450 extra troops. Australia’s role in stabilization 
operations was subsequently held back. Domestic constraints can be cited as an explanation 
for this shift: the strain placed on Australia’s military capabilities, combined with divisions 
within the Howard’s government on Iraq had made any increase in commitment difficult. In 
the next section, I explore the first domestic constraint, the strain put on Australia’s military 
capabilities. This leads to a discussion on regional security, as concurrent military 
engagements narrowed the range of militarily feasible options for Canberra.  
Regional Security: Asia Pacific 
In this section, I assess the salience of security threats in Australia’s immediate region: the 
Asia-Pacific. To measure the impact of regional security concerns on the Australian 
decision-making process leading to a military commitment in the war in Iraq, the key 
indicators from chapter 3 are restated: (1) the involvement or presence of the United States 
in the immediate region of the ally, where a strong presence would alleviate these concerns 
and disengagement exacerbate them; (2) the level of threat, which can be measured by 
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other ADF commitments in the region or the number of criminal and/or hostile incidents 
close to the state’s borders; and (3) fluctuations in military expenditure. These are assessed 
concurrently with American expectations and demands for military cooperation with 
Australia. 
Successive Australian governments have had a predisposition for supporting 
American initiatives, as have the British. This predisposition has been an important driving 
force of Australian foreign and defence policy insofar as it seeks greater American 
involvement in the Pacific region. The necessity of managing the perceived special 
relationship, increasing Australia’s visibility and influence in Washington, and fostering an 
expectation of mutual support on issues of national interest, comprises a strategy seen as 
beneficial to Australia’s security. Furthermore, being perceived as a close ally to the United 
States may also increase Australia’s leverage when dealing with other states, especially in 
the Asian region.430 Underlying this consistent support for American leadership and 
presence in the region is a profoundly realist understanding of interstate interactions. As 
stated by the Foreign Minister, “The United States’ strategic presence and US alliances in 
the region continue to underpin regional stability, by balancing and containing potential 
rivalries”.431 At the same time, Australia has leveraged its position in Asia by tightening its 
bilateral ties with China.  
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The stability of Australia’s immediate neighbourhood is a constant theme for DFAT 
and Defence. As Paul Dibb, former Deputy Secretary for Defence, has said, echoing the 
words of Prime Minister Howard, Australia is confronted with an “arc of instability” in its 
vicinity.432 Through successive foreign and defence policy papers, Australia has declared 
Asia and the Pacific as the key focus of its security, where “…the web of US security 
alliances in the region are the linchpin for regional security and prosperity…”433 Australia 
is an important regional player through its involvement in the South Pacific neighbourhood, 
specifically in East Timor, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea, with the 
Bougainville crisis. The ADF contribution in Bougainville, code-name Operation Belisi II, 
was the leading commitment for the peace monitoring group. In 2003, Australia sent 2000 
military personnel to the Solomon Islands to the Regional Assistance Mission, under code-
named Operation Helpem Fren (“help a friend” in English), a commitment equal in size to 
Australia’s contribution in Iraq.  
Weak states in Australia’s immediate region have all required the attention and 
involvement of the ADF. However, the most pressing preoccupation in the region remains 
Indonesia because of its proximity, the high level of illegal migration and risks of terrorist 
attacks. There has been no alternative to Australian leadership in the South Pacific to 
                                                 
432 Paul Dibb, “The Arc of Instability and the North of Australia: Are They Still Relevant to Australia’s New 
Defence Posture?” (Paper presented at the Charles Darwin Symposium Series, Northern Territory University, 
Darwin, 29-30 September 2003). Howard made a parallel to George Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech during the 
2002 State of the Union Address. Indeed, Prime Minister Howard often referred to an “arc of instability” as 
threatening Australia’s regional interests. See Graeme Dobell, “The ‘Arc of Instability’: the History of an 
Idea”, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of 
Australia’s Defence Policy (Canberra: Australian National University E Press, 2007), 85-104. 
433 Alexander Downer, “Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign Policy Challenge” (Speech at 
the National Press Club, Canberra, May 7, 2002). 
  
 
214
address regional security problems like these. While indicating that the campaign against 
terrorism remains the central challenge, Australia’s foreign policy identifies other areas of 
concern including the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula and Kashmir.434 At the end of 
2002, as Australia was ending a year-long commitment in Afghanistan and drawing up 
contingency plans for Iraq, the ADF had about 2500 deployed personnel in 12 countries 
around the world.435 This represented a high operational tempo for the ADF, the highest 
since World War II.  
 In response to the 9/11 attacks, Australia made a commitment to the United States 
by sending forces in Afghanistan, but it also made a commitment to its own region. 
Canberra has reinforced regional cooperation through intelligence sharing and the 
enhancement of counter-terrorism capabilities. Australia and Indonesia joined forces after 
the 2002 Bali attacks and Australia has also sought bilateral agreements and memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines to enhance regional 
counter-terrorism cooperation.436 Further regional cooperation has also been promoted 
through forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the ASEAN, Regional Forum and the 
APEC Forum.  
However, the achievements of such institutional arrangements remain limited. The 
norm of non-interference has been an impediment to further integration, and expansion has 
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diluted the common purpose of organizations such as ASEAN.437 In other words, the region 
is still far from developing a security community. Indonesia in particular has been a 
constant security preoccupation for Australia, especially with the growing problem of 
illegal migration. Furthermore, Indonesia has had a slow transition from a military 
authoritarian regime to being a democracy, where efforts are further undermined because of 
economic difficulties.438 Even after the accession to independence of East Timor, the 
further disintegration of Indonesia remains a major strategic concern for Australia.439  
 
Figure 6.1 Map of Australia’s immediate neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
 
The Asia Pacific is Australia’s area of primary strategic concern (Figure 6.1). As 
such, defence policy is and will continue to be driven by the Defence of Australia doctrine, 
                                                 
437 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2000/2001 (London: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
438 Paul Dibb, “Indonesia: the key to South-East Asia’s Security”, International Affairs 77, 4 (2001), 829-842. 
439 Donald K. Emmerson, “Will Indonesia Survive?” Foreign Affairs 79, 3 (2000), 95. 
  
 
216
the concept of self-reliance and the display of strong leadership and engagement in its 
immediate neighbourhood. The threat of terrorism increased the salience of security 
concerns in the region especially after the 2002 Bali bombings. Regional security concerns, 
therefore, acted as an important factor in the curtailment of Australia’s commitment to US 
military operations, allowing it to focus on self-sufficient niche contributions in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Contrary to the hypothesis on regional security, as stated in chapter 
3, it seems that an increase in regional security concerns does not increase military 
contributions to US-led coalitions. The relationship leans in the opposite direction, where 
regional security concerns compete with US alliance expectations, leading the allied state to 
make more modest and short-term military contributions because of increased demands 
(real or anticipated) on its armed forces. 
Alternative Explanations 
In this section, I discuss competing explanations to understand Australia’s participation to 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although I will devote less attention to the explanations 
which were previously discussed in chapters 4 and 5, I will focus on arguments that feature 
prominently in the analyses of Australian foreign policy during that period. The main 
arguments are: 1) that Australia’s participation was motivated by striking a deal on a free 
trade agreement with the US; 2) that domestic politics restricted the Howard government’s 
political options when deciding on military commitments in Iraq, as well as further 
commitments in Afghanistan. One difference that stands out in the comparative analysis is 
that domestic politics, understood as opposition voiced by the opposition and public 
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opinion, appear much less important in conventional explanations of Australia’s 
involvement. Indeed, public dissent over Australia’s role in Afghanistan and Iraq has been 
more subdued, when compared with Britain or, a situation that can be attributed to the 
disarray of the opposition Labour Party.    
First, several commentators have opined that Australia’s military contribution to the 
War on Terror was part of a deal to secure a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. 
Although this goal is mentioned as a key strategic objective for DFAT, it is difficult to 
assess if the pursuit of such an agreement was brought up as part of the Australia-US 
negotiations over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, between 2001 and 2003. It is 
conceivable that Australia’s support of American engagements improved the overall 
relationship with advantages that went beyond the security relationship. Statements by the 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer are often ambiguous on this point. In a speech 
delivered to the National Press Club, he states that “Our relationship with the United States 
is vital. But we must work to match the strong security relationship with a much better 
economic relationship. Too often, American decision-makers harm our trade. That is why 
we are seeking to put the economic relationship on a more strategic footing through our 
proposal for a Free Trade Agreement…”440  
On a separate occasion, when addressing an American audience in Dallas, Texas, 
the link between economic and security concern is reaffirmed: “Sometimes it is difficult not 
to get the impression that the maturity of our security relationship is not matched by equally 
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mature economic and commercial relations. I believe that we should match our strong 
security relations with the US with a more sound economic relationship – and on a better 
strategic footing. That is why we are seeking a Free Trade Agreement between our two 
countries.”441 The timing of the speech is impeccable, in the middle of the American 
campaign to recruit allied support for the war in Iraq.442 However, there is evidence to 
suggest that the bilateral FTA negotiations were rather arduous and left important 
Australian grievances unresolved.443 The benefits of a closer US-Australia relationship can 
thus be measured in terms of access which permitted the Australian delegation to bring the 
FTA up the list of priorities, rather than concrete results in Australia’s favour. Therefore, no 
direct link can be established between trade concerns with the United States and Australian 
military commitments to the War on Terror. However, negotiating access was a bilateral 
strategy used by Canberra to leverage its military commitment. 
Furthermore, some concerns have been expressed with regards to the negative 
impacts of 9/11 on Australia’s trade. Much like Canada, Australia is dependent on its 
exports and dependent on the United States for trade. Policy papers have outlined the 
impact of the threat of terrorism on trade flows, but are presented differently than in 
Canada, where security and trade are seen as a trade-off, rather than mutually reinforcing 
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goals as they are in Australia.444 There is little convincing evidence to suggest that concerns 
over trade could have steered Australia’s security relationship with the United States 
especially in the absence of a contiguous border. 
 Second, domestic-level explanations stress the pressures exerted by the opposition 
and public opinion on the Howard government. Here too, popular dissent was heard loud 
and clear with a majority opposing the war in Iraq before the commitment was announced, 
according to polls conducted during the Fall months of 2002.445 The Labour Party also 
voiced strong opposition to the war in Iraq arguing that Australia should go to war only 
with UN approval. Citing past experiences with the UN, Voeten notes that “SC 
authorization was crucial to Australia’s willingness to intervene in East Timor,” for which 
there was bipartisan support and that there were similar expectations regarding Iraq.446 This 
fit with the party line, as debates in the House of Commons grew increasingly 
aggressive.447   
Why was Labour unable to capitalize on public opinion’s negative view of the 
Howard government? On the subject of Australia’s bilateral alliance with the United States 
and the overarching importance of this alliance for Australia’s foreign and defence policy, 
there has always been consistent bipartisan support. This was reflected in the Labour 
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party’s posture: “…Labour carefully maintained open avenues of retreat into realist support 
for the US in the event of unilateral action.”448 Labour even joined the government in 
defeating a motion introduced by the Green party, to condemn military action taken in Iraq 
without UN authorization.449  
On November 12, 2002, as UNMOVIC was preparing for its work in support of 
UNSC 1441 to begin on November 25, the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministers issued a 
joint statement updating the Australian position: “Saddam Hussein accepted resolution 
1441 only with an assertion that Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction. This is 
not the case to the best of our knowledge. Robust inspections will enable this issue to be 
tested.”450 Despite public divisions over Iraq, the Howard government carried on with its 
policy on Iraq, demonstrating that domestic politics did not bear directly on the final 
decision. In the final analysis, Labour party failed to make political gains, as shown by the 
2004 re-election of Howard.  
Conclusion  
By supporting the Bush administration early on, during both the war in Afghanistan and in 
the lead-up to the Iraq War, Prime Minister Howard was able to leverage his support for the 
War on Terror to gain unprecedented access to Washington.451 This access allowed the 
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Prime Minister, as well as his Defence Minister and Foreign Minister, to push for items 
which were high on the Australian agenda, such as the Free Trade agreement, the threat of 
North Korea, and the reinforcement of Australian-American security ties.  
It is important to acknowledge that the US alliance, and the expectations it placed 
on Australian participation, was the most important motive in the decision-making process 
leading to the Australian military commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq. Canberra’s strategy 
between 2001 and 2003 was to make early commitments in support of the United States. 
This strategy allowed Australia to engage in military cooperation at a minimum risk, 
through small and tailored military contributions, but with maximum impact in its ability to 
extract concessions from its American ally.452 The case study analysis also finds support for 
domestic-level constraints, defined as the level of government cohesion and military 
feasibility. The latter placed especially strong constraints on Australian’s military 
cooperation, due to Australia’s many regional security concerns and its level of engagement 
in its immediate neighbourhood. 
This case study led to a counter-intuitive finding with respect to the management of 
regional security threats. In chapter 3, the hypothesis on the relationship between regional 
security concerns and military cooperation with the United States suggests that an increase 
in the former would lead to an increase in the latter, because the allied state would try to 
leverage its commitment to obtain the support of the dominant power for its regional 
ventures. However, looking at the period between 2001 and the present, regional security 
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concerns have acted as a competing demand on the Australian armed forces, ultimately 
resulting in reluctance on the part of Australian decision-makers to make increase its 
commitment in Afghanistan or Iraq. In the long term, the hypothesis holds, but in the short 
term, concerns over the operational tempo of the military are paramount.  
In the final analysis, Canberra leveraged its military commitment across issue-areas 
and enhanced its alliance with Washington, by re-enforcing intelligence and defence 
relationship, by gaining greater access to the President and his senior officials, and by 
drawing attention to Asia, encouraging greater American involvement in the region. The 
Howard government also pushed to accelerate negotiations over a bilateral free trade 
agreement with the United States, a mission he may have accomplished as a result of 
greater Australia-US relations and more frequent interactions.   
Table 6.2 Comparative Military Expenditure of Australia [2000; 2008] 
 
 2000 2008 
Local Currency m.dollars 12,435 21,935 
US $m. 11,057 15,321 
As Percentage of GDP 1.9 1.9 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009). 
 
To the extent that the ADF will be increasingly called upon for operations with the US, or 
solicited for stabilization operations in its immediate region, we are likely to see a force 
structure prioritizing the army. This is reflected in the government’s decision to increase the 
size of the army by two battalions of 1000 to 1500 soldiers in 2006 (from six to eight 
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battalions).453 Although military expenditures have increased by over 70% since 2000, they 
have remained stable as a percentage of the GDP (Table 6.2) with an increase of almost 
3000 military personnel over the same period.  
The support offered to the United States by Australia, apparent with Australia’s 
continued involvement in Iraq through to 2009, has been nuanced under the new Rudd 
government. Without underestimating the importance of the US alliance for Australian 
interests, he says that “…our alliance with the United States does not automatically 
mandate our compliance with every element of US foreign policy.”454 This echoes nicely 
what was told to Richard Armitage by an Australian official: “You Americans have got to 
understand that after Vietnam we’ll never give you a blank cheque again.”455 Although 
Vietnam represents a closer strategic interest than Iraq geopolitically, there is an established 
practice where Australia will defend its alliance beyond its immediate region of strategic 
interest. However, when military cooperation imposes domestic political costs in the end, 
as it did in the cases of Vietnam and Iraq, such commitments are difficult to sustain 
politically and are likely to undermine Australian resolve over the long term. As a result, 
the appeal of the “niche contribution” will be appealing for military interventions that are in 
support of the US alliance but not directly relevant for Australia’s strategic interests.  
 
                                                 
453 Australia. Department of Defence, “A Stronger Army: Two More Battalions”, Defence August (2006), 
Online. http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/200608/. 
454 Cited in Frank Frost, “Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2006”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 61, 3 (2007), 414. 
455 Cited in Beazley, “Thinking Security: Influencing National Security Strategy from the Academy: An 
Australian Experience”, 17. 
  
Conclusion 
Peace, Commerce, and honest friendship with all nations – entangling alliances with none. 
 
 Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826 
3rd President of the US, 1801-1809 
 
For the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, engaging the United States begs 
caution. Since the end of World War II, their foreign and defence policy was decisively 
harmonized with their American ally. The end of the Cold War only reinforced American 
leadership as Western alliances such as NATO endured. This is not to say that there have 
not been major disagreements between the United States and its allies. Even special allies, 
the focus of the three case studies presented here, have turned down opportunities for 
military cooperation with the United States. The War in Vietnam and the recent War in Iraq 
are two famous episodes, showing that alliance support is not unconditional. Despite these 
disagreements, close allies have not lost any privileges, such as access to intelligence or 
American military technology. Why is this so? Special allies have strong incentives to 
engage in military cooperation with the United States but domestic-level constraints 
mitigate the equation. 
This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its 
special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military 
cooperation, while two intervening variables, the level of government cohesion and military 
capabilities, determine its implementation. By examining British, Canadian and Australian 
decision-making during the lead-up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this study also 
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shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through 
bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. 
This research puzzle makes a contribution to alliance theory. In the absence of a 
credible challenger to American primacy, we are compelled to look at how the United 
States has managed its alliance partners so successfully. In this context, understanding the 
relationship between the United States and its allies becomes crucial, as a prominent feature 
of the lasting unipolar distribution of power. This is especially important in times of war, 
when the US demonstrates the might of its global power. Furthermore, it allows secondary 
states an opportunity to renegotiate their alliance with the US when considering military 
cooperation. The stated goal of this dissertation was thus to develop a theory of foreign 
policy which accounts for allied contributions in times of war by examining the United 
States and its closest allies, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 
In this concluding chapter, I summarize the theoretical argument and main findings. 
I will also present an overview of the case studies, showing how America’s special allies 
responded to 9/11 and joined the international campaign against terrorism. Finally, I 
introduce avenues for future research and address the policy relevance of this study in 
regards to asymmetric security cooperation. 
Great Expectations: Special Allies and Military Cooperation 
The field of International Relations theory is rich with explanations about the United 
States’ management of the international system as the dominant global power. Realist 
authors argue that the power disparities are so great that America is likely to remain 
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unchallenged and that the balance of power will remain unchanged for some time.456 
Tenants of liberalism tend to focus on international institutions, as providing key 
constraints on the exercise of unbridled hegemonic power, or focus on domestic institutions 
to explain the emergence of a peaceful democratic order based on a cohesive group of core 
states that will not challenge each other to war.457 Finally the constructivist school points to 
the emergence of international norms that constrain states into compliant behaviour.458  
All three schools have made important contributions to alliance theory but are ill-
suited to explain foreign policy outcomes. Indeed, many of the macro-level theories 
discussed in chapter 2 were not designed to explain foreign policy decision-making. 
Similarly, many domestic-level explanations, such as democratic peace theory, attempt to 
explain international outcomes, rather than state behaviour in a specific context. Therein 
lays the theoretical appeal of the neoclassical realist approach, where the attempt is to 
introduce state-level variables into the analysis, as a complement to systemic variables, in 
order to gain a more contextual understanding of foreign policy decision-making. 
Introduced in the 1990s, there is room for scholarly contributions and theoretical 
innovations in this burgeoning research area. For example, most research conducted under 
the neoclassical realist research agenda focuses on the grand strategies of modern great 
                                                 
456 Brooks and Wohlforth, A World Out of Balance. 
457 Ikenberry, America Unrivaled. 
458 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. 
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powers.459 The theoretical avenue proposed by neoclassical realists is equally well-suited in 
the study of the behaviour of secondary states, though this is rarely undertaken: “Unit-level 
variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states – great powers as well as 
lesser states – to respond to systemic imperatives.”460 In my analysis, state responses to 
international threats are the product of an asymmetric bargaining game, where secondary 
states are inclined to respond to American expectations but are limited in their ability to 
deliver on those commitments domestically. Alliance expectations are thus negotiated with 
reference to resources that can be mobilized for military cooperation. There is thus a three-
step decision-making process that we can identify to make sense of foreign and defence 
policy-making, starting from the assessment of international threats by state leaders, to the 
consideration of options in response to this threat, and finally, the extraction of societal 
resources to implement the plan.461  
The point of departure is thus relative power distribution at the systemic level. 
Because I focus on three of the United States’ closest allies, this implies that these partners 
share similar external constraints: due to the proximity of their security relationship with 
the United States, international assessments are evaluated through the prism of this 
dominant relationship. To explain the variation in foreign and defence policy responses, we 
                                                 
459 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategies Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993); Zakaria, From Wealth to Power; Randall L. Schweller, 
Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  
460 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the 
States, and Foreign Policy”, in Steve E. Lobell, Norrin P. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds), 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 
461 Id. 
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need to account for interactions between the dominant power and its allies, but also 
understand how domestic constraints limit the options of secondary allied states.  
Alliance Decision-Making from 2001 to 2003 
When President George W. Bush presented the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) on 
September 17, 2002, his speech outlined a set of renewed expectations of the United States’ 
allies in the post-9/11 context. Though the NSS clearly reinforced Washington’s 
independence in drafting its grand strategy, as was apparent by the stated preference for 
coalitions of the willing and the concept of pre-emption, the need for strong alliances 
remained an underlying theme. For example, NATO commitments were emphasized, 
reminding members to bring their military capabilities up to par. Moreover, President Bush 
identified the need for more military bases for its troops abroad in anticipation of longer 
deployments.462 To gain a fuller picture of intra-alliance interactions, the analysis has also 
taken into account what allies want from the United States in studying decision-making 
processes leading to military cooperation. 
The UK 
To the UK, its alliance with the US is priceless. The Anglo-American alliance is a priority 
above all other foreign policy goals. The term appeasement is often used as a rhetorical tool 
to criticize inaction in the face of threats. Successive British prime ministers have used this 
device to defend the special relationship on the basis of internationalism and to uphold their 
                                                 
462 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington D.C.: 
White House, 2002). 
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role in preventing American isolationism. The UK needs the US to have a foreign policy 
worthy of great power status. At the outset, the UK shares important strategic interests with 
the United States, notably in the Middle East where British presence has been consistent in 
supporting American involvement. London also vies for a leadership position in NATO, 
through initiatives such as leading the International Stabilization and Assistance Force or 
ISAF at the beginning of the American invasion of Afghanistan.  
An underlying assumption for British decision-makers is that proximity to the 
United States translates into a degree of influence and leverage worth pursuing. The 
evidence from the case studies suggests otherwise. The UK appears as the least independent 
of the three special allies. By tying its foreign policy so closely to American demands, it 
enhances its great power status but undermines its autonomy. The UK, as a great power, 
could withstand American pressures and act autonomously. However, dependence on the 
US in upholding its great power status has had the opposite effect. For London, the risk of 
being marginalized by Washington is worse than the risk of disapproval on the domestic 
front. Six years of involvement in an unpopular, American-led war serve as evidence for 
this claim. The Iraq War both disabled the New Labour Party and ostracized Tony Blair, 
once appreciated as a charismatic Prime Minister.   
 Nevertheless, key domestic constraints mitigate the influence of US demands on 
British military commitments, as the case studies show. I have highlighted the causal 
significance of two, by tracing fluctuations in the level of cohesion within the Blair 
government and by weighing concerns over the availability of military capabilities. These 
factors balance US expectations of its closest allies. 
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Canada 
As long as Canada is not seen as a security liability to the United States, it can get away 
with a lot in Washington. In other words, security and economic interdependence allows 
Ottawa some flexibility in managing its alliance with the US. Canadian strategic interests 
have been limited to its immediate region and have not relied on its ability to project power 
abroad independently from the US. Because Canada’s immediate region is relatively 
secure, it looks to the US for initiatives on international engagements. Following 9/11, 
Canada’s priorities were dictated by its geographical position: security concerns on the 
continent and at the border dominated the agenda, but Ottawa was still able to make a 
commitment to the War in Afghanistan.  
The case study analysis explains Canada’s military commitments between 2001 and 
2003. It demonstrates how American expectations about Canada’s military role structured 
the type of commitment made to the War in Afghanistan. These were relatively low, given 
the strong border security concerns shared by the two countries. It also shows that in the 
Fall of 2001, few domestic constraints operated beyond the limits inherent to Canada’s 
military capacity. The Chrétien government was cohesive which translated into a swift 
implementation of Canada’s military contribution. Things changed in the Fall of 2002 as 
the government’s cohesion was undermined by a battle for the leadership of the Liberal 
party. Over the same period, an American request for a renewed commitment in 
Afghanistan increased the pressure on its military capabilities. As such, both sets of 
domestic constraints are seen as dominant factors in explaining Ottawa’s decision to opt out 
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of the Iraq War, despite strong but short-lived diplomatic consequences. This is the doctrine 
of selective engagement at its best.463  
The analysis presented here shows that decision-makers assess US expectations in 
order to determine the type of military commitment to make. To the extent that what the US 
requested was feasible militarily for Canada and that Chrétien led a cohesive government, 
these demands were met and implemented with a high degree of deferral to American 
leadership. Following my line of argument, the imminent change in leadership in late 2003, 
combined with overstretched military capabilities made a commitment in Iraq unlikely. 
Domestic constraints also contributed to changes in the implementation of the Canadian 
strategy in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, commitments would need to appear free 
from American influence, though the price of operating more independently was high: by 
taking over ISAF, extending the engagement and eventually moving the CF to a more 
volatile and dangerous region. This significantly raised the profile of Canada in the War on 
Terror and represented the most significant military engagement undertaken by the 
Canadian Forces since the Korean War. Canada’s response played well with domestic 
audiences: Ottawa offered support for Afghanistan on moral grounds and turned its back on 
the controversial invasion of Iraq. 
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Australia 
Australia both benefits and suffers from its insularity in the Pacific region. On the one 
hand, it enjoys natural defences since it is surrounded by water and fairly isolated from 
other major powers that could compete for regional influence. On the other hand, its Pacific 
neighbourhood is fraught with instability, such as the case of East Timor, and Australia 
must manage this insecurity constantly. Australia is at a safe distance from potential 
regional contenders but it is also far from its closest allies, the United States and United 
Kingdom. Its strong alliance with the United States allows Australia to promote its primary 
interests: having a greater presence in Asia and upholding the regional balance of power.  
Following 9/11, there has been a strong convergence between Australia and the 
United States on the perception of international threats. The 2002 Bali bombings, resulting 
in a high number of Australian casualties, rallied the Howard government more closely to 
the Bush administration’s framing of the terrorist threat and the broader Global War on 
Terror label. The decision to take part in the American-led coalition was also motivated by 
the need to strengthen the Australia-US alliance because Australia depends on American 
support to establish its regional leadership. Although there is an expectation of mutual 
support, Australia has traditionally opted for a low investment/low risk approach in meeting 
American expectations and soliciting assistance from the alliance.  
The explanation also focuses on domestic constraints to explain Australian military 
cooperation with the United States during the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq. The period 
between 2001 and 2003 is characterized by fluctuations in the level of government 
cohesion under Howard and a high operational tempo for the ADF. This translated into 
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niche commitments and deferral to American leadership in Afghanistan, but a more 
cautious approach in Iraq. The case study shows that regional commitments undertaken by 
Australia placed strong constraints on how it could assist the United States, imposing limits 
on its military capabilities. 
In sum, structural differences in power translate into different evaluations of threat. 
While the interests of the dominant partner are truly global, smaller alliance partners have 
interests that are more regional in scope. Reiterated, my argument stresses that alliance 
expectations have a more direct influence on the decision-making process of secondary 
states when the use of force is at stake. As such, political elites must balance their 
assessments of US expectations for military cooperation with domestic constraints.  
Referring back to the typology of strategies for asymmetric security cooperation, as 
presented in chapter 1, a basic trade-off exists for secondary allied states: strategies to 
secure closer cooperation with the United States minimize decision-making input and 
flexibility; while opting out of US plans purchases autonomy at the risk of losing alliance 
privileges. The main alliance benefits are status for the UK, international relevance for 
Canada and regional security guarantees for Australia. In the end, Canada has the least to 
lose from opting out of US plans, since the impact of any retributions are likely to be just as 
costly for the US due to the interconnected nature of the relationship. A senior Canadian 
defence official noted that Canada was temporarily excluded from ‘Four Eyes’ but quickly 
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reinstated due to the technical difficulties that this exclusion entailed for the UK, Australia 
and the United States.464  
Future Research and Policy Relevance 
In the final analysis, each special ally is concerned with enhancing its bilateral relationship 
with the United States. Even when the US seeks out its allies for political or military 
support, it seems that the American willingness to engage in military operations with its 
closest alliance partners is not always forthcoming. The extent to which the United States 
needs its allies is unclear and deserves further research. On a few occasions, American 
officials have even expressed weariness with regards to allied meddling in the conduct of 
military campaigns.465 In the case of Afghanistan, for example, it has been reported that 
Washington “want[s] to maintain US military flexibility to operate […] with minimal non-
US interference.466 These additional questions should further our understanding on the 
complexity of intra-alliance interactions, not only between the dominant power and its 
partners, but between the equal powers within the alliance. 
 A second avenue of research looks to the impact of the democratic system of 
government on alliance interactions and military cooperation. What is absent from the 
literature is the extent to which such bargaining is public and has signaling effects between 
allies. Thus, due to the democratic nature of their political system, Canada, the UK and 
Australia may send strong signals to the United States with regards to the strength of their 
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resolve in committing troops to a particular military operation. Both the UK and Australia 
pledged a strong political commitment to the United States in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, 
in the fall of 2002. However, as public dissent was increasing on the domestic front, the 
fall-out from the interaction between government and opposition sends a different signal to 
the United States. Beyond the initial displays of political support, will the ally be politically 
capable of staying the course?  
Political competition on the domestic front can be seen as casting doubts on the 
ally’s resolve to stay engaged in military cooperation with the United States. This signaling 
effect is indicative of a state’s ability to see through its commitment in favour of the use of 
force and its resolve in supporting a longer term commitment once the war has been 
initiated.467 Through comparative case studies, it would be possible to uncover if 
alignments between government and opposition enhance or undermine a state’s reputation 
for reliability with its dominant ally.468 According to this logic, the reputation for reliability 
will be affected by domestic competition.   
The impact of reputation is well studied in the study of conflict, as a reputation for 
resolve translates into more credible threats by states, but less so in the study of military 
cooperation.469 The impact of reputation on alliance relationships is not well understood, 
but the underlying logic in both contexts is similar: “honored commitments should build 
credible reputations, increasing the likelihood that other leaders expect future commitments 
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will be honored, too”.470 The challenge is to demonstrate that concerns over reputation are 
part of the decision-making process leading to military cooperation with the United 
States.471  
In terms of policy relevance, this project offers several recommendations for 
secondary states contemplating military cooperation with their dominant alliance partner. 
First, the research shows that tying foreign policy decisions on military cooperation more 
closely to domestic constraints can increase the level of flexibility when weighing out their 
options. The cases demonstrate that allied states tend to privilege the bilateral level of 
interaction when negotiating such commitments with the United States. Secondary states 
are better off using a combination of negotiation strategies when engaging with their 
dominant partner. For example, the UK, Canada and Australia could benefit from working 
more closely together, rather than channeling their interactions through the dominant 
alliance partner.  
Second, this line of research would encourage decision-makers to think more 
pragmatically about coalitions of the willing as a model for engagement in military 
cooperation. On the one hand, attempts to channel military interventions through the UN 
appear to offer secondary states greater leverage, because multilateral processes can act to 
restrain a dominant power like the United States. On the other hand, tying the decision-
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making process on military cooperation to the will of an international body undermines the 
flexibility of secondary powers just as it does for the leading power. 
Conclusion 
The decision to launch the war in Afghanistan was directly motivated by the September 11 
attacks. The conviction that the Taliban regime was a terrorist harbour quickly brought 
together a coalition of nations in favour of bringing down the regime to address the threat 
of terrorism. The direct link between terrorism as experienced on 9/11 and Afghanistan 
garnered support for the United States which was not replicated in the case of the Iraq War.  
Mutual expectations of alliance commitments are periodically readjusted at critical 
junctures. 9/11 and the new American grand strategy that followed was a crucial moment 
for its alliance relationships. Immediately after 9/11, Canada, Britain and Australia quickly 
demonstrated their support for the United States. However, in planning a response to the 
September 11 attacks, each state pursued different priorities. For Britain, the dominant 
concern was to secure the title of closest ally and increase its influence over the conduct of 
the war on terrorism; Canada’s priority was focused on the border, demonstrating extreme 
caution in internationalizing the war on terrorism precipitously; and finally, for Australia, 
regional concerns were dominant, as it saw an opportunity for greater American 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Almost a decade after the event, the landscape has changed 
from the initial adjustment period. The UK is strengthening the European dimension of its 
security but is careful not to undermine the transatlantic link. Canada has reformed its 
military and invested in strengthening its security at home. Australia, for its part, has turned 
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to China as a result of increasing economic ties, and thus introducing certain caveats in its 
relationship with the United States.472 
Even if alliance relationships endure and become institutionalized, allies will have 
individual assessments of international threats that may or may not be considered in the 
same order of priority by their alliance partners. Secondary states respond to threats in their 
immediate region but leave international burdens to the initiative of the dominant power. In 
other words, not all states, even allied states, perceive threats similarly given asymmetric 
capabilities. As such, secondary states rely on the United States in responding to 
international threats and are guided by American expectations when taking part in the 
effort. Although great expectations are often frustrated, managing each partner’s aspirations 
is the key to any enduring alliance.  
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